Sorrell v. Thevenir

Decision Date01 June 1994
Docket Number93-1041,Nos. 92-2382,s. 92-2382
Citation633 N.E.2d 504,69 Ohio St.3d 415
PartiesSORRELL et al., Appellants, v. THEVENIR, Appellee. CLARK et al. v. QUALITY STORES, INC.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

R.C. 2317.45 violates Sections 2, 5 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional in toto.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Gallia County, No. 91-CA-4.

ON ORDER from the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, Certifying Questions of State Law, No. 3:91CV7704.

Case No. 92-2382

In her complaint before the court of common pleas, plaintiff-appellant Sherry A. Sorrell alleged that on September 15, 1988, she was working as a cashier at Brown's Market. Plaintiff alleged that as she bent over to sweep dirt into a dustpan, defendant-appellee, James A. Thevenir, came up behind her and grabbed her about the waist. As a result of defendant's unexpected conduct, plaintiff pulled herself up suddenly and twisted. Consequently, plaintiff alleged she has endured severe pain, requiring medical treatment and causing her to miss work.

Plaintiff and her spouse filed the instant action requesting damages for physical injuries, emotional distress, loss of income and loss of consortium, and demanded a jury trial. A jury eventually returned a verdict of compensatory damages in the amount of $10,128.26. In response to an interrogatory, the jury declared that $5,000 of this amount was for pain and suffering. The jury awarded nothing for future damages, and nothing to plaintiff's husband.

Subsequently, in accordance with R.C. 2317.45, the trial court conducted a postverdict hearing wherein plaintiff disclosed the extent and nature of all statutorily defined collateral benefits received by her. Defendant asserted that pursuant to R.C. 2317.45(B)(2) he was entitled to a setoff of the entire jury verdict, since plaintiff had received over $14,000 in workers' compensation benefits.

In an opinion dated January 31, 1991, the trial court held R.C. 2317.45 to be unconstitutional under Section 16, Article I (right to a remedy), and Section 5, Article I (inviolate right to a jury trial) of the Ohio Constitution. In addition, the court held that since the fundamental constitutional right to a jury trial was involved, a strict scrutiny test applied in determining the constitutionality of R.C. 2317.45 under the Due Process Clause of the Ohio Constitution. The trial court concluded that the statute failed to meet the strict scrutiny test and further observed that "[t]he statute was enacted to cure a supposed 'insurance crisis.' There is no demonstrated evidence from which to conclude that a 'crisis' ever existed or that [Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws Part I, 1661] cured this 'crisis.' There is no compelling reason to trample plaintiff's constitutional rights to relieve a particular industry of liability." Thus, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for the entire amount of the jury verdict without setting off the collateral benefits (workers' compensation) she received.

Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded in a split decision. The appellate court majority held that while the case was not exactly on point, Morris v. Savoy (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 576 N.E.2d 765, "indicates the [Supreme Court of Ohio] would find R.C. 2317.45 to be constitutional."

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Case No. 93-1041

According to plaintiff-petitioner Bobbie Clark, on November 4, 1989, he was injured as the result of the negligence of defendant-respondent Quality Stores, Inc. in maintaining its property.

Plaintiff and his spouse filed a personal injury action against defendant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division. A jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $241,168, plus $25,000 for the spouse's loss of consortium.

Subsequently, defendant moved for a setoff of $146,000 for disability income, including future disability income, from Social Security and the state of Ohio, as well as the disability retirement benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System.

Thereafter, in response to a motion by plaintiffs, the federal district court certified the following questions to this court:

"A. Whether O.R.C. § 2317.45, which allows for the reduction of an award of damages in a tort action by the amount of collateral benefits, as defined in O.R.C. § 2317.45, violates the Ohio Constitution[?]

"B. Are Social Security disability income benefits paid to Plaintiff a collateral source pursuant to O.R.C. § 2317.45(A)(1)(a) where the benefits were received following the tort, and the plaintiff asserted and the defendant disputed that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled as a consequence of the tort, and each party submitted evidence to support its position at trial[?]

