Somuah v. Flachs
| Citation | 118 Md.App. 303,702 A.2d 788 |
| Decision Date | 01 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 133,133 |
| Parties | Millicent SOMUAH, Individually, etc., v. Jeremy FLACHS. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
John Smallwood (Smallwood & Wells, P.A., on the brief), Largo, for appellee.
Argued before DAVIS and SONNER, JJ., and PAUL E. ALPERT, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.
Appellee, Jeremy Flachs, brought suit against appellant, Millicent Somuah, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to recover the reasonable value of legal services he had provided to her. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which were denied. At trial, both parties moved for judgment; those motions were also denied. The case was ultimately submitted to a jury, which found in favor of Mr. Flachs, and awarded him $19,946.01. Ms. Somuah filed a motion for both JNOV and a new trial. Those motions were denied, and this timely appeal followed.
Ms. Somuah raises three issues, which we consolidate, reorder, and rephrase:
I. Did the circuit court err by refusing to instruct the jury that when a lawyer fails to inform a prospective client that he is not admitted to practice in the state where suit will likely be brought, that failure constitutes cause for that lawyer's discharge?
II. Did the circuit court err by failing to grant either Ms. Somuah's motion for summary judgment or her motion for judgment at trial on the ground of Mr. Flachs' failure to inform Ms. Somuah of his lack of a license to practice law in Maryland?
This unfortunate case arises out of a March 8, 1992 automobile accident in Prince George's County in which Ms. Somuah was badly injured. After the accident, she was taken to Prince George's Community Hospital, where she spent several weeks recovering from her injuries.
At the time of the accident, Ms. Somuah was a Virginia resident. Several weeks after the accident, her brother (who was apparently also a Virginia resident) contacted Mr. Flachs about the possibility of filing a lawsuit on Ms. Somuah's behalf. Mr. Flachs is a lawyer who is licensed to practice in both Virginia and the District of Columbia.
On April 3, 1992, Mr. Flachs visited Ms. Somuah at the hospital, and interviewed her with the help of her son, Christian. During that visit, Mr. Flachs never informed Ms. Somuah that he was not licensed to practice in Maryland. At the end of the meeting, Ms. Somuah retained Mr. Flachs to represent her in any future lawsuit involving the accident. The retainer agreement reads as follows:
AGREEMENT
AGREEMENT entered into this 3 day of April, 1992, by and between Jeremy Flachs, Attorney-at-Law, and Millicent Somuah, Client.
ATTORNEY agrees that he will represent Client in the following matter only:
personal injury in auto accident on 3/8/92 on Indian Head Highway
CLIENT agrees to compensate Attorney for his services in the following manner:
(d) One Third 1/3 of any amount received by Client (in the claim described above) whether by way of compromise or by actual litigation in any court, said fee to be deducted before payment of expenses, including medical bills.
CLIENT agrees that he will be responsible for actual court costs if a suit is filed, and that in the event of a settlement of his claim before or after suit is filed, that the fee provided for herein and such actual costs as may have been incurred shall be a lien upon any money received or recovered in this case.
CLIENT agrees to pay all costs of investigation, preparation and trial of the case, and authorizes and directs Jeremy Flachs to deduct from the Client's share of proceeds, and pay directly to any doctor, hospital, expert, or other creditor, any unpaid balance due them for Client's care and treatment, or for their services and/or testimony related to this case.
CLIENT agrees that Jeremy Flachs will investigate Client's claim and, if after so investigating, claim does not appear to him to have merit, that said Attorney shall have the right to cancel this Agreement.
(Strikeout in original).
After the April 3 meeting, Mr. Flachs began investigating whether Ms. Somuah had a cause of action. He also took steps to gather and preserve evidence. In the course of both the investigation and the collection of evidence, Mr. Flachs expended a substantial amount of money.
In mid-Summer 1992, Mr. Flachs began exploring the possibility of filing suit in Maryland state court. To this end, he contacted a Maryland lawyer, Gregory Wells, to inquire whether he would be willing to assist in a Maryland lawsuit. Mr. Wells considered the possibility, and in July 1992 went with Mr. Flachs to meet Ms. Somuah at her home. During that meeting, Mr. Flachs informed Ms. Somuah for the first time that he was not licensed to practice law in Maryland. After the meeting, Mr. Wells declined to accept the case, and Mr. Flachs began searching for another Maryland attorney to work on the case.
