Solyom v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Com'n, MARYLAND-NATIONAL

• Decision Date: 08 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 337,MARYLAND-NATIONAL,337
• Citation: 53 Md.App. 280,452 A.2d 1283
• Parties: Richard L. SOLYOM v. TheCAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 280

53 Md.App. 280

452 A.2d 1283

Richard L. SOLYOM v. The MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION.

No. 337.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 8, 1982.

Tracy E. Mulligan, Rockville, and Edwin Vieira, Jr., Manassas, Va., for appellant.

Hugh L. Reilly, Kensington, and Henry Mark Holzer, Mount Kisco, N.Y., for amicus curiae, Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Ron Paul, U.S. Congress.

Arthur S. Drea, Jr., Silver Spring, with whom were Sanford E. Wool and Laurie Sue Borman, Silver Spring, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before MORTON, MOYLAN and MOORE, JJ.

MORTON, Judge.

The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, a public body engaged in the governmental function of furnishing parks and public recreation areas in the Maryland-Washington Metropolitan District in Prince George's and Montgomery Counties, brought a petition for condemnation in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of a 1,253 square foot parcel of land in order to complete the development of a local park. Richard L. Solyom, owner of a one-ninth interest in the property, counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that the Commission was obligated under Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, to "tender gold and silver coin, dollar for dollar, in payment of the debt determined by the condemnation judgment ... to be owed...." The Commission moved to strike and dismiss the counterclaim and for summary judgment thereon. The trial judge (Fairbanks, J.), concluding that Article 1 did not compel payment in specie, dismissed the counterclaim and Solyom filed this timely appeal from that dismissal and various other orders and rulings predicated upon it. ¹

The constitutional provision upon which appellant relies for the proposition that in order to be fully compensated for his interest in the land he must be paid in specie is Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution, which provides:

"No State shall ... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts...."

As appealing as the argument may seem to economists such as Mr. Solyom, Dr. John A. Sparks, Dr. Philip D. Bradley, and Dr. Elgin Groseclose, ² and Senator Jesse Helms and Representative Ron Paul of the United States Congress, ³ it must fail.

Although some authorities see a serious question as to whether the framers of the constitution intended to prohibit the use of legal tender paper money, ⁴ it was soon taken for granted in this country that the federal government did have the power to emit paper money. Congress, as early as the War of 1812, directed the issue of United States notes as currency with the quality of legal tender and in 1884, in the last of the Legal Tender Cases, the Supreme Court determined that Congress could do so in time of peace as well as war. Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L.Ed. 204 (1884). The Court there stated that Congress, under its powers to borrow money on the credit of the United States and to issue circulating notes for the money borrowed, was authorized to establish a uniform national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency, dollar for dollar, legal tender for the payment of all debts, public and private.

Pursuant to its power over the monetary system, Congress in 1933 provided, as currently set out at 31 U.S.C.A., § 463, that:

"Every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no such provision shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred. Every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts."

The Supreme Court, concluding in Norman v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407, 79 L.Ed. 885 (1935), that "gold clause" stipulations in preexisting local governmental and private obligations, interfering as they did with Congress's monetary power, could be abrogated by that statute, stated:

"In the currency as thus provided, States and municipalities must receive their taxes; railroads,...