Sommers v. Sec'y, Case No: 2:12-cv-645-FtM-29DNF
| Decision Date | 19 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:12-cv-645-FtM-29DNF |
| Parties | SAMUEL TURK SOMMERS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court upon a petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Samuel Turk Sommers ("Petitioner") who is presently confined at the Union Correctional Center in Raiford, Florida (Doc. 1, filed Dec. 3, 2012). Petitioner, proceeding pro se, attacks a conviction entered by the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court in Collier County, Florida for trafficking in illegal drugs. Id. Respondent filed a response to the petition, and Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 11; Doc. 20).
Upon due consideration of the pleadings and the state-court record, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Because the Court may resolve the Petition on the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) ().
On May 14, 2008, Petitioner was charged by third amended information with one count of trafficking in 14 grams or more of illegal drugs in violation of Florida Statute § 893.135(1)(c) (count one) and one count of trafficking in 28 grams or more of illegal drugs in violation of Florida Statute § 893.135(1)(c) (count two) (Ex. 1A at 71).2 Count one involved activity that occurred on August 17, 2006, and count two involved activity that occurred on October 11, 2006. Id.
Prior to trial, Petitioner wrote several letters to the trial court in which he expressed dissatisfaction with his court appointed defense attorney. On June 20, 2007, Petitionercomplained that: counsel had not moved to have his bail reduced; counsel had made a poor performance at a hearing on a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant ("CI"); counsel had not called to talk about Petitioner's case and ideas; other inmates were outraged by counsel's negligence; and counsel just did not care about his clients (Ex. 1 at 26-27). In that letter, Petitioner stated that he could prove his innocence "with a decent lawyer, preferably a pro bono one." Id. at 27.
On September 25, 2007, Petitioner filed a pro se motion in the trial court in which he requested "to be co-counsel to my Public Defender Ronald Regnaert." (Ex. 1 at 30)
On January 2, 2008, Petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss Ineffective Counsel" in which he complained that counsel was not timely responding to his calls and requested that "all paperwork, findings, case notes, etc. held by the Public Defender's Office pertaining to this case be remanded to the defendant pursuant to this dismissal." (Ex. 1 at 33).
On February 25, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss his counsel because counsel "has been continuing defendant's case for (15) months without consultation or approval from the defendant." (Ex. 1 at 45).
On February 29, 2008, Petitioner sent a letter to the trial judge stating that he had "submitted two (2) motions to dismiss and discharge my Public Defender, Ronald Regnaert and proceed prose." (Ex. 1 at 48, 49). This letter was, in fact, the first time Petitioner specifically and unequivocally mentioned a desire to proceed pro se.
On April 22, 2008, Petitioner sent a letter to the trial court, recognizing that he faced sixty years in prison if convicted as charged and beseeching:
I beg this Hon. Court to appoint me a private independent counsel with trial experience, because I fear that the public defender's office and Ron Regnaert can no longer represent my defense properly and vigorously.
(Ex. 1 at 69).
On May 5, 2008, the trial court held a Nelson3 hearing on Petitioner's complaints about his public defender (App. D). Petitioner explained to the court that counsel had continued his case without his permission, did not answers his phone calls or acknowledge the letters he wrote, did not want to call witnesses or develop evidence on his behalf, and did not file Petitioner's self-written motion to dismiss the charges. Id. at 11-12. Petitioner told the court that he had filed a grievance with the Florida Bar, but was told that he had to "take it up" with the trial court. Id. at 13. The trial court explained to Petitionerthat he faced 60 years in prison with a minimum mandatory sentence of 25 years in prison if convicted at trial. Id. at 13-14. Petitioner then complained that the amended information which charged him with trafficking in heroin was incorrect, noting that "[i]t's not true, it's prescription pain medication." Id. at 14. At that point, the trial court cautioned Petitioner that the hearing was recorded, and that his statement could be interpreted as a confession. Id.
Defense counsel told the court that discovery was complete, that the prior two continuances about which Petitioner complained were at the state's request, all witnesses had been deposed or subpoenaed and that he had done everything asked of him (App. D at 15). Counsel noted that Id. Counsel stated that he was ready to go to trial. Id. at 16. The court denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss his counsel. Id. at 17. At that point, defense counsel suggested that the court hold a Farreta4 hearing. Id. The trial court declined, but stated that "if [Petitioner] changes his mind at trial and wants to represent himself, we can still goforward I'll just advise him." Id. Petitioner did not make a request for self-representation at trial.
At trial, evidence was produced showing that Petitioner had access to prescription narcotics (T. at 200, 211). He was employed at a supermarket, and his supervisor, who was facing trafficking charges, agreed to assist the police as a CI so as to negotiate a better plea deal in her own criminal case. Id. at 210, 236. The supervisor approached Petitioner and asked if he had pain pills. Id. at 199-200. She told Petitioner that her sister was in need of the medication. She was persistent in her attempts to get Petitioner to sell the pills to her sister, and Petitioner testified that he was afraid he could lose his job if he refused. Therefore, he finally agreed. Id. at 199-203. On August 17, 2006, Petitioner sold thirty pain pills to an undercover officer posing as the supervisor's sister. Id. at 204-205. Several months later, the same undercover officer contacted Petitioner and asked for more pain pills. Id. at 206. On October 12, 2006, she purchased forty-eight pills from Petitioner. Id. at 206-210. Petitioner's supervisor was not involved in the second transaction. Petitioner's defense at trial was entrapment on both counts.
After a jury trial, Petitioner was acquitted on count one and found guilty on count two (App. D at 103-104). He was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years in prison. Id. at 105. Petitioner's sentence and conviction were per curiamaffirmed by Florida's Second District Court of Appeal ("DCA") on April 22, 2009 (Ex. 2 at 70).
On September 1, 2009, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 3.850 motion") in which he raised five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and one claim of cumulative error (App. 3A at 12). The post-conviction court denied each claim in the petition. Id. at 2. Florida's Second DCA per curiam affirmed (Ex. 4 at 58).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir.2008). Notably, a state court's violation of state law is not sufficient to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). That said, the Supreme Court has also explained that "the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since 'a general standard' from [the Supreme Court's] cases can supply such law." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). State courts "must reasonably apply the rules 'squarely established' by Court's holdings to the facts of each case. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).
Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision...
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