Somers v. Gen. Elec. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:20-CV-00704-WSH-CRE |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | BRUCE SOMERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHER SIMILARILY SITUATED; Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant, |
Cynthia Reed Eddy Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
This civil action involves Plaintiff Bruce Somers, who was formerly employed by Defendant General Electric Company (“GE”). Plaintiff brings this lawsuit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated to recover wages for earned but unused vacation time from Defendant. Plaintiff's complaint sets forth claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and a violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”), 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq. See Compl. (ECF No. 1-2). This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
Presently before the court is a motion by Defendant for summary judgment with respect to all claims. (ECF No. 23). For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Plaintiff began working for Defendant on July 9, 1990, at its facility in Grove City, Pennsylvania. Defendant's Concise Statement of Material Facts (“CSMF”) (ECF No. 25) at ¶1.[1]Prior to February 25, 2019, “Plaintiff was classified as a non-exempt employee and paid on an hourly basis at an hourly rate of $33.86.” Id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiffs employment was governed by an employment handbook (“Handbook”), which provided vacation and time-off policies. The Handbook provided the following policy for employees who leave the company: “If you earn vacation under the Annual Vacation Allotment Method, you (or your estate) will be paid for any unused vacation days when you leave the Company for any reason, including resignation, discharge, retirement, layoff, disability or death.” Id. at ¶ 5. “Under the Hourly Vacation and Other Time Off Policy, employees who were hired before June 18, 2007, including Plaintiff, accrued paid vacation benefits under the Annual Vacation Allotment Method.” Id. at ¶ 10.
“Effective February 25, 2019, [Defendant] and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation (“Wabtec”) closed a corporate transaction in which Wabtec acquired the [Defendant].” Id. at ¶ 14. “Prior to the closing of the [] transaction on February 25, 2019, Plaintiff received a letter signed by Scott Wahlstrom, Executive Vice President, Human Resources for Wabtec, which indicated that ‘Wabtec plans to offer employment to all [Defendant] employees who are actively employed on the date that the transaction closes.'” Id. at ¶27. That letter indicated that there would be no changes to the number of vacation days earned and that vacation would not reset on the date the transaction closes. Id. At ¶¶ 29-30. That letter provided that Plaintiff's employment would automatically transfer to Wabtec unless Plaintiff affirmatively rejected the offer. Id. at ¶ 33. Plaintiff did not reject the offer and began working for Wabtec. Id. at ¶ 36.
“GE and Wabtec had an agreement relating to [Defendant] employees' earned but unused vacation under the Hourly Vacation and Other Time Off Policy.” Id. at ¶ 18. The agreement provided the following with respect to “Continuing Employees, ” such as Plaintiff:
Vacation and Paid Time Off. ...Direct Sale Purchaser... shall... provide vacation benefits to Continuing Employees for so long as they are employed with. Direct Sale Purchaser. that are at least as favorable as those provided to Continuing Employees under the applicable vacation program of the Company or its Affiliates immediately prior to [February 25, 2019]. Effective as of [February 25, 2019]. Direct Sale Purchaser. shall. honor all obligations of the Company. for the accrued, unused vacation and paid time off as of [February 25, 2019] for Continuing Employees.
“As of February 24, 2019, Plaintiff had 184 hours of accrued, unused vacation benefits available to him.” Id. at ¶ 39. Plaintiff utilized 184 hours of vacation benefits during the rest of calendar year 2019, and he received full pay for that time. Id. At ¶¶ 41-42.
On May 24, 2020, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated arguing that because Plaintiff separated from Defendant on February 24, 2019, Defendant should have paid Plaintiff and others like Plaintiff, who then commenced employment with Wabtec, for earned but unused vacation time.[2] Plaintiff has set forth claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and a violation of the WPCL.
On June 26, 2020, Defendant filed an answer, and the parties engaged in discovery. On March 31, 2021, Defendant filed the pending motion for summary judgment, a supporting brief, the CSMF, and an Appendix. (ECF Nos. 23-26). On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff responded with a brief in opposition, a response to Defendants' concise statement of material facts, and an Appendix. (ECF Nos. 27-28). Defendant filed a reply thereto. (ECF Nos. 33-35). As the present motion for summary judgment has been fully briefed, it is now ripe for disposition. The court's analysis follows.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one that could affect the outcome of litigation. Willis v. UPMC Children's Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). However, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” N.A.A.C.P. v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The initial burden is on the moving party to adduce evidence illustrating a lack of genuine, triable issues. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue, in rebuttal. Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587). When considering the parties' arguments, the court is required to view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The benefit of the doubt will be given to allegations of the non- moving party when in conflict with the moving party's claims. Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 Fed.Appx. 139, 141 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., 44 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Nonetheless, a well-supported motion for summary judgment will not be defeated where the non-moving party merely reasserts factual allegations contained in the pleadings. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)). The non-moving party must resort to affidavits, depositions, admissions, and/or interrogatories to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue. Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 773 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).
Defendant first contends it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Def.'s Br. (ECF No. 24) at 4-7. According to Plaintiff, the Hourly Vacation and Other Time Off Policy set forth in the Handbook is the sole contract that allegedly governed the relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. Def.'s CSMF (ECF No. 25) at ¶ 6. Defendant contends that the Handbook did not create a contract because it specifically states that it does not. See id. at ¶ 7 (“Under the header of “Important Information About This Handbook, ” the Hourly Vacation and Other Time Off Policy provided, inter alia: “This handbook does not create a contract of employment between [Defendant] and any individual.”) (emphasis in original)).
“In Pennsylvania, a breach of contract claim requires (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract and (3) resultant damages.” Knapp v. Susquehanna Vill. Facility Operations, LLC, 2019 WL 4671108, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A handbook distributed to employees as inducement for employment may be an offer and its acceptance a contract.” Morosetti v. Louisiana Land & Expl. Co., 564 A.2d 151, 152 (Pa. 1989). “Generally, explicit disclaimers of contract formation in an employee handbook preclude a breach of contract claim.” Caucci v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 153 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also McElroy v. Sands Casino, 593 Fed.Appx. 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) ).
In this case, the language in the disclaimer set forth in the Handbook clearly put Plaintiff on notice that the policies in it do not create a contract. See Your Benefits Handbook (ECF No. 26-3) at 9. Thus, because the Handbook did not create a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant,...
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