Somes v. United Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-CV-10183-MEL.,98-CV-10183-MEL.
• Citation: 33 F.Supp.2d 78
• Parties: Jamie E. SOMES, as executrix of the estate of Steven P. Somes Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

33 F.Supp.2d 78

Jamie E. SOMES, as executrix of the estate of Steven P. Somes Plaintiff, v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC. Defendants.

No. 98-CV-10183-MEL.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

January 11, 1999.

John C. Sikorski, Ronald C. Kidd, Robinson, Donovan, Madden & Barry, Paul S. Weinberg, Robinson, Donovan, Madden & Barry, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.

Peter J. Black, Meehan, Boyle & Cohen, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND DECISION

LASKER, District Judge.

Jamie Somes commenced this suit against United Airlines under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 229, § 2. On October 18, 1995, her husband, Steven Somes, suffered a cardiac arrest and died while traveling from Boston to San Francisco aboard United Airlines Flight 37. Mrs. Somes alleges that United is liable because it failed to equip its aircraft with certain medical equipment, including an automatic external defibrillator, and because her husband would have survived if the in-flight emergency medical kit had contained such equipment. (Pl.'s Compl. at ¶ 15.) United moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the plaintiff's claim is preempted by federal law. The motion is denied.

I. Preemption Principles

The question whether a state law claim is preempted by a federal statute is a matter of congressional intent. French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1989) (citing California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987)). Congressional intent to preempt state law can be found in the explicit language of a statute, implied from the existence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947), or inferred when the state law in question directly conflicts with a federal law or stands as an obstacle to achievement of federal objectives. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (citations omitted).

A cardinal rule of preemption analysis is the "starting presumption that Congress d[id] not intend to supplant state law." New York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). This "presumption against preemption" takes on added significance "where federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation." Id. at 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671. Accordingly, "the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Id. (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146).

II. The Civil Aeronautics Act, the Federal Aviation Act, and the Airline Deregulation Act

The federal statutes relevant to the question of whether Somes' action is preempted are: the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Congress enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act ("CAA") in 1938 for the purpose of "regulat[ing] entry into the interstate airline industry, the routes that airlines could fly, and the fares that they could charge consumers." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 422, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Civil Aeronautics Act, § 411, 52 Stat. 987-994). The CAA did not expressly preempt state regulation, and contained a "savings clause," which preserved existing common law and statutory remedies. The CAA's "savings clause" provided:

Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.

Civil Aeronautics Act, § 1106, 52 Stat. 1027 (1938) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1998)).

The Federal Aviation Act was passed by Congress in 1958, Pub.L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731. The statute largely replaced the CAA, but kept intact the principal provisions of the CAA, including the savings clause. This statutory scheme remained in place until 1978, when Congress deregulated domestic air travel.

In 1978, Congress determined that "`maximum reliance on competitive market forces' would best further `efficiency, innovation and low prices,' as well as `variety [and] quality ... of air transportation'" and enacted the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), Pub.L. No., 92 Stat. 1705. Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (citing former 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(4), 1302(a)(9)). The ADA contains a preemption provision, which, as amended, provides:

[A] State ... may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier.

49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1998).¹ This explicit preemption provision was included in the ADA "[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own." Morales, 504 U.S. at 378, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Congress, however, left in place the "savings clause." See U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1998) ("A remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.").

The scope of the ADA's express preemption clause "has been a source of considerable dispute since its enactment." Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir.1998). Before Congress enacted the ADA, it was understood that the "savings clause" preserved state law personal injury actions. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 96 S.Ct. 1978, 48 L.Ed.2d 643 (1976) (holding state tort action for fraudulent misrepresentation could "coexist" with the Federal Aviation Act as contemplated by the savings clause). However, since the ADA's enactment, the courts have divided over the interrelationship between the ADA's preemption clause and Congress' retention of the "savings clause" with respect to state tort claims.

III. Supreme Court Precedent

The Supreme Court has interpreted the reach of the ADA's express preemption clause on two occasions, but has not directly addressed whether state tort actions are within the provision's preemptive scope. The Court first construed the provision in Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). In that case, several states sought to enforce airline fare advertising guidelines adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG") through their existing general consumer protection laws. Morales, 504 U.S. at 380-81, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Recognizing that the ADA's preemption provision and the preemption clause in the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") contained the "identical" preemptive language ("relate to"), the Court drew upon its ERISA decisions to hold that "[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to airline `rates, routes, or services'" were preempted by the ADA. Id. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)). Applying this expansive interpretation of the phrase "relate to," the Court then found that because the "obligations imposed by the [NAAG] guidelines would have a significant impact upon the airlines' ability to market their product, and hence a significant impact upon the fares they charge," they had a "forbidden significant effect" on airline "rates, routes, or services" and were therefore preempted. Id. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031. However, the Court nevertheless acknowledged that "`[s]ome state actions may affect [airline rates, routes, or services] in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner' to have preemptive effect." Id. (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. 2890).

Because the Court has used ERISA caselaw as a yardstick for construing the phrase "relate to," it is worth noting that it has recently narrowed ERISA's preemptive reach. In Travelers, the Court commented, as to ERISA, that "[i]f `relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for `[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere.'" 514 U.S. at 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671 (citations omitted). The Court has since directed courts to "look ... to the objectives of the ... statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would survive," rather than apply the preemption standard with "uncritical literalism." Calif. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656, 115 S.Ct. 1671).

The Court recognized more specific limits to the ADA's preemptive reach when it revisited the provision in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995). Wolens involved state law claims arising from an airline's retroactive changes to its frequent flyer program. 513 U.S. at 224-25, 115 S.Ct. 817. Participants in the program sued the airline alleging violations of a state consumer fraud statute and breach of contract. Id. The Court again looked to the plain language of the preemption clause, this time focusing on the words, "enact" and "enforce." Id. at 227, 115 S.Ct. 817. It held that the consumer fraud claims were preempted because, similar to the NAAG guidelines at issue in Morales, the state statute "serve[d] as a means to guide and police the marketing practices of the airlines," thereby imposing state substantive standards with respect to "rates, routes, or services." Id. at 228, 115 S.Ct. 817. However, it ruled that the common law-based contract claims were not preempted because they merely involved the enforcement of the airline's "own self-imposed undertakings," and "d[id] not amount to a State's `enact[ment] or enforce[ment] [of] any law rule, regulation, standard or other provision having the force and effect of law'...