Sommerfield v. City of Chi.

Decision Date09 August 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 08 C 3025
PartiesDETLEF SOMMERFIELD, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO and SERGEANT KNASIAK #1841, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Judge Joan B. Gottschall

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Detlef Sommerfield, a patrol officer in the Chicago Police Department ("CPD"), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City of Chicago ("the City") and Sergeant Lawrence Knasiak. This is the second of two cases ("the 2006 case" and the "2008 case") that Sommerfield has filed against the City and Knasiak; he litigated the 2006 case to a final judgment. All claims against the City in this case having been dismissed, see Sommerfield v. City of Chi., No. 08 C 3025, 2009 WL 500643 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2009), only the two counts against Knasiak remain. Sommerfield alleges that Knasiak repeatedly harassed him and otherwise discriminated against him on the basis of his race, religion, and national origin, and that Knasiak retaliated against him after he complained about the harassment. Count VI is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and Count VII is a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for racial discrimination. Knasiak has moved for summary judgment on both counts. The court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56;Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2009). The court ruling on the motion construes all facts and makes all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is called for when the nonmoving party cannot establish an essential element of its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2012).

In addition to complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties must also adhere to the Local Rules for the Northern District of Illinois and this court's Standing Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment. The court discussed these rules at length in its September 20, 2010, order in the 2006 case. (Case No. 06 C 3132, Order Sept. 20, 2010, at 6-8, ECF No. 494.) Unfortunately, it is necessary to repeat that discussion here. Local Rule 56.1 provides that the moving party shall serve and file:

1) any affidavits and other materials referred to in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);
2) a supporting memorandum of law; and
3) a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law . . . .
The statement referred to in (3) shall consist of short numbered paragraphs, including within each paragraph specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph.

L.R. 56.1(a). The party opposing summary judgment is required to respond with its own supporting evidence, memorandum, and "concise response to the movant's statement . . . ." L.R. 56.1(b). The opposing party's Rule 56.1 statement should also contain "any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment." Id. The opponent must include references to its supporting materials. Id. This court's Standing Order makes clear that all argument must becontained in the party's brief, not in the Rule 56.1 statement. Standing Order at 1-2. The court may deny a motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with the rules.

Here, just as in the 2006 case, the parties have not complied with the procedures set out in Rule 56.1. Each of the numbered paragraphs in Knasiak's Rule 56.1 statement contains numerous facts and record citations, while Sommerfield has loaded up his response to Knasiak's Rule 56.1 statement with improper argument and additional facts. The court denied Knasiak's motion to strike Sommerfield's filings, given the age of the case and, to quote the order from the 2006 case, the court's lack of "confidence that a second round of briefing would improve the situation." (Order Sept. 20, 2010, at 8.) Instead, the court will disregard the improper portions of the filings. Generally, although Sommerfield "disputes" many of Knasiak's facts, he fails in many instances to cite record evidence demonstrating the dispute, as required by Local Rule 56.1(d)(3)(B)-(C). In those instances, the court deems the fact admitted. Where Sommerfield states that he denies "the implication" of a listed fact or does not dispute a fact but instead argues that an action was taken for retaliatory purposes, the court deems the fact admitted. Similarly, where Sommerfield includes additional facts in his response that do not bear on whether a dispute exists as to the fact listed by Knasiak, the court ignores the additional facts, which should instead have been listed in his statement of additional facts.

II. UNDISPUTED FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed for purposes of Knasiak's motion for summary judgment, except as otherwise noted. Sommerfield has been a patrol officer with the CPD since July 5, 1994. He was assigned to the 008th District of the CPD from December 10, 1998, untilapproximately August 13, 2007, when he was transferred to the 001st District. He served on the third watch. Sommerfield's national origin is German, and his religion is Jewish.

