Soong v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare

• Decision Date: 09 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 23575,23575
• Parties: Llewellyn SOONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE and Jerry L. Harris, its Director, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 261

968 P.2d 261

132 Idaho 166

Llewellyn SOONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE and Jerry L. Harris, its Director, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 23575.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Nov. 9, 1998.

Danny J. Radakovich, Lewiston, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Marcy J. Spilker, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for Defendants-Respondents. Marcy J. Spilker argued.

PERRY, Judge.

Llewellyn Soong appeals from the district court's order affirming the Idaho Personnel Commission's decision upholding the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's termination of Soong's employment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Soong began work as a therapeutic recreational specialist for the Department of Health and Welfare at State Hospital South (SHS) in 1979. In January 1990, he transferred to a similar position at State Hospital North (SHN). He was terminated in January 1994.

After his termination, Soong instituted the appropriate grievance process. Eventually, an evidentiary hearing was held before a hearing officer of the Idaho Personnel Commission (IPC), where testimony revealed that Teri Rainey was the supervisor during Soong's tenure at SHN. In June 1993, Rainey conducted an annual performance evaluation and classified Soong as "needs improvement" due to poor job performance, including his inability to correctly perform patient assessments. As a result of this evaluation Based on the evidence presented, the hearing officer rendered extensive findings of fact, conclusions of law and a preliminary order upholding the dismissal. Soong appealed the hearing officer's preliminary order to the IPC which adopted the hearing officer's decision. Soong then filed an appeal with the district court which again upheld Soong's termination. Soong appealed.

                Soong was placed on a ninety-day special evaluation period.  At the end of the ninety-day period, Rainey reevaluated Soong, again classifying him as "needs improvement" because of his lack of clinical skills in performing patient assessments and inadequacies in record documentation.  Rainey extended Soong's special evaluation period for another sixty days.  At the end of the sixty-day extension, Soong's performance was once more rated as "needs improvement."   As a result, Rainey outlined specific clinical expectations, based on Soong's job description, and required Soong to make substantial progress toward those expectations in order to preclude further disciplinary action.  Soong was placed on another sixty-day special evaluation period.  On January 24, 1994, Rainey evaluated Soong's performance during the previous sixty-day period and determined that Soong's performance remained unacceptable.  An intent to dismiss letter was issued that same day.  Soong was terminated from employment at SHN on January 31, 1994
                

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Soong appeals the order of the district court. We utilize the same standard of review set forth in I.C. § 67-5318. Lockhart v. State Dept. of Fish and Game, 127 Idaho 546, 552, 903 P.2d 135, 141 (Ct.App.1995). Thus, this Court will not set aside the decision of the commission unless the findings of fact are not based on any substantial, competent evidence; the commission has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; or the findings of fact by the commission do not as a matter of law support the decision. I.C. § 67-5318; Lockhart, 127 Idaho at 552, 903 P.2d at 141. Judicial review of administrative action requires that a court decide, in light of the entire record, whether the agency's findings of fact are reasonable. Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 260, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985). With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of Soong's appeal.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Excluded Evidence

Soong contends that the hearing officer improperly excluded relevant evidence. Soong asserts that the Personnel System Act, I.C. §§ 67-5301 to -5342, (the Act) employs essentially a "let 'em play" philosophy. Soong avers that all salient information should have been before the hearing officer, relying on I.C. § 67-5316(8), which states that the "hearing officer to whom the matter has been assigned shall make such inquiry and investigations as shall be deemed necessary."

We review questions of relevancy de novo. Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Hous. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 466, 860 P.2d 653, 669 (1993). "Relevant Evidence" means evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. The Idaho Rules of Evidence do not fully apply during a termination hearing; however, a hearing officer "may exclude evidence that is irrelevant." IDAPA 04.11.01.600.

Soong complains that the hearing officer improperly excluded the testimony of Ka-sia Baumer and Cokia Arthur. Baumer, a psychiatric technician who had worked with Soong at both SHS and SHN, testified that the structure and emphasis between SHS and SHN were very different. The hearing officer, while allowing Baumer's testimony regarding her observations of Soong at SHN, excluded testimony of Baumer's observations of Soong at SHS. Additionally, Arthur, an employee at Tri-State Health and Rehabilitation Center, in Clarkston, Washington, was precluded from testifying regarding her observations of Soong at Tri-State. Soong was The fact of consequence at the hearing was whether Soong satisfactorily performed in conformity with his job description and the clinical expectations while at SHN. The evidence Soong sought to introduce via these two witnesses, which dealt with Soong's performance in different jobs at different institutions, did not have a tendency to make that fact more or less probable. Therefore, the evidence was irrelevant and properly excluded by the hearing officer.

employed by Tri-State after his dismissal from SHN. Arthur admittedly knew nothing about the therapeutic recreational specialist position at SHN and had never reviewed the job description in connection with employment at SHN.

B. Commission's Findings of Fact

1. Evidence considered

Soong asserts that any reliance on events not specifically set forth in the letter of termination may not be utilized to justify his dismissal. The Act requires that the IPC adopt a rule for disciplinary dismissal of employees "only for cause with reasons given in writing." I.C. § 67-5309(n).

In the case at bar, Soong's termination letter stated he was being dismissed for: (1) "Failure to perform the duties and carry out the obligations imposed by the state constitution, state statute or rules of the Department of the Idaho Personnel Commission"; (2) "Inefficiency, incompetency or negligence in performing duties"; and (3) failure "to meet the Clinical Expectations that were discussed with you and your Supervisor, Teri Rainey, CTRS, on 12/3/93." The letter also referenced Soong's annual performance evaluation dated June 1993. Annual performance evaluations cover, as the term indicates, approximately one year of employment. Therefore, Soong's performance from June 1992 to his termination was covered by the dismissal letter. Moreover, any incident of inefficiency, incompetence or negligence in performing his duties was properly considered because such performance was referenced in the termination letter.

Thus, although correctly stating the requirements of the Act, Soong reads his letter of termination too narrowly. Not only was Soong's failure to meet the clinical expectations a ground for his termination, but so was any episode of inefficiency, incompetence or negligence in performing his duties at SHN. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was properly considered.

2. Job description

Soong contends that he cannot be terminated for inadequate job performance unless there is a valid job description against which his performance can be measured. Although the Department placed in evidence a copy of Soong's job description, he asserts that it is invalid. The gravamen of his contention is that the term "classification," as used in the Act, is intended to be synonymous with "job description." If this is so, according to Soong, the IPC would have had to issue each job description. Soong contends that there was "no real proof" that the job description submitted during the hearing was approved by the state personnel director.

The Idaho legislature created the Idaho Personnel Commission (IPC) and the system governing employment by the state of Idaho. I.C. §§ 67-5301to -5342. The IPC was instructed to adopt a job classification system, after analyzing the duties and responsibilities of each position. I.C. § 67-5309(a). A "class" is defined as "a group of positions sufficiently similar as to the duties performed, degree of supervision exercised or required, minimum requirements of training, experience or skill, and other characteristics, that the same title, the same tests of fitness and the same schedule of compensation may be applied to each position in the group." I.C. § 67-5302(3). From this definition, the purpose of job classes is to group similar positions together so they will be treated consistently for recruitment and compensation. Such grouping would not be possible if, as Soong suggests,...