Sonner v. Filson

• Decision Date: 25 August 2017
• Docket Number: 2:00-cv-01101 KJD-CWH
• Parties: MICHAEL SONNER, Petitioner, v. TIMOTHY FILSON, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

MICHAEL SONNER, Petitioner, v. TIMOTHY FILSON,¹ et al., Respondents.

2:00-cv-01101 KJD-CWH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

August 25, 2017

ORDER

Before the court for a decision on the merits is an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Michael Sonner, a Nevada prisoner sentenced to death. ECF No. 96.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In an opinion affirming Sonner's conviction and sentence, the Nevada Supreme Court recounted the factual background of this case:

On the evening of November 30, 1993, a red sport utility vehicle stopped at the Trinity Truck Stop at the junction of Interstate 80 and Highway 95, twenty-three miles west of Lovelock. After pumping $22.00 worth of gas, the driver left without paying.

Trooper Carlos Borland was alerted to what had occurred at the truck stop and eventually halted the red Chevy Blazer near Lovelock. Prior to the stop, the Chevy Blazer and Borland's patrol car both passed Steven and Doyle Anderson. As the Andersons approached the patrol car and the Blazer, Steven Anderson saw TrooperBorland lying on the ground and the Blazer pulling away from the shoulder. The Andersons stopped to help the stricken officer. Another passing motorist, Jerold Burkhart, also saw the Blazer speed away. Burkhart stopped and used Borland's radio to summon help. Borland was transported by ambulance to the Pershing General Hospital emergency room where doctors vainly attempted to stabilize him before he succumbed to a gunshot wound to the head. The Andersons and Burkhart testified that Borland's pistol was still in its holster.

On December 1, 1993, a stolen red Chevy Blazer was found abandoned in Churchill County. Shoe prints were observed leading away from the vehicle in the direction of the Clan Alpine Mountains. A helicopter reconnaissance team eventually saw what appeared to be a campfire several miles from the Blazer. A S.W.A.T. team landed, and a standoff ensued during which Sonner appeared suicidal when he raised his weapon in the direction of the officers in an attempt to draw their fire. The officers fired two shots, and although Sonner was not hit, he dropped his gun and surrendered. At trial, Sonner never disputed that he killed Trooper Borland. A jury convicted Sonner of first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon and sentenced him to death.

Sonner v. State, 930 P.2d 707, 710-11 (Nev. 1996). In a subsequent opinion, issued after a rehearing and still affirming the conviction and sentence, the Nevada Supreme Court set forth further background information regarding Sonner's trial and sentencing:

Sonner was tried in September 1994. The jury found him guilty of one count each of first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon, ex-felon in possession of a firearm, possession of a stolen vehicle, and resisting a public officer. At the penalty hearing, the state presented evidence that Sonner had been convicted of robbery and assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer in North Carolina, was a fugitive from North Carolina, had robbed and raped a woman in Virginia, and had shot to death two people in Texas. His presentence report showed that he had eleven prior felony convictions.

The jury found that the murder was committed under five aggravating circumstances: Sonner was under sentence of imprisonment; Sonner had previously been convicted of two felonies involving the use or threat of violence (each prior conviction was listed as a separate aggravating circumstance); the murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or to effect an escape from custody; and the victim was a peace officer, which Sonner knew or reasonably should have known, killed while engaged in the performance of his official duty. The jury found four mitigating circumstances: the murder was committed while Sonner was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; he was subject to neglect as a child; he was subject to abuse as a child; and he had never denied culpability for his criminal conduct. The jury returned a sentence of death. The district court also adjudicated Sonner a habitual criminal.

On October 28, 1994, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Sonner to death for the murder, a consecutive prison term of six years for ex-felon in possession of a firearm, a consecutive term of life in prison without possibility of parole for possession of a stolen vehicle and habitual criminality, and aconsecutive prison term of six years for resisting a public officer.

Sonner v. State, 322, 955 P.2d 673, 674 (Nev. 1998)

After the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence, Sonner's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied on October 5, 1998. Sonner v. Nevada, 525 U.S. 886 (1998).

On January 8, 1999, Sonner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state district court. On September 29, 1999, the state district court denied that petition, and on June 9, 2000, the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Sonner's appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court issued its remittitur on July 6, 2000.

Sonner initiated this federal habeas corpus action on September 11, 2000, by submitting his initial federal petition to the court and paying the filing fee. ECF Nos. 1 and 2. On October 19, 2000, the court granted Sonner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion for appointment of counsel, and directed the clerk to file his petition. ECF Nos. 3-5. Counsel undertook representation on April 23, 2001. ECF No. 12.

Discovery proceedings (first informal, then formal) ensued and did not conclude until October of 2004. On January 3, 2006, Sonner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 96. On June 5, 2006, respondents filed a motion to dismiss (ECF No. 103) asserting that many of the claims in the amended petition are barred by the statute of limitations, that many of the claims in the amended petition are unexhausted in state court, and that certain claims in the amended petition are not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. Sonner responded by filing a motion for stay and abeyance (ECF No. 108), which the court granted (ECF No. 113).

From December 21, 2006, to January 9, 2012, proceedings were stayed to allow Sonner to exhaust state court remedies for claims contained in his amended petition. ECF Nos. 113-128. During the stay, Sonner returned to state district court and filed a second state habeas petition on February 1, 2007. The state district court determined that only four of Sonner's claims were properlybefore the court and ordered him to file an amended petition containing only those four claims. The district court ultimately found those claims to be without merit. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to deny relief, but concluded that all of Sonner's claims were procedurally barred as untimely under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726(1) and successive under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810(1).

As noted, proceedings were reopened in this case on January 9, 2012. ECF No. 128. On March 26, 2013, pursuant to respondents' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 132), this court dismissed several of Sonner's claims as time-barred. ECF No. 170.

On May 10, 2013, the respondents filed their answer to Sonner's remaining habeas claims. Briefing on the merits of those claims concluded on January 6, 2014. On May 14, 2014, this court entered an order denying Sonner's motion for leave to conduct discovery, motion for evidentiary hearing, and motion for stay and abeyance, but conditionally granting his motion for leave to expand the record.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the standard of review under AEDPA:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the statecourt decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 411.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S....