"C. Are payments made through a disability income program by Plaintiff's employer, the State of Ohio, a collateral source pursuant to O.R.C. § 2317.45(A)(1)(a) where the benefits were received following the tort, the plaintiff asserted and the defendant disputed that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled as a consequence of the tort, and each party submitted evidence to support its position at trial[?]

"D. Does Plaintiff's election to receive disability retirement benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Public Employees Retirement System, O.R.C. § 145.01 et seq., cause those benefits to be deemed a collateral source pursuant to O.R.C. § 2317.45(A)(1)(a) where the benefits were received following the tort, the plaintiff asserted and the defendant disputed that the plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled as a consequence of the tort, and each party submitted evidence to support its position at trial[?]

"E. What procedure should a trial court follow to determine whether an entitlement to such collateral benefits resulted from the tort, where the jury has returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff[?]

"F. Which party has the burden of proof on the issues under O.R.C. § 2317.45(B)(2)(a)(i) of what collateral benefits have been received or are 'reasonably certain' to be received as a result of the tort within the next sixty months after entry of judgment[?]"

The cause is now before this court pursuant to Rule XVI (now XVIII) of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice.

Murray & Murray Co., L.P.A., Thomas J. Murray, Nancy L. Ogden, Sandusky and Alicia Wolph, Fostoria; Schulman, Mestel & Burick Co., L.P.A., and Allen J. Schulman, Jr., Canton, Porter, Little, Sheets & Lentes and Jennifer L. Sheets, Pomeroy, for appellants.

Theisen, Brock, Frye, Erb & Leeper Co., L.P.A., John E. Erb, James S. Huggins and Paul A. MacKenzie, Marietta, for appellee.

A. William Zavarello and Mark W. Ruf, Akron, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease and William D. Kloss, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Insurance Institute.

Weston, Hurd, Fallon, Paisley & Howley, Ronald A. Rispo and William H. Baughman, Jr., Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Ass'n of Civil Trial Attys.

Wolske & Blue, Gerald S. Leeseberg and Sarah H. Meirson, Columbus, for petitioners.

Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick and Robert G. Clayton, Jr., Toledo, for respondent.

A. WILLIAM SWEENEY, Justice.

In the cases before us, R.C. 2317.45 is assailed as being unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the following provisions of the Ohio Constitution: Section 16, Article I (due process, right to a remedy and open courts), Section 2, Article I (equal protection), and Section 5, Article I (right to a jury trial). For the reasons that follow, we hold R.C. 2317.45 to be unconstitutional under all of the foregoing constitutional provisions.

In determining the constitutionality of any statute, we begin our analysis with the principle that all legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus; Mominee v. Scherbarth (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 274, 28 OBR 346, 349, 503 N.E.2d 717, 720; Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 631, 576 N.E.2d 722, 727. While some of the arguments of the parties and amici curiae relate to the wisdom of abrogating the collateral source rule, this court's duty is to ignore such arguments and determine the constitutionality of R.C. 2317.45 as an exercise of legislative power. State ex rel. Bishop v. Mt. Orab Village Bd. of Edn. (1942), 139 Ohio St. 427, 438, 22 O.O. 494, 498, 40 N.E.2d 913, 919.

I

R.C. 2317.45, 1 part of the Tort Reform Act of 1987 ("Act"), was enacted by Am.Sub.H.B. No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661, 1694, and became effective January 5, 1988. The purpose of the Act, as stated in its title, is "to make changes in civil justice and insurance law, thereby reducing the causes of the current insurance crisis and preventing future crises, and ensuring the availability and affordability of insurance coverages required by charitable nonprofit organizations, public organizations, political subdivisions, individual proprietors, small businesses, and commercial enterprises."

One commentator noted that another purpose of the Act is to prevent double recoveries in tort actions. Darling, Ohio Civil Justice Reform Act (1987) 130-131; see, also, Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.45 (1992), 53 Ohio St.L.J. 587; Baker v. Goldblatt (C.A. 6, 1992), 955 F.2d 402, 407. However, opponents of the Act, including the Ohio Public Interest Campaign, claimed that the insurance industry had contrived an insurance crisis in order to promote and protect "organized price gouging" by insurance underwriters. ...

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