Sergeant Knasiak was one of Sommerfield's senior officers, along with Lieutenant Carson Earnest (who served as watch commander about 50% of the time), Sergeant John Maciejewski, Sergeant Christine Pickering Deierl, and Sergeant Betty Woods. Knasiak was a sergeant in the 008th District from August 1997 until he retired on June 15, 2007. Knasiak worked the third watch from about January or February 1999 until approximately 2001, when he was moved to the second watch. Knasiak was reassigned to the third watch for approximately two to three months in 2004; he then returned to the second watch until his retirement.

1. Knasiak's Verbal Harassment of Sommerfield

Sommerfield contends that Knasiak repeatedly attacked him verbally for being German and Jewish. He quotes twenty-five such remarks in his own affidavit, but he does not identify the dates—or even the years—when the remarks were made. (Pl.'s Statement of Facts ("SOF") Ex. 6 (Sommerfield Aff. Sept. 29, 2009), ECF No. 191-8.) In his deposition, Sommerfield also stated that Knasiak told him "he would get" him about "about three or four times" after he filed an internal complaint against Knasiak in March 2004. (Pl.'s SOF Ex 1 (Sommerfield Dep.) 49:21 - 50:18, ECF No. 191-3.) Officer Galassi testified at deposition that he heard Knasiak say "Burn Jew, Burn" once during roll call, but he did not remember when the remark occurred. (Pl.'s SOF Ex. 17 (Galassi Dep.) 32:7-15, ECF No. 192-13.) Former police officer John Minich stated in an affidavit that he heard Knasiak abuse Sommerfield regarding his nationality and religion, but he did not identify any specific dates. (Pl.'s SOF Ex. 19 (Minich Aff.) at ¶¶ 16-18, ECF No. 192-15.) During his deposition, Knasiak denied making any of the statements.

2. Patrol Duties and Partner Assignments

Sommerfield claims that Knasiak discriminated against him by requiring him to work in high crime areas by himself and not assigning him a partner. Patrol duties in high-crime areas are part of a CPD patrol officer's job. Sometimes patrol officers are not assigned a partner because of manpower allocation and other factors. Primary beat cars working the midnight watch must be manned by at least two officers if possible. Knasiak testified that "[o]n the afternoon and midnight watch, the beats are manned by two people" (Pl.'s SOF Ex. 4 (Knasiak Dep.) 20:2-4, ECF No. 191-6), and that "[a] police officer will not be forced to work [alone] during those hours" (Id. at 21:11-14).

Sommerfield worked as a relief officer in the 008th District. Relief officers are not assigned a specific car, but instead fill in cars that are short an officer. The watch commander on duty makes the decision as to which officers will be relief officers and which officers will be assigned a regular beat car.

Sommerfield worked without a regular partner at various points in time. He was not the only CPD officer who did so. Sommerfield also worked with partners at times. Officer Abdallah Abuzanat was a patrol officer assigned to the third watch in the 008th District from Summer 2000 until September 2004. He was "[q]uite often" assigned as Sommerfield's partner during approximately one-and-a-half of the four years he was in the 008th District. (Def.'s SOF Ex. 12 (Abuzanat Dep.) 50:11-16, ECF No. 180-12.) He was assigned to a beat car with Sommerfield for "about four to six months." (Id. at 51:3-5.) Officer Edward Burger worked the third watch in the 008th District from approximately July 2003 to October 2005. During that time, he worked with Sommerfield "more than once a week." (Def.'s SOF Ex. 13 (Burger Dep.) 102:5, ECF No. 180-13.)

The parties dispute whether, as a sergeant, Knasiak had any authority over whether Sommerfield was assigned a partner. Sommerfield acknowledged during his deposition that "ultimately it is the watch commander's choice" who receives which duties and partners. (Sommerfield Dep. at 34:3-4.) But he further testified that "[i]f a watch commander isn't there, which . . . happened a lot . . . . whoever is in charge that day, depending on rank . . . really makes the ultimate call." (Id. at 37:13-24.)

Sergeant Deierl, who was assigned to the 008th District on August 1, 2000, and also works the third watch, testified that a sergeant would handle roll call if the watch commander was unable to attend. (Pl.'s SOF Ex. 8 (Deierl Dep.) 171:12-16...

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