Somers v. ALDINE INDEPENDENT SCH. DIST., Civ. A. No. 75-H-2106.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 75-H-2106.
• Citation: 464 F. Supp. 900
• Parties: Inez B. SOMERS v. ALDINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

464 F. Supp. 900

Inez B. SOMERS v. ALDINE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT.

Civ. A. No. 75-H-2106.

United States District Court, S. D. Texas, Houston Division.

February 12, 1979.

Thomas R. Beech, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

L. Chris Butler, Reynolds, White, Allen & Cook, Houston, Tex., for defendant.

Memorandum and Order:

SINGLETON, District Judge.

Inez B. Somers, plaintiff in this action, is seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., for the allegedly discriminatory actions of her former employer, Aldine Independent School District.

Trial of this action was held before the court on January 3, 1979. This Memorandum and Order constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows.

Inez B. Somers was employed by the Aldine Independent School District (hereinafter referred to as "Aldine") as a teacher from August 19, 1970, through January 3, 1973. During that period of time, Aldine had a maternity policy which required pregnant employees to either take a mandatory leave of absence or be terminated following the third month of pregnancy. This mandatory leave was without pay and without any assurance of reinstatement. In addition, Aldine's sick leave policy did not include pregnancy.

On or about January 2, 1973, Ms. Somers informed Mr. Jack Welch, principal of Hambrick Junior High School where she was a teacher, that she was seven months pregnant. The next day, Mr. Welch informed Ms. Somers that she could no longer teach in Aldine because she was pregnant and that she must either take a leave of absence or be terminated. Ms. Somers refused to request a leave of absence and requested that she be allowed to continue teaching until the delivery of her child and that she be allowed to use her accumulated sick leave following the delivery, after which she would return to her teaching duties. Her request was refused in all respects.

There was no investigation on the part of Aldine as to Ms. Somers' physical ability to continue teaching. That aspect of the problem was not a factor in Aldine's decision to terminate her. In fact, Ms. Somers informed Mr. Welch, the Board of Trustees of Aldine Independent School District (hereinafter referred to as "the Board"), and the Commissioner of Education of the State of Texas (hereinafter referred to as "the Commissioner") that her doctor was in favor of her continued employment. The affidavit of Dr. J. L. Spezia supports Ms. Somers' contention that her pregnancy would have no detrimental effect on her continued employment. The fact that Ms. Somers continued teaching past the three-month-cutoff date through the seventh month of pregnancy without any problems to herself or her job further demonstrates her ability to perform her teaching duties unhindered by her pregnancy.

In further support of this court's finding that Ms. Somers was terminated solely because she was pregnant is Mr. Welch's testimony that up to January 3, 1973, Ms. Somers had performed all her duties well, and he had no criticism of her ability and performance as a teacher.

Following her termination on January 3, 1973, Ms. Somers appealed to the Board and filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as "EEOC"). The Board affirmed her termination as did the Commissioner of Education on Ms. Somers' appeal. The EEOC concluded there was reasonable cause to believe Ms. Somers' termination was the result of a sexually discriminatory maternity policy in violation of Title VII. When conciliation efforts by the EEOC failed to resolve the matter, Ms. Somers requested and received a "right-to-sue" letter and subsequently filed this lawsuit within ninety days.

Discrimination in employment which is based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions was first prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal Employment Act of 1972. Guidelines promulgated by the EEOC in 1972 state, inter alia, that exclusion from employment because of pregnancy is a violation of Title VII, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10. Eighteen federal district courts and seven federal courts of appeals which have considered the issue of pregnancy-based discrimination in employment have held that such discrimination is prohibited by Title VII.

Regardless of this history, the Supreme Court in 1976 held that an employer's disability plan which excluded pregnancy-related disabilities was not violative of Title VII. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). In 1977 that Court denied sick leave benefits to pregnant employees in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977).

On October 31, 1978, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended through Public Law 95-555. Civil Rights Act of 1964—Pregnancy Discrimination, Pub.L.No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1979) (to be codified as 42 U.S.C 2000e-2(k)). This Act is intended to clarify Congress's original intent to include pregnancy-based discrimination in its prohibition of sex discrimination in employment. The committee report on Public Law 95-555 explicitly rejects the Supreme Court's holdings in both Gilbert and Satty and endorses the dissenting Justices' opinion in Gilbert as a correct interpretation of Title VII. H.R.Rep.No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 6515-6531.

In view of Public Law 95-555, the facts of this case conclusively establish that Ms. Somers was discriminated against on the basis of sex in that she was denied sick leave with pay and ultimately terminated solely because she was pregnant. Furthermore, the evidence established that only pregnant female employees were required by Aldine to take mandatory, unpaid leave. Male employees suffering temporary physical disabilities were not required to take mandatory, unpaid sick leave or face termination because of any temporary...