Sonman Shaft Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.

• Citation: 88 A. 746,241 Pa. 487
• Decision Date: 27 June 1913
• Docket Number: 30
• Parties: Sonman Shaft Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

88 A. 746

241 Pa. 487

Sonman Shaft Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., Appellant

No. 30

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 27, 1913

Argued April 22, 1913

Appeal, No. 30, Jan. T., 1913, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Clearfield Co., May T., 1909, No. 322, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Sonman Shaft Coal Company v Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Affirmed.

Trespass for unlawful discrimination and for failure to furnish an adequate supply of coal cars. Before SMITH, P.J.

The facts appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court and in the following opinion of SMITH, P.J., sur defendant's motion for a new trial, and for judgment n.o.v.:

The first position taken by the learned counsel for defendant is that this state court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the action. The plaintiff in this case, by its declaration set out two causes of action, namely, first, discrimination proper, and, second, insufficient and inadequate car supply in violation of the common law duty of a common carrier. The jurisdiction of this court in cases of discrimination has been affirmed by our Supreme Court in Puritan Coal Mining Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 237 Pa. 420, as also in Walnut Coal Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 237 Pa. 410. The recovery in the case in hand was based on the inadequacy of car supply only. While there was distinct proof of discrimination practiced by the defendant company, yet the data on which a recovery could be based was not furnished. The question in this case as to jurisdiction, therefore, is as to whether the federal tribunals have exclusive jurisdiction over a matter of common law duty. The learned counsel for defendant relies on the authority of Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, which was a case involving a North Carolina statute, to sustain its position that the state court in this case did not have jurisdiction of this cause. We fail to see how that case is applicable to the case in hand. The decision there is based on a square conflict between the North Carolina statute and the act of congress regulating interstate commerce. The question of the common law duty of furnishing an adequate car supply is not even referred to in the decision. That case moreover deals with the rate question rather than with the car supply question, and indeed in the matter of rates the Interstate Commerce Act seems to cover about all that can be said in the matter of regulating interstate commerce as to rates. All of the cases in fact in the United States Court, in which the jurisdiction of the state courts has been denied, was based on a clear case of conflict between the provisions of a state statute and the Interstate Commerce Act. Where such conflict does not exist the express language of the twenty-second section of the act to regulate commerce, which reads as follows: "Nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute but the provisions of this act in addition to such remedies" would seem to apply. In the case in hand, involving as it does the question of adequacy of car supply, a careful reading of the Interstate Commerce Act does not disclose to us any possible conflict of authority. The Federal Supreme Court, moreover, had distinctly recognized the right of redress in other jurisdictions, in the language of Mr. Justice WHITE in the Texas and P.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. case, 204 U.S. 426-446, when he said, "The manifest purpose of the provision in question was to make plain the intention that any specific remedy given by the act should be regarded as cumulative when other appropriate common law or statutory remedies exist for the redress of the particular grievance or wrong dealt with in the act." Again, the United States Supreme Court, in Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, upheld the jurisdiction of the state court for damage caused by failure to deliver goods which was recognized as a common law breach of duty and not within the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. In that case the court said, inter alia, "jurisdiction is not defeated by implication." The recovery in the case in hand was limited by the court to intrastate shipments, including of course cars sold f.o.b. at the mines. It is hard to see how the question of exclusive jurisdiction in the United States Court could be made to apply to such shipments within the State and certainly no authority cited by the learned counsel takes such a position.

Without further elaboration of argument, we think it is clear that the most recent authorities of both the state and federal courts sustain the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action.

Defendant's brief contends:

"II. Defendant not in default because unable to supply all the cars demanded by plaintiff."

The elaborate argument of the learned counsel in their brief under this head is not convincing that any error was committed by the court. It ignores or glosses over a primary principle which should govern common carriers. The primary duty of a railroad company, in ordinary times and under ordinary conditions, is to have an adequate car supply for the needs of the country through which the lines pass and to furnish such cars to shippers when requisition therefor is made in good faith. In this respect the coal business does not differ from any other business, although the defendant railroad company seems to have taken the position that they have a right to regulate the coal market. The rule in this respect is clearly expressed in 5 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law pp. 160, et al., as follows: "The duty of carriers embraces, not only the duty to transport goods accepted by them, but to do so promptly and within a reasonable time. But in the case of railroads and similar companies, endowed with special and unusual powers with express view to their rendering to the public a freight and passenger service adequate to the needs of the county through which their lines pass, the law imposes the obligation to have and to furnish sufficient facilities for the reasonably prompt transportation of goods tendered for carriage, and they are liable for a failure to transport promptly, whether the failure is due to a want of facilities or to a captious refusal to carry." The only question in this case was whether the defendant fulfilled this duty, and the jury have decided that it did not. Both the plaintiff and defendant in this case, by their proofs, sustained the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff. There was no contention, for instance, against the plaintiffs claim that it had a mine equipped and able to ship the coal which it claimed it could have shipped. There was no serious contention against the claim of plaintiff that it had a market or trade within the State of Pennsylvania for the coal which it claimed it could have mined and sold at a profit. There was no denial of the fact that the plaintiff made requisitions upon the defendant company for cars and facilities for shipping coal to a much greater extent than it received such facilities and nearly up to its actual rating by the railroad company. There was no denial that the railroad company absolutely failed or refused to furnish the cars demanded, and neither then nor now can give any legal or equitable excuse other than its claim that it had a right to pro rate its cars and did not have a sufficient number to give everybody all the cars that were demanded. Further, the proofs on both sides show that the conditions of the bituminous coal trade were normal and the defendant company proved conclusively that it had a surplus of cars and in fact stored cars during a portion of the period. In the face of these admitted facts we are wholly unable to see how there could be anything else than a recovery for such an amount in damages as the plaintiff has shown it sustained. The defendant company's counsel took pains to prove conclusively that they had an adequate car supply for the needs of the business in the region. In the testimony of J. W. Manly, one of defendant's witnesses, page 250, appears the following evidence: "Q. Have you a record there for April 28, 1904? A. Yes, sir. Q. What are shown to be the empty cars by that record to have been on the Pennsylvania Railroad lines, empty bituminous coal cars; they would be stored cars what I mean by that? A. We have on that date 900. . . . Q. Were or were not there unused and stored bituminous coal cars on the lines during the period of this action? A. Yes, sir." Then again, in the testimony of G. W. Creighton, General Superintendent, page 246, appears the following: "Q. During the time of this action from April, 1903, to that time in 1907 was there any time when the bituminous coal equipment, any percentage of them were not being used by the shippers? A. I imagine there were, yes. By Mr. Liveright: We object to the answer and ask to have it stricken out. A. I can answer it positively. . . . Q. Were there coal cars stored and unused during that time? A. Yes." This testimony was offered by the defendant and the purpose for which it was offered was thus stated by ". . . and that there were also empty cars, bituminous coal cars, on their tracks unused during the period proposed to be testified to. This for the purpose of showing that at the time which the testimony is directed, at such period as the witness may testify to, there was an adequate equipment in the control and use of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to furnish equipment for these shippers of bituminous coal." It was further proven by the crossexamination of G. E. Oler, defendant's witness having charge of the distribution records of the defendant company, the large number of cars each year which were not counted in the general...