Sommerfeldt v. Trammell, s. A8205-03290

• Decision Date: 03 July 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. A8205-03290,s. A8205-03290
• Citation: 702 P.2d 430,74 Or.App. 183
• Parties: Pamela Best SOMMERFELDT and Peter C. Best, Trustees under the Last Will and Testament of Dorothy Cabot Best, and Pamela Best Sommerfeldt, individually, Appellants, v. Lyle M. TRAMMELL; Gleason, Scarborough, Trammell and Hannon, P.C., Attorneys at Law, Respondents. ; CA A32748.
• Court: Oregon Court of Appeals

Page 430

702 P.2d 430

74 Or.App. 183

Pamela Best SOMMERFELDT and Peter C. Best, Trustees under the Last Will and Testament of Dorothy Cabot Best and Pamela Best Sommerfeldt individually, Appellants, v. Lyle M. TRAMMELL; Gleason, Scarborough, Trammell and Hannon, P.C., Attorneys at Law, Respondents.

Nos. A8205-03290; CA A32748.

Court of Appeals of Oregon.

Argued and Submitted March 22, 1985.

Decided July 3, 1985.

Steven W. Seymour, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Samuels, Samuels, Yoelin & Weiner, Portland.

Gerald R. Pullen, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.

Before BUTTLER, P.J., JOSEPH, C.J., and ROSSMAN, J.

JOSEPH, Chief Judge.

In this legal malpractice action, plaintiffs appeal from an amended judgment dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim. We reverse.

In May, 1982, plaintiffs filed a complaint for professional negligence. In September, 1982, defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim. In December, 1982, the court entered an order allowing defendants' motion and giving plaintiffs 10 days to plead further. In February, 1983, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that alleged that plaintiffs and defendants had an attorney-client relationship, that defendants assumed the responsibility to analyze and evaluate a lease agreement for plaintiffs, that plaintiffs relied on defendants for interpretation, analysis and evaluation of each and every portion of that lease, including paragraph 17, ¹ that defendants misinformed them that the option to renew in that paragraph was subject to an increase in the rent on the basis of the change in the Consumer Price Index between August 1, 1978, and December 31, 1983, and that, as a result of defendants' misinforming plaintiffs of the effect of the language in the paragraph, plaintiffs were damaged in the amount of $102,204 or more. In February, 1983, defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that it still did not state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim. In March, 1983, the court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice and in July, 1984, entered an amended judgment dismissing the complaint.

Defendants argue that the trial court's dismissal with prejudice can be upheld on any of three grounds: (1) any damages were so remote and speculative as to be unrecoverable as a matter of law, because the action was initiated in 1982 and no damages could occur until the lease was renewed, if ever, on September 1, 1983; (2) as a corollary to that argument, plaintiffs did not plead a justiciable controversy and were seeking an unconstitutional advisory opinion; and (3) the paragraph which defendants allegedly analyzed inaccurately was so understandable and straightforward that defendants had "no duty to advise what it legally meant."

The trial judge apparently relied on defendants' third ground ² in granting the motion to dismiss. We consider all of defendants' arguments, because we must affirm the trial court if, notwithstanding its actual reliance on an erroneous reason, its ruling that the complaint does not state a claim is correct. However, we are not persuaded by any of defendants' arguments.

The remote and speculative damages argument and the lack of a justiciable controversy argument are essentially the same. Although those arguments might have carried some weight before September 1, 1983, they no longer provided a basis for dismissing the action when the judgment was entered in 1984.

We also disagree with defendants' other argument, relied on by the trial court, that they had no duty to use due care when interpreting a lease provision for their clients if the language involved was clear to and understandable by a lay person. Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges that an attorney-client relationship existed and that defendants assumed responsibility to analyze and evaluate the lease and advise them as to its meaning. It also alleges that they relied on defendants' mistaken analysis of paragraph 17. (When plaintiffs brought the lease to ...