Sony Bmg Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum

• Citation: 672 F.Supp.2d 217
• Decision Date: 07 December 2009
• Docket Number: Case No. 07cv11446-NG.
• Parties: SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Joel TENENBAUM, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

672 F.Supp.2d 217

SONY BMG MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Joel TENENBAUM, Defendant.

Case No. 07cv11446-NG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 7, 2009.

John R. Bauer, Robinson & Cole LLP, Daniel J. Cloherty, Victoria L. Steinberg, Dwyer & Collora LLP, Boston, MA, Eve G. Burton, Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Denver, CO, Matthew Oppenheim, Pro Hac Vice, Potomac, MD, Timothy M. Reynolds, Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Pro Hac Vice, Boulder, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Matthew H. Feinberg, Matthew A. Kamholtz, Feinberg & Kamholtz, Boston, MA, Charles Nesson, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GERTNER, District Judge:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . 219
                 II. EQUITABLE DEFENSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . .  223
                III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  224
                     A. Legal Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
                     B. Fair Use Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  225
                     C. Fair Use Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  227
                        1. Statutory Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
                           a. Purpose and Character . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  227
                

                b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
                           c. Portion of the Work Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
                           d. Effect on the Potential Market for the Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  230
                        2. Non-statutory Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
                           a. Assumption of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
                           b. Marketing Activities and Failure to Protect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  234
                           c. Availability of Paid Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  235
                           d. Policing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
                           e. The Injustice of this Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
                IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
                

I. INTRODUCTION

Joel Tenenbaum ("Tenenbaum"), the defendant in this copyright infringement action, was accused of using file-sharing software as a college sophomore to download and distribute 30 copyrighted songs belonging to the plaintiffs. More than one and a half years after Tenenbaum filed his original answer to plaintiffs' complaint, and seven months after his attorney entered an appearance (and assured the Court that he would seek no further amendments because Tenenbaum wanted an immediate trial),¹ counsel moved to amend Tenenbaum's answer to argue that his file sharing constituted a "fair use" under the Copyright Act. What has since become a capstone of the defense, both in this court and the court of public opinion, was litigated — candidly — as an afterthought, and literally on the eve of trial.

The plaintiffs, four recording companies, moved for partial summary judgment on the fair use issue, claiming that there were no material facts in dispute and that only a question of law remained for the Court, not the jury, to decide (document # 871). Plaintiffs argue that the law and precedent is overwhelming, ruling out fair use as a valid defense to Tenenbaum's file sharing on the facts he presented.

A word on process: The Court, deeply concerned by the rash of file-sharing lawsuits, the imbalance of resources between the parties, and the upheaval of norms of behavior brought on by the internet, did everything in its power to permit Tenenbaum to make his best case for fair use. Over the record companies' strenuous objection, the Court allowed the fair use defense to be added at the eleventh hour. Again over plaintiffs' objection, the Court allowed limited discovery on the issue, even though discovery had otherwise been closed.² The Court did what it could to focus the issue, notwithstanding what can only be described as a truly chaotic defense.³ Unfortunately, the chaos meant that the fair use issue was briefed on the very eve of Tenenbaum's trial. Indeed, defendant's papers, submitted little more than a week before trial was to begin, can only be described as perfunctory

At the pre-trial conference, the Court forecast to the parties the likelihood that the fair use defense would be rejected. Then, after a full examination of the parties' arguments, the Court issued its formal ruling, rejecting fair use and stating that a published opinion would follow. See July 27, 2009 Order. This Memorandum describes in greater detail the reasons for the Court's decision — why fair use, ultimately, was not appropriate for a jury in this case.

As it made clear previously, the Court was prepared to consider a more expansive fair use argument than other courts have credited — perhaps one supported by facts specific to this individual and this unique period of rapid technological change. For example, file sharing for the purposes of sampling music prior to purchase or space-shifting to store purchased music more efficiently might offer a compelling case for fair use. Likewise, a defendant who used the new file-sharing networks in the technological interregnum before digital media could be purchased legally, but who later shifted to paid outlets, might also be able to rely on the defense.

But the defendant would have none of it. Rather than tailoring his fair use defense to suggest a modest exception to copyright protections, Tenenbaum mounted a broadside attack that would excuse all file sharing for private enjoyment. It is a version of fair use so broad that it would swallow the copyright protections that Congress created, defying both statute and precedent. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012-19 (9th Cir.2001). In his view, a defendant just needs to show that he did not make money from the files he downloaded or distributed — i.e., that his use was "non-commercial" — in order to put his fair use defense before a jury. And every non-commercial use, to him, is presumptively fair. Beyond that threshold, the matter belongs entirely to the jury, which is entitled to consider any and all factors touching on its innate sense of fairness — nothing more and nothing less. See Def.'s Proposed Jury Instructions at 4 (document # 893-4) ("Fairness is a principle not capable of bright-line definition. We know it when we see and feel it."). Defendant's version of fair use is, all in all, completely elastic, utterly standardless, and wholly without support. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) ("[T]he mere fact that a use is . . . not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement.").

To be sure, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial, but only on issues that turn on reasonably disputed facts. See Nancy Gertner & Judith H. Mizner, The Law of Juries 1-25 (2d ed.2009); see also Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir.2006). The purpose of pre-trial summary judgment procedures is to determine whether there are in fact any material facts in dispute and, given the existing legal framework, whether a reasonable jury could find in the defendant's favor. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (permitting summary judgment where moving party has shown that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact"). The Court is supposed to be a gatekeeper. If the defendant does not offer facts that present even a colorable legal defense of fair use, the Court is obliged to say so, and it did. The doctrine of fair use is not infinitely malleable, requiring a jury determination every time it is intoned, no matter what the facts. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. Pa. L.Rev. 549, 584 (2008) (cataloging 297 dispositive opinions in which a judge resolved fair use). The defendant has to show the Court that the law, when properly applied to the facts he intends to prove at trial, could produce a verdict in his favor.

Tenenbaum did not meet this burden; in truth, he did not come close. He offered few disputed facts and little, if any, legal authority for his position. His opposition briefs were not accompanied by any affidavits, expert reports, deposition testimony, or other evidence of the kind required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2). "Creating a genuine issue of material fact requires hard proof," as one court noted, not, as here, "spongy rhetoric." Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir.2002). Plaintiffs, in contrast, presented a raft of facts in support of their motion. See Pls.' Statement of Material Facts (document # 874); Opp'n to Summ. J. at 5-9 (document # 889). The following details were not in genuine dispute: (1) the main purpose of Tenenbaum's file sharing was his own private enjoyment and that of his friends, that is, the very use for which the artist or copyright holder is entitled to expect payment as a reward; (2) he downloaded entire songs, although not entire albums of music; (3) he did not transform the 30 works at issue (i.e., turn them into his own creative work); (4) his file sharing spanned more than four years and several different software platforms, both before and after this activity was detected in August 2004; and (5) during that time, his file-sharing software made more than 800 songs available to other Kazaa users to download. See Pls.' Statement of Facts at 1-4, 6. His activity continued notwithstanding changes in the case law, making it clear that the conduct was not protected; by 2...