Sontag v. Sontag

• Decision Date: 12 November 1985
• Citation: 495 N.Y.S.2d 65,114 A.D.2d 892
• Parties: Lorraine SONTAG, Appellant, v. Mark SONTAG, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 65

495 N.Y.S.2d 65

114 A.D.2d 892

Lorraine SONTAG, Appellant, v. Mark SONTAG, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Nov. 12, 1985.

Reisman, Peirez & Reisman, Garden City (Jerome Reisman and Robert M. Calica, Garden City, of counsel), for appellant.

Kantor, Davidoff, Wolfe, Rabbino & Kass, P.C., New York City (Steven W. Wolfe and Franklin Williams, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and BRACKEN, O'CONNOR and WEINSTEIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a matrimonial action, the plaintiff wife appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated January 7, 1985, which granted the defendant husband's motion to enforce a stipulation entered into by the parties on July 17, 1984.

Order affirmed, with costs.

In this matrimonial action, the parties entered into a stipulation which was spread upon the record in Justice Levitt's chambers on July 17, 1984. The stipulation represented the culmination of two years of negotiations and a series of "off-the-record conferences with the Court in an attempt to settle certain matters". The stipulation provided, inter alia, for maintenance, child support, life insurance, medical insurance, visitation, and allocation of proceeds upon sale of the marital residence.

Defendant moved by notice of motion dated August 27, 1984, to enforce the stipulation. Apparently, on the day following the July 17, 1984 court proceeding, plaintiff "changed her mind" and decided to "not abide by the terms of the stipulation". Plaintiff contends, in essence, that the stipulation was not final and binding but entered into subject to the execution of a formal written document embodying the terms agreed to and certain incidental issues to be resolved in the future.

Pursuant to CPLR 2104, an oral stipulation is binding on the parties provided that the agreement is spread upon the record in "open court". The "open court" requirement is satisfied by transcribed proceedings in chambers (Matter of Dolgin Eldert Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 1, 34 N.Y.S.2d 833, 286 N.E.2d 228; Owens v. Lombardi, 41 A.D.2d 438, 343 N.Y.S.2d 978, lv. denied 33 N.Y.2d 515, 348 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 302 N.E.2d 554). Therefore, plaintiff's allegations must be examined in light of the strong policy reasons favoring stipulations of settlement:

"Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and not lightly cast aside (see Matter of Galasso, 35 N.Y.2d 319, 321, 361 N.Y.S.2d 871, 320 N.E.2d 618). This is all the more so in the case of 'open court' stipulations (Matter of Dolgin Eldert Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 1, 10 ) within CPLR 2104, where strict enforcement not only serves the interest of efficient dispute resolution but also is essential to the management of court calendars and integrity of the litigation process. Only where there is cause sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake or accident, will a party be relieved from the consequences of a stipulation made during litigation (Matter of Frutiger, 29 N.Y.2d 143, 149-150 )" (Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510, 474 N.E.2d 1178).

Plaintiff's allegations fall considerably short of the type required to afford relief from a stipulation. Unsubstantiated,...