Solsvik v. Maremar Compania Naviera, SA
Citation | 399 F. Supp. 712 |
Decision Date | 06 August 1975 |
Docket Number | C75-187S.,No. C75-186S,C75-186S |
Parties | Nils M. SOLSVIK, Plaintiff, v. MAREMAR COMPANIA NAVIERA, S.A., a corporation, and Union Commercial Steamship Co., a corporation, Defendants. Clayton R. LaPLANT, Plaintiff, v. MAREMAR COMPANIA NAVIERA, S.A., a corporation, and Union Commercial Steamship Co., a corporation, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
Harold F. Vhugen, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff.
Theodore A. LeGros, Thomas F. Paul, Seattle, Wash., for defendant.
Solsvik and LaPlant are longshoremen in the employ of Rothschild Washington International Stevedoring Co., an independent contractor engaged by defendants to discharge cargo from defendants' vessel M/V AETOS in the Port of Seattle. Plaintiffs allege injuries suffered in the course of discharge operations on January 3 and January 6, 1975, respectively, and contend that the injuries were the proximate result of the negligence of defendants.
The cases are now before the Court on cross-motions to strike pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b), and, insofar as the two cases involve identical issues of law, they will be treated together.
Defendants' answers contain affirmative defenses that seek to impose reductions on plaintiffs' potential recoveries by reason of the alleged concurrent negligence of Rothschild. The affirmative defenses seek to reduce each plaintiff's recovery by the combined percentage of contributory negligence of the respective plaintiff and Rothschild, or, in the alternative, by the greater of (1) the amount of benefits recovered by each plaintiff under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act1 or (2) fifty percent.
Plaintiffs move to strike these affirmative defenses, contending that the law, specifically the 1972 Amendments (which became effective November 26, 1972, and are hereinafter referred to as the "Amendments")2 to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, does not countenance reduction of plaintiffs' recoveries under any of the theories proposed by defendants. I agree.
The Amendments manifest the balance achieved by Congress among the competing rights and obligations of shipowners, stevedores and longshoremen. If, indeed, inequities exist under the Congressional scheme, then relief therefrom must be sought through legislation. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corporation, 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952).
Accordingly, I choose to follow the reasoning expressed in Lucas v. "Brinknes" Schiffahrts Ges., 379 F. Supp. 759 (E.D.Pa.1974)3 and hold that defendants are unable to impose the reductions sought against plaintiffs' potential judgments. Plaintiffs' motions to strike affirmative defenses are therefore granted.
The complaint in each case alleges the injury to plaintiff, and asserts that ". . . defendants were negligent and failed to furnish plaintiff with a safe place to work." The complaints further state that plaintiffs suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of defendants.
Defendants contend that the failure to provide a safe place to work is no longer actionable in light of the Amendments, and that each such allegation should be stricken for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
There is no doubt but that the Amendments restrict a longshoreman's cause of action against a shipowner to that grounded in negligence:
33 U.S.C. § 905(b).
The legislative history of the Amendments indicates that Congress intended that a uniform national standard be applied to the conduct of shipowners:
4
The substantive content of the negligence standard to be applied is linked to traditional land-based negligence law:
"The purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a vessel in the same position he would be if he were injured in non-maritime employment ashore, insofar as bringing a third party damage action is concerned, and not to endow him with any special maritime theory of liability or cause of action under whatever judicial nomenclature it may be called, such as `unseaworthiness', `nondelegable duty', or the like."5
To the extent that an allegation of failure to provide a safe place to work might, prior to the Amendments, have implied the existence of a nondelegable duty to do so, and to the extent that such an allegation formerly brought to bear strict liability under the related warranty of seaworthiness, the allegation is no longer actionable under the Amendments.6
However, placed in its proper post-Amendment context, such an allegation may state a cause of action consistent with application of the appropriate standard of negligence. The Supreme Court has...
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