Before Mr. Flachs could locate another Maryland lawyer, Ms. Somuah, by letter dated August 20, 1992, fired him. After his discharge, Mr. Flachs sent a letter to Ms. Somuah asking to be reimbursed for the time and money he spent preparing her case. When Ms. Somuah declined, Mr. Flachs brought this lawsuit.
At trial, most of the evidence focused on two separate issues: 1) the date Mr. Flachs informed Ms. Somuah that he was not licensed to practice in Maryland; and 2) the extent to which Mr. Flachs informed Ms. Somuah of his efforts and expenditures on her behalf. On the first issue, the parties agreed that Mr. Flachs did not inform Ms. Somuah of his lack of a Maryland license until the July 1992 meeting with Mr. Wells. On the second issue, there was a bit more disagreement. Nevertheless, Ms. Somuah admitted that, while recovering in the hospital, she was videotaped by a company hired by Mr. Flachs; she also admitted that, in addition to the July The jury ultimately found in favor of Mr. Flachs, and awarded him $19,946.01. Ms. Somuah's post-judgment motions were unsuccessful, and this appeal followed.
1992 visit to her home with Mr. Wells, Mr. Flachs visited her home on a separate occasion with a safety expert he had hired.
Mr. Flachs brought this action pursuant to Skeens v. Miller, 331 Md. 331, 628 A.2d 185 (1993), in which the Court of Appeals held that if an attorney's representation is terminated by a client without cause, he may recover from that client the reasonable value of the services provided prior to termination. Id. at 335-36, 628 A.2d 185. According to Mr. Flachs, Ms. Somuah terminated his representation without cause, and he is thus entitled to reimbursement for the services he provided to her.
At trial, the circuit court gave the jury the following instruction on the applicable law:
Basically in a case such as this, a contract between a client and his attorney is revocable at the will of the client. A contract between the attorney and his client, and the client wants to revoke it in this case, he may do so. All he has to do is write a letter saying I revoke it. A lawyer who is discharged by his client for what we call cause is not entitled to be compensated for legal services rendered. When we say cause we mean good and valid reason. But an attorney discharged without cause is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value of the legal services rendered prior to his discharge.
As I said before, for cause he is not entitled to be compensated for legal services. Without cause he is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable value of his legal services. And cause, again, is good and valid reason.
Mrs. Somuah objected to this instruction, and asked the court to add the following in its charge to the jury: 1) an instruction that a contract to provide legal services by a lawyer who is not licensed in Maryland is unenforceable; and 2) an instruction that an individual who is not admitted to the Maryland Bar may not practice law in Maryland. 1
In this appeal, Ms. Somuah argues that the circuit court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that when a lawyer fails to inform his client that he is not licensed to practice in the state in which suit likely will be brought, that failure constitutes cause for discharge. This issue is not the same as the ones raised by Ms. Somuah in her objections below. Thus, Ms. Somuah has waived her right to raise it. Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 232, 167 A.2d 773 (1961).
Even if she had not waived the issue, however, Ms. Somuah's argument would be without merit because the instruction she advances in this appeal is not a correct statement of the applicable law. 2 We explain.
In assessing the validity of Ms. Somuah's proposed jury instruction, we are required ultimately to determine what constitutes "cause" for a lawyer's discharge. Neither of Maryland's appellate courts have addressed this issue. Nevertheless, given that cause encompasses those circumstances under which an attorney has forfeited his right to compensation, cases dealing with an attorney's right to compensation are of significant guidance.
An overview of attorney compensation cases, from both Maryland and other jurisdictions, reveals a relatively small set of common sense principles that govern an attorney's ability to recover fees. For instance, an attorney generally will not be allowed to recover his fee if he fails to represent his client with undivided fidelity. See In re Thomasson's Estate, 355 Mo. 274, 196 S.W.2d 155, 162-63 (1946) ("Thomasson II") (). Further, a lawyer will not be allowed to recover his fee if his...
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