Songa v. Sunrise Senior Living Invs. Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 May 2014
• Docket Number: Civil No. 13–2254(DSD/JJG).
• Citation: 22 F.Supp.3d 939
• Parties: Mattu SONGA, Plaintiff, v. SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING INVESTMENTS INC., doing business as Rosewood Estates, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

22 F.Supp.3d 939

Mattu SONGA, Plaintiff,
v.
SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING INVESTMENTS INC., doing business as Rosewood Estates, Defendant.

Civil No. 13–2254(DSD/JJG).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed May 16, 2014

Motion granted.

[22 F.Supp.3d 940]

Mattu Songa, New Brighton, MN, pro se.

Jeffrey B. Hardie, Esq., Thomas P. Murphy, Esq. and Hunton & Williams, LLP, McLean, VA; Joel D. O'Malley, Esq. and Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, counsel for defendant.

ORDER
DAVID S. DOTY, Judge.

This matter is before the court upon the motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment by defendant Sunrise Senior Living Investments, Inc. (Sunrise), doing business as Rosewood Estates. Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the court grants the motion for summary judgment.

[22 F.Supp.3d 941]

DISCUSSION I. Rule 56(d)

Songa first argues that summary judgment is not warranted because discovery is not complete. “A party opposing summary judgment who believes that she has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery must seek relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56[d], which requires the filing of an affidavit with the trial court showing what specific facts further discovery might unveil.” Stanback v. Best Diversified Prods., Inc., 180 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir.1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Songa filed an affidavit, but has not identified specific facts that discovery would reveal in support of her claims. Further, the parties were notified that the court intended to treat the instant motion as one for summary judgment. Upon such notice, Songa submitted a supplemental memorandum opposing summary judgment, but adduced no further evidence, exhibits or affidavits in support of her position. “Where a party fails to carry her burden under Rule 56[d], postponement of a ruling on a motion for summary judgment is unjustified.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, Songa's argument is unavailing, and the court may properly consider summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings.

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

[22 F.Supp.3d 942]

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. See id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A party asserting that a genuine dispute exists—or cannot exist—about a material fact must cite “particular parts of materials in the record.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). If a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of a claim, the court must grant summary judgment, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. Statute of Limitations

As an initial matter, Sunrise argues that the claims for defamation and IIED are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court agrees.

In Minnesota, claims for defamation and IIED are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.07; see also Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775, 791 (1975) (per curiam); Wenigar v. Johnson, 712 N.W.2d 190, 208–09 (Minn.Ct.App.2006). Songa was terminated in February 2010 and filed the instant action in August 2013. As a result, the defamation and IIED ² claims are time-barred and summary judgment is warranted.³

IV. Race and National Origin Discrimination

Songa next argues that Sunrise discriminated against her on the basis of her race and national origin. Title VII and the MHRA ⁴ prohibit employers from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise ... discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race ... or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).

In the absence of direct evidence, race and national origin discrimination claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework of

[22 F.Supp.3d 943]

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir.2009). Upon such a showing, a defendant must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See id. at 692–93. “If the employer makes such a showing, the plaintiff must then demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated non-discriminatory rationale was a mere pretext for discrimination.” Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted).

Here, even if Songa could establish a prima facie case of race or national original discrimination, Sunrise has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory research for her discharge: her failure to work cooperatively. An employer's burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination is not onerous. Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 954 (8th Cir.2012) (citation omitted), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1252, 185 L.Ed.2d 181 (2013). Indeed, the record reveals tension and frustration between Hall and Sunrise employees, including Songa. See Songa Aff. Ex. 4. Such concerns may constitute legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination. See Larry v. Potter, 424 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir.2005) (finding “negative work attitude” to be legitimate,...