Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Ins., Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 03 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-1154-J-34PDB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | SOMPO JAPAN NIPPONKOA INSURANCE, INC., Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., SAVAGE SERVICES CORPORATION, and SAVAGE INDUSTRIAL RAIL SERVICES, INC., Defendants. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Cross-Plaintiff, v. SAVAGE INDUSTRIAL RAIL SERVICES, INC., Cross-Defendant. |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants, Savage Services Corporation's & Savage Industrial Rail Services, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 43; Motion), filed on May 14, 2020. Plaintiff Sompo Japan Nipponkoa Insurance, Inc. (Sompo) filed a response in opposition to the Motion on May 28, 2020. See Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion of Defendants Savage Services Corporation and Savage Industrial Rail Services, Inc. to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and/or Transfer the Case (Doc. 44; Response). With leave of Court, see Order (Doc. 50), Defendants Savage Services Corporation (SSC) and Savage Industrial Rail Services, Inc. (SIRS) (collectively, the Savage Defendants) filed a reply in support of the Motion on June 29, 2020. See Defendants, Savage Services Corporation's & Savage Industrial Rail Services Inc.'s Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 53; Reply). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.
Sompo initiated this action on October 8, 2019, by filing a two-count Complaint (Doc. 1; Initial Complaint) against CSX Corp., CSX Transportation, Inc., and SSC. The Court struck the Initial Complaint as an improper shotgun pleading, see Order (Doc. 7), and on October 28, 2019, Sompo filed its First Amended Complaint (Doc. 8; Amended Complaint). In the Amended Complaint, Sompo asserted a claim for negligence against SSC and CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), as well as a breach of contract claim against CSXT, premised on a February 9, 2016 train collision in Marysville, Ohio. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 9, 14, 18-31. On January 30, 2020, SSC filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 20) in which it argued, among other things, that: SIRS not SSC is the proper party to this action, the negligence claim is time-barred under Ohio law, and the Court should transfer the matter to Ohio as a more convenient forum. Sompo opposed the motion to dismiss (Doc. 30), but also sought leave to amend its complaint to name SIRS "as the proper defendant." See Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Leave to Amend its Complaint (Doc. 31), filed March 4, 2020. The Magistrate Judge granted this request, see Order (Doc. 40), and Sompo fileda Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 41; Operative Complaint) on April 24, 2020, which is the operative pleading in this action.
In the Operative Complaint, Sompo asserts a claim against CSXT under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706, as well as a claim for negligence against SSC and SIRS. See generally Operative Complaint. As alleged in the Operative Complaint, the collision occurred when a CSXT train was improperly diverted from the main railway to a rail siding at a manufacturing facility where the train collided with an unattended rail car or cars. See Operative Complaint ¶¶ 29-30. Sompo asserts that the Savage Defendants provided rail services at this manufacturing facility on behalf of their client, the facility's owner, and it was someone working in the employ of SSC and/or SIRS who "improperly left a rail switch in an open and/or unlocked position" causing the accident. Id. ¶¶ 25, 29-30.1 Significantly, the CSXT train involved in the collision was carrying a shipment of auto parts from Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (Honda Motor) to Honda of America Mfg., Inc. (Honda America), which were damaged in the accident. Id. ¶¶ 8, 11-15. As a result, Honda Motor and Honda America, which are insured by Sompo, incurred $4,275,884.17 in losses. Id. ¶ 15. Sompo reimbursed its insureds in this amount and now brings this action as the subrogee and/or assignee of its insureds. Id. ¶ 16. On May 14, 2020, CSXT filed a cross-claim against SSC and SIRS asserting claims of implied indemnity, common law indemnity, and negligence. See Defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc.'s Answer andAffirmative Defenses to Count One of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and Cross-Claim (Doc. 42; CSXT Cross-Claim).2
In the instant Motion, the Savage Defendants raise three primary arguments. First, the Savage Defendants contend that Sompo's claim against SIRS is due to be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Second, the Savage Defendants argue that Sompo's negligence claim should be dismissed as to both SIRS and SSC because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Third, the Savage Defendants assert in the alternative that the Court should sever Sompo's negligence claim against SSC and SIRS from the remainder of this action and transfer it to the Southern District of Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).3 The Savage Defendants also filed a similar motion concerning the CSXT Cross-Claim. See Defendants, Savage Services Corporation's & Savage Industrial Rail Services Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss CSX Transportation, Inc.'s Cross-Claim, or in the Alternative, Motion to Sever and to Transfer to Ohio Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(A) (Doc. 49; Cross-Claim Motion). CSXT responded to the Cross-Claim Motion by filing CSX Transportation, Inc.'s Notice as to Cross-Claim (Doc. 56) in which it states that it "takes no position as to whether the Court possesses personal jurisdiction over SSC and SIRS or whether venue is proper in this District as to Plaintiff's claim against SSC and SIRS." See CSX Transportation Inc.'s Notice as to Cross-Claim (Doc. 56; CSXT Notice), filed July 17, 2020. CSXT further states that if the Court determines that it is appropriate to transfer Sompo's claim against SSC and SIRS, then CSXT "does not oppose andconsents to severance and transfer of its Cross-Claim (Doc. 42) to Ohio." Id. at 1. However, CSXT maintains that Sompo's Carmack Amendment claim against CSXT should remain in this venue. Id. at 2.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over SIRS, and that severance and transfer of Sompo's claim against the Savage Defendants, as well as the CSXT Cross-Claim is warranted under the circumstances. As such, the Court will not address the Savage Defendants' other arguments in support of dismissal.
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the "plaintiff seeking the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of jurisdiction." See United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). Where a defendant "challenges jurisdiction by submitting affidavit evidence in support of its position, 'the burden traditionally shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction.'" See id. (quoting Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int'l Hotels, Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2002)). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a district court has discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing. See Delong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1988). However, where the court does not conduct a hearing, "the plaintiff must present only a prima facie showing of . . . personal jurisdiction." Id.
A plaintiff makes a prima facie showing by presenting evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Morris v. SSE,Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 492 (11th Cir. 1988). Thus, "[t]he district court must construe the allegations in the complaint as true, to the extent they are uncontroverted by defendant's affidavits[,]" and "where the evidence presented by the parties' affidavits . . . conflicts, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant plaintiff." Id. (citing Delong Equip. Co., 840 F.2d at 845); see also Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274 (citing Polski Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transp. A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 972 (11th Cir. 1986)) ( that, if the defendant rebuts the jurisdictional allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, "the plaintiff is required to substantiate [its] jurisdictional allegations [ ] by affidavits or other competent proof, and not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint."). This construction in favor of the plaintiff is particularly necessary where the jurisdictional questions are intertwined with the merits of a case. See Delong Equip. Co., 840 F.2d at 845.
In accordance with this legal framework, the Court will summarize the facts alleged in the Operative Complaint as relevant to personal jurisdiction, and then review the evidence put forth by the parties as to the question of personal jurisdiction, all the while construing the alleged facts and evidence in favor of the non-moving plaintiff, Sompo. Morris, 843 F.2d at 492.
In the Operative Complaint, Sompo includes the following allegations relevant to personal jurisdiction:
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