Sorrell v. Paige Indus. Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 15-2004 (TJK) |
| Parties | CORRY D. SORRELL, Plaintiff, v. PAIGE INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiff Corry Sorrell contends that his former employer improperly paid him as a laborer instead of an electrician, assigned him to lower-paying jobs, drug tested him too much, and failed to provide him with certain employment documentation. He alleges these actions stemmed from discrimination and retaliation based on his age and race in violation of Title VII, Section 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. His former employer moved for summary judgment, and Sorrell cross-moved for partial summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant his employer's motion, deny Sorrell's, and enter judgment for his former employer.
Paige Industrial Services, Inc. ("Paige") provides electrical and construction services throughout the District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia. ECF No. 31-2 (Def.'s SMF) ¶ 1. The company provides services on both public- and private-sector projects, but most of its work is for federal, state, and local governments. Id. ¶ 7. Paige employees are assigned a base hourly pay rate when they are hired. Id. ¶ 13. On private jobs, employees earn their base rate. Id. ¶ 14. On public projects, however, the relevant government entity sets pay, called a "scale rate," and an employee is paid the higher of his base rate and scale rate. Id. ¶¶ 10, 15.
Sorrell started working at Paige in October 2010, when he was 41 years old. Id. Originally, Paige hired Sorrell as a laborer in its construction division, where his duties consisted of carrying drywall to worksites, removing scrap drywall, and sweeping floors. Id. ¶ 38. His base rate was $15.00 per hour. Id. ¶ 35. In May 2011, he started working as a laborer in Paige's electrical division. Id. ¶ 40. A year later, Sorrell received a raise to $17.00 per hour because Paige's vice president, Frederick Gramlich, had heard he was doing good work. Id. ¶ 41-42. In 2013, Sorrell enrolled in electrical courses at Prince George's Community College, and Paige reimbursed him for them. Id. ¶ 52. Later that same year, Sorrell enrolled in an apprenticeship program through Independent Electrical Contractors (IEC). Id. ¶ 53. Gramlich encouraged Sorrell to apply, and Paige sponsored his application and paid the program fees. Id. ¶¶ 53-56.
Before Sorrell enrolled in the apprenticeship, Paige classified him as a laborer, rather than an electrician, on all federal projects. Id. ¶¶ 44-51. After Sorrell entered the apprenticeship program, under the contract that both Sorrell and Paige signed, Paige paid Sorrell a percentage of the electrician wage on federal projects. Id. ¶ 63. The following year, in mid-to-late July 2014, Sorrell became dissatisfied with his pay and complained to his supervisor, Jeffrey Carney. ECF No. 31-3 (Sorrell Tr. A) at 224:18-225:20. On July 28, 2014, Sorrell sent a letter to Gramlich, making a similar complaint. See ECF No. 31-15. Gramlich responded by telling Sorrell that Paige was reviewing his rate. Id.
Sorrell resigned from Paige on August 15, 2014, just a few weeks later. Def.'s SMF ¶ 67. And four days after that, Sorrell called Paige and spoke with Jennifer DeMarr, an administrative assistant. See ECF No. 31-16. Sorrell requested that Paige email him his electrical work history so that he could take his journeyman electrician test. Id. Robert Brown,Paige's outside accountant, fielded the request from DeMarr, but advised her that it could wait until after an upcoming meeting. Id. Paige never responded to Sorrell's request, but Sorrell eventually obtained his apprenticeship work history from IEC. See Sorrell Tr. A at 248:6-11. Soon after, he began working for another contractor. Id. at 165:11-166:8.
On August 27, 2014, Sorrell filed an administrative complaint alleging discrimination with the Baltimore office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and flagged it to be cross-filed with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (MCCR). ECF No. 31-17. After the MCCR denied his claim, ECF No. 31-18, and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, ECF No. 35 at 40, Sorrell filed this lawsuit on September 8, 2015, in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging discrimination on the basis of race and age, and retaliation, under Title VII, Section 1981, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA). ECF No. 1. Paige removed the case, id., and later moved for summary judgment, ECF No. 31. Sorrell filed an opposition, as well as a cross-motion for partial summary judgment directed at Paige's purported justification for his salary. ECF Nos. 35-37.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriately granted when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movants and drawing all reasonable inferences accordingly, no reasonable jury could reach a verdict in their favor." Lopez v. Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., 826 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2016). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the evidence "is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (citations omitted). "Importantly, while summary judgment must be approached with specific caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up).
As explained below, the Court finds that Paige is entitled to summary judgment on all counts. First, Sorrell did not oppose Paige's motion as it relates to his ADEA and DCHRA age discrimination and retaliation claims, and in any event, there is no evidence that Paige discriminated against Sorrell because of his age or that it retaliated against him for engaging in age-related protected activity. Second, summary judgment is appropriate on Sorrell's DCHRA race and age discrimination claims because the statute of limitations bars those claims. Third, Paige is entitled to judgment on Sorrell's Title VII and Section 1981 race discrimination claims because no reasonable jury could conclude that Paige's legitimate reasons for paying Sorrell as it did—based on his experience and skill level—were pretextual and that the real reason was discrimination. And fourth, summary judgment is warranted for Paige on Sorrell's Title VII, Section 1981, and DCHRA retaliation claims because Sorrell has not shown that Paige's actions were adverse or that Paige took those actions because of his protected activity.
The ADEA and DCHRA prohibit discrimination based on a person's age and retaliation for related protected activity. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (d); D.C. Code §§ 2-1402.11(a)(1)(A),2-1402.61(a). To establish a discrimination or retaliation claim, a plaintiff may rely on direct evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent, as well as indirect evidence from which such motive for the challenged employment decision could be inferred. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009). When a plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, the claim is subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. DeJesus v. WP Co., 841 F.3d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (ADEA); Dougherty v. Cable News Network, 396 F. Supp. 3d 84, 100-01 (D.D.C. 2019) (DCHRA). Under that framework, a plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by coming forward with evidence showing that he (i) was 40 or older, and so falls within the ADEA's protective reach; (ii) was otherwise qualified for the position in which he was working; (iii) suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) was "disadvantaged in favor of a younger person." Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In the retaliation context, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by showing that he (i) engaged in protected activity; (ii) suffered an adverse employment action; and (iii) a causal link connects the protected activity and adverse action. Moss v. Hayden, 18-cv-470 (JEB), 2020 WL 4001467, at *2 (D.D.C. July 15, 2020).
Sorrell did not oppose Paige's motion for summary judgment as to his age discrimination and retaliation claims, or otherwise try to put forward any evidence supporting a prima facie case. Thus, the Court treats the facts proffered by Paige as conceded. See Rogers v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 214 F. Supp. 3d 10, 11 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). After considering those facts, the Court finds that Paige has carried its burden to show it is entitled to summary judgment. Nothing in the record suggests that Paige set Sorrell's pay based on an age bias, rather than his experience and skill set,an obviously legitimate business justification. In fact, there is no evidence in the record of age discrimination at all. As for retaliation, Sorrell has provided no evidence that he engaged in age-related protected activity, e.g., that he complained internally...
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