Sorrels v. Tech
| Decision Date | 03 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 108,624.Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma,Division No. 2.,108,624.Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
| Citation | 266 P.3d 653,2011 OK CIV APP 107 |
| Parties | Sherry Lee SORRELS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Gary Fred TECH, Individually and as Trustee of the Amended and Restated Fred Tech Trust, Janis Tech and The Unknown Heirs, Executors, Devisees, Trustees, Personal Representatives, Assigns and Successors of Janis Tech and Fred Tech, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from the District Court of Canadian County, Oklahoma; Honorable Gary E. Miller, Trial Judge.AFFIRMED.
R. Stephen Haynes, Law Offices of R. Stephen Haynes, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Robert W. Nelson, Chad E. Ihrig, Nelson, Roselius, Terry & Morton, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff Sherry Lee Sorrels appeals the district court's order granting defendant Janis Tech's 1 motion for summary judgment. The appeal has been assigned to the accelerated docket pursuant to Oklahoma Supreme Court Rule 1.36(b), 12 O.S. Supp.2009, ch. 15, app. 1, and the matter stands submitted without appellate briefing. Because it is undisputed that Sorrels signed an agreement assuming responsibility for obtaining insurance coverage on certain real property, she cannot maintain an action against Janis Tech related to that subject, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
¶ 2 Sorrels is the daughter and one of three children of Fred Tech, who died in 2003. Janis and Fred Tech were married at the time of his death. Pursuant to the Fred Tech Trust, Sorrels is the distributee of approximately 140 acres and improvements thereon previously owned by her father, the SW 1/4 of Section 8, Township 14 North, Range 9 West, in Canadian County, Oklahoma (the Property). However, paragraph 4.1 of the trust instrument provided that not more than five acres of the Property, including Fred Tech's former residence, would be subject to Janis Tech's “rights to occupy such residence” and “to continue to reside in such residence so long as she desires, provided, she shall be responsible for the expenses of normal upkeep and maintenance of the residence” until her abandonment of the residence or death. The same paragraph allocated payment of the ad valorem taxes on the Property to Sorrels.
¶ 3 From the record, it appears that there was controversy involved in settling Fred Tech's estate and distributing the property subject to the Fred Tech Trust. Primarily, this controversy appears to have involved Sorrels and her two brothers, each of whom also received a distribution of real property pursuant to the Trust. During this controversy, the trustee executed a quit claim deed in favor of Janis Tech conveying her interest in the residence. The parties to the deed were the trustee on behalf of the Trust and Janis Tech. That deed provided that on her death or abandonment of the residence, all of Janis Tech's rights in the Property would terminate and that Sorrels would then “hold and own such property free and clear of any claim to use or benefit thereof” by Janis Tech. The deed also contains the following language: “Party of the Second Part [Janis Tech] during the time she occupies and uses said premises shall be responsible for the expense of normal upkeep and maintenance of the residence, however, the distributee [Sorrels] ... shall be responsible for payment of ad valorem taxes on the property with the Party of the Second Part and the distributee to each be responsible for insuring their respective interest in the premises and the improvements thereon.” The deed is dated July 23, 2003, and was recorded with the Canadian County Clerk two days later.
¶ 4 Ultimately, the parties were able to resolve their differences and executed an Agreement dated May 19, 2004. The Agreement incorporated the terms of the quit claim deed. Sorrels, her two brothers and Janis Tech are the signatories to the Agreement, which recites that its purpose is to memorialize these parties' agreement “with respect to distribution of assets of the Fred Tech Trust and termination (winding up of the affairs) of said Trust.” Ten days later, a tornado destroyed the residence.
¶ 5 During the time that she occupied the residence, Janis Tech maintained the insurance policy in effect at Fred Tech's death. The proceeds of the insurance policy in effect at the time the residence was destroyed were paid to Janis Tech. Subsequent to the May 29 tornado, Janis Tech abandoned the residence and disclaimed any further interest in the Property. Sorrels maintained a successful action to quiet title to the Property distributed to her pursuant to the Fred Tech Trust.2 In that action, Sorrels also sought to recover the insurance proceeds paid to Janis Tech and the difference between that amount and the actual value of the residence and related buildings. As to this claim, Janis Tech filed a motion for summary judgment. The order sustaining that motion is the subject of this appeal.
