Somerset v. Newjersey, Civ. No. 17-993 (KM)
| Decision Date | 26 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 17-993 (KM) |
| Parties | JERRY SOMERSET, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
This action grows out of the dissolution of a business venture between longtime friends, Jerry Somerset and Joseph Elam. Mr. Somerset sues under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.. Somerset, who is vision-impaired, alleges that he made the down payment on a van for Elam to drive in connection with their floor refurbishing business. Elam, he says, used the van in another business, in violation of their agreement to share and share alike.
Somerset sued Elam in state court; the matter went to trial; and judgment was entered in favor of Elam. Somerset v. Elam, No. DC-06311-15 (N.J. Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part) (the "State Court Action"). Now Somerset has brought suit in federal court against the State of New Jersey; the Hon. Frank Covello, J.S.C., who presided in the State Court Action; Lawrence D. Eichen, Elam's attorney in the State Court Action; Joseph Elam; Strategic Delivery Systems (a/k/a SDSR, the Healthcare Delivery Specialists) ("SDSR"), seemingly the other business in which Elam used the van; and Partners Pharmacy LLC.
Before this Court are motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, filed by Eichen (ECF no. 8); the State and Judge Covello (ECF no. 24); and Partners Pharmacy (ECF no. 25). Partners Pharmacy's motion also includes an application to vacate default. For the reasons stated herein, the motions will be granted.
The motions, in part, are motions to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1) challenges may be either facial or factual attacks. See 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2007); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial challenge asserts that the complaint does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. A court considering such a facial challenge assumes that the allegations in the complaint are true. Cardio-Med. Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983); Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. "In reviewing a facial attack, the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)).1
Because the Rule 12(b)(1) component of the defendants' motions relies only on the Complaint and documents properly considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, I treat it as a facial challenge. I will not weigh the evidence, but will construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendant,as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must take the allegations of the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the complaint's factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, so that a claim is "plausible on its face." Id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). That facial-plausibility standard is met "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While "[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Where the plaintiff, like Mr. Somerset here, is proceeding pro se, the complaint is "to be liberally construed," and, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Manna, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). "While a litigant's pro se status requires a court to construe the allegations in the complaint liberally, a litigant is not absolved from complying with Twombly and the federal pleading requirements merely because s/he proceeds pro se." Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App'x 325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
The Complaint and the motions to dismiss rely on matters that are, strictly speaking, extrinsic to the pleadings. Mr. Somerset's Complaint attaches three letters; one of the defense motions attaches certain filings from the prior State Court Action; and Somerset's reply to Partners Pharmacy attaches part of a transcript from the State Court Action. Both sides' attachments are properly considered on a motion to dismiss.
Attached to the Complaint as exhibits are three letters: one from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and two from the United States Attorney for this District. (ECF no. 1 at 8-10) Those letters concern Mr. Somerset's complaints about the conduct of Judge Covello and Mr. Elam in the prior State Court Action.
A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is generally confined to the allegations of the complaint, but it may also consider authentic documents attached or integral to the complaint:
Although [the rule against considering extrinsic documents is] phrased in relatively strict terms, we have declined to interpret this rule narrowly. In deciding motions under Rule 12(b)(6), courts may consider "document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint," In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original), or any "undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document," PBGC v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 134 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016). See also Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014); In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). "The rationale underlying this exception is that the primary problem raised by looking to documents outside the complaint—lack of notice to the plaintiff—is dissipated '[w]here plaintiff has actual notice ... and has relied upon these documents inframing the complaint.'" In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2nd Cir. 1991)).
The authenticity of these three letters does not appear to be disputed. They are attached and integral to the Complaint, which in effect incorporates them by reference. Although these letters are of limited significance in relation to the issues on these motions to dismiss, it is permissible to consider them.
The State and Judge Covello attach to their motion to dismiss certain papers from that State Court Action: the complaint, the judgment, a post-trial motion filed by Mr. Somerset, and the State court's order denying that motion. (ECF no. 24-7) Mr. Somerset's Reply attaches part of a transcript from the State Court Action. (ECF no. 27-1) Although not attached to the Complaint, these documents may be considered integral to its claims, which refer to and are based on the judgment and proceedings in the State Court Action.
In addition, these State court filings are public records of which a court may take judicial notice:
[0]n a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice of another court's opinion—not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its authenticity. See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Funk v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 796, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1947) ().
S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426-27 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally Fed. R. Evid. 201.
Mr. Somerset cites the transcript excerpt in support of his contentions against Partners. (ECF no. 27 at 2) Defendants cite the court documents in support of their contentions that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of res judicata, this action is barred by the prior state court judgment. The documents are relevant, not for facts contained therein, but inorder to establish the nature of the prior proceedings and the rulings of the State court. For that limited purpose, I will take notice of them.
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