Solorio v. Larranaga
Decision Date | 16 June 2020 |
Docket Number | Case No. 1:19-cv-00716-DAD-SAB (PC) |
Parties | JACOB RAY SOLORIO, Formerly known as Brianna Nycole Solorio Plaintiff, v. LISA LARRANAGA, et al. Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR RELIEF, FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER
Plaintiff Jacob Ray Solorio1 is a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff's complaint in this action was filed on May 22, 1019. (ECF No. 1.)
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/// On November 27, 2019, the Court screened Plaintiff's complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint.
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on January 6, 2020. On January 23, 2020, the Court screened Plaintiff's first amended complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 13.)
On March 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 17.)
On April 9, 2020, the Court screened Plaintiff's second amended complaint and found that Plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff was granted thirty days in which to file a second amended complaint, but Plaintiff failed to do so. (Id.) Accordingly, on May 20, 2020, the Court issued an order to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim for relief, failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order. (ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff failed to respond to the Court's May 20, 2020 order. Therefore, dismissal is warranted.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that "fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or that "seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Lisa Larranaga, identified as a Wellpath Program Manager ("Larranaga"); (2) Duncan Denise, identified as a captain ("Duncan")2; (3) Lieutenant Kirk ("Kirk"); (4) Monique Brown, identified as a program director ("Brown"); (5) Jeff Dirske, identified as a sheriff-coroner ("Dirske"); and (6) the Stanislaus County Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department").3 (SAC 1-3.)
Plaintiff's first cause of action is described as "access to treatment concerning medical/psychological condition[,] cruel and unus[ua]l punishment[, and] due process deprivation of mental health treatments."4 (SAC 3.) Since 2015, Plaintiff has been a pretrial detainee incarcerated at the Stanislaus County Jail. (SAC 4.) Plaintiff is a transgender inmate and suffers from gender dysphoria. (Id.) For over four years, Plaintiff alleges they have diligently requested psychological treatments by a competent mental health provider that specializes, treats, and isexperienced with transsexual persons. (Id.) Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Larranaga failed to secure psychological treatment, Defendants Duncan, Kirk, and Brown, denied treatment, and Dirske has supervisor liability. (SAC 3.) Plaintiff's complaint is separated into sections for each individual Defendant in relation to the first cause of action, and the Court now turns to these individual sections.
Plaintiff alleges the following:
(SAC 6-8.)
Plaintiff puts forth the following allegations as to Defendant Larranaga:
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