¶ 6 Rule 13 of the Rules for District Courts of Oklahoma, 12 O.S. Supp.2009, ch. 2, app., governs the procedure for summary judgment in the district court. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶ 2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. On review, we examine the pleadings and evidentiary materials submitted by the parties to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Id. This Court bears “an affirmative duty to test all evidentiary material tendered in summary process for its legal sufficiency to support the relief sought by the movant.” Copeland v. The Lodge Enters., Inc., 2000 OK 36, ¶ 8, 4 P.3d 695, 699. “Only if the court should conclude that there is no material fact in dispute and the law favors the movant's claim or liability-defeating defense is the moving party entitled to summary judgment in its favor.” Id.
¶ 7 The summary judgment pleadings establish the following undisputed facts material to Janis Tech's motion for summary judgment:
1. Pursuant to the Fred Tech Trust, Sorrels became the owner of the Property subject to Janis Tech's right to occupy the residence until her death or abandonment of the residence on the death of Fred Tech.
2. Fred Tech died on March 13, 2003.
3. On July 23, 2003, the trustee of the Fred Tech Trust executed a quit claim deed conveying to Janis Tech her interest in the Property pursuant to the terms of the Trust.
4. The quit claim deed was properly recorded with the Canadian County Clerk on July 25, 2003.
5. The quit claim deed provided that Janis Tech and Sorrels would “each be responsible for insuring their respective interest in the [Property] and the improvements thereon.”
6. After various disputes regarding distribution of the Trust assets, Janis Tech, Sorrels and the other Trust distributees signed an Agreement dated May 19, 2004, providing for the distribution of Trust assets.
7. The Agreement incorporated the terms and conditions of the quit claim deed.
8. The Agreement distributed the Property to Sorrels “subject to the terms and conditions of Section 4.1 ... of the Fred Tech Trust, and all provisions of the Quit Claim Deed” to Janis Tech.
9. One term of the quit claim deed required Sorrels to be responsible for insuring her interest in the “premises and the improvements” covered by the deed.
10. Janis Tech maintained an insurance policy on the residence covered by the quit claim deed.
11. Sorrels did not insure her interest in the Property.
12. The residence and related buildings located on the Property were destroyed by a tornado on May 29, 2004.
13. Janis Tech did not represent to Sorrels that she had obtained full coverage insurance on the residence and related buildings.
¶ 8 First, Sorrels argues that Janis Tech acquired no estate in the Property but only a personal right to occupy the Property until she died or abandoned that right. Kemp v. Turnbull, 1946 OK 277, 174 P.2d 384, relied on by Sorrels for this argument, discussed a “probate homestead” created by operation of law pursuant to statute. The statute provides: “Upon the death of either husband or wife, the survivor may continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead....” 58 O.S.2001 § 311. The Court held that a probate homestead was not an estate in land and was not alienable, unlike a life estate devised to a surviving spouse by will. The Court also distinguished the probate estate from the life estate devised to the wife pursuant to her husband's will. Here we deal with the latter, and Kemp is not dispositive. 3
¶ 9 As a matter of real property law, Janis Tech acquired a life estate pursuant to paragraph 4.1 of the Trust. See Lohmann v. Adams, 1975 OK 86, 540 P.2d 552 (). Janis Tech's life estate was subject to forfeiture if she abandoned or chose not to occupy the Property. See Berry v. Cooley, 1940 OK 473, ¶ 33, 109 P.2d 1081, 1086 (). This type of forfeiture provision was distinguished from a “disabling restraint” in Lohmann, 1975 OK 86, ¶¶ 22–23, 540 P.2d at 555. There, the Court held that disabling restraints contained in instruments creating a life estate and remainder were invalid as impermissibly preventing alienation of a freehold estate. The Court did not decide whether forfeiture restraints were likewise invalid because: “In any given case consideration would have to be given to the justifications for the restraint and the nature of the estate restrained.” Id. ¶ 40, 540 P.2d at 557. No Oklahoma case has addressed the validity of a conditional limitation on a life estate requiring occupancy of the estate. However, other jurisdictions...
To continue reading
Request your trial