Sosinavage v. Thomson
| Decision Date | 02 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:14-cv-3292-NLH-AMD |
| Parties | JOHN A. SOSINAVAGE, Plaintiff, v. POLICE CHIEF JOHN SCOTT THOMSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
CHERYL L. COOPER, LAW OFFICES OF CHERYL L. COOPER On behalf of Plaintiff
BETSY G. RAMOS EDWARD FRANK KUHN, III MICHELLE L. COREA CAPEHART & SCATCHARD On behalf of Defendants
Pending before the Court is Defendants John Scott Thomson, Louis Vega, Michael Lynch, Orlando Cuevas, and the City of Camden's (“Defendants”) unopposed[1] motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF 336). For the reasons expressed below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Plaintiff John A. Sosinavage (“Plaintiff”) served as a member of the Camden City Police Department (“CCPD”) from approximately September 1994 to May 2013. (ECF 44 at ¶ 5). Plaintiff was promoted to the position of lieutenant during the Summer of 2004 and was assigned to Internal Affairs until May 2009, when he was transferred to patrol. (Id. at ¶ 12).
Defendant Vega was hired as civilian police director of CCPD in August 2008. (Id. at ¶ 13). Defendant Thomson served as CCPD's chief of police, (id. at ¶ 5) while Defendant Cuevas and Defendant Lynch both served as deputy chiefs and inspectors, (id. at ¶ 6-7).
On May 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants, (ECF 1), and thereafter twice amended the Complaint (ECF 4; ECF 44). Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges ten counts, (ECF 44), of which seven apply to Defendants and are thus at issue here, (ECF 336-2 at ¶ 2).[2] The Court summarizes the relevant counts by separating them into three general groups as follows.
Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6 of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint allege violations of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14. During Plaintiff's tenure in Internal Affairs, CCPD was under a consent decree for irregular Internal Affairs practices and Plaintiff was tasked with ensuring compliance with the decree and New Jersey Attorney General (“NJAG”) Guidelines. (ECF 44 at ¶¶ 17, 20). Plaintiff claims that Vega expressed a desire to impose fear on CCPD officers and reprioritize Internal Affairs with a focus on rules infractions. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39). Vega also reportedly sought issuance of a firearm in December 2008, after which Plaintiff contacted the Camden County Prosecutor's Office (“CCPO”) and learned that Vega was ineligible for a firearm without additional paperwork. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-54). Plaintiff was thereafter allegedly instructed by Thomson to not contact counsel without first consulting him and told that Plaintiff had complicated Thomson's relationship with Vega. (Id. at ¶ 59). Thomson also, according to Plaintiff, was of the stated belief that investigations of disciplinary matters made by high-ranking officers did not require subsequent investigations, (id. at ¶ 81), and ordered the completion of charges made against officers prior to the conclusion of investigations and despite Plaintiff's objections, (id. at ¶ 8485).
Plaintiff claims that, due to his objections, he was retaliated against including being transferred from Internal Affairs and replaced by a sergeant; assigned the midnight shift, other unfavorable work hours, and more weekends than all other officers; required attendance at meetings without full compensation; and unfairly disciplined. (Id. at ¶ 106).
Plaintiff filed a state court action in April 2010[3] alleging improper practices and retaliation, (id. at ¶¶ 111-12), and spoke out against CCPD practices in his role as a union official, (id. at ¶¶ 115-16). His objections included allegations of improper application for off-duty pay by Cuevas, (id. at ¶ 119), and improper intervention by Thomson in that and other investigations, (id. at 124, 128), contributing to Count 2. Counts 3 and 6 claim retaliation and damages stemming from Plaintiff's objections, (id. at ¶¶ 131-33), and reiterate and expound upon the same allegations, (id. at ¶¶ 154-86), including claims that Plaintiff was pressured into not making a complaint against Cuevas and suffered harassment and retaliation for doing so, (id. at ¶¶ 170, 186).
Plaintiff asserts that he was a public employee who spoke out on matters of public concern and that his state court action and objections to CCPD conduct and practices constituted protected speech under the United States Constitution. (See Id. at ¶¶ 135-45). As a result of his protected speech, Plaintiff alleges harassment, intimidation, and retaliation. (Id. at ¶ 146). This same speech, according to Plaintiff, is protected under the New Jersey Constitution, (id. at ¶ 149), and because of such speech Plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against in the form of adverse employment actions, (id. at ¶¶ 151-52).
Plaintiff claims that individual Defendants' “acted under color of state law” and that Thomson, as chief of police, set out the policies and made final decisions on behalf of CCPD. (Id. at ¶¶ 189-92). Defendants Thomson, Lynch, and Cuevas created customs of manipulation, intimidation, and the like in violation of NJAG Guidelines and the consent decree of which City administration was on notice, (id. at ¶¶ 193-201, 204), and Plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against in the form of transfer, harassment, schedule manipulation, and improper discipline due to his speaking out, (id. at 205-06).
The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the United States Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is “material” when “its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015)). “All facts and inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Candido v. Hogsten, 316 Fed.Appx. 128, 129 (3d Cir. 2008). It is the movant's responsibility to show an absence of genuine issue of material fact, after which the burden shifts to the nonmovant, which “must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial.” V.C. by Costello v. Target Corp., 454 F.Supp.3d 415, 422 (D.N.J. Apr. 14, 2020); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ().
This same general analysis applies even when a summary judgment motion, as here, is unopposed. Rakowski v. City of Brigantine, No. 19-21847, 2022 WL 326992, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2022) (citing Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1990)). However, Local Civil Rule 56.1 provides that “any material fact not disputed shall be deemed undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.” L. Civ. R. 56.1(a). It therefore requires “an exceptional case where the court concludes that summary judgment should nonetheless be denied or withheld” when a summary judgment motion is appropriately filed, supported, and unopposed. See Hines v. Lanigan, No. 17-2864, 2021 WL 4963252, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2021).
It is with this standard in mind that the Court will analyze to determine whether any elements of Plaintiff's respective claims are unsupported. See Wood v. Detwiler, 782 Fed.Appx. 103, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because Wood failed to offer evidence supporting the essential elements to his Eighth Amendment claims.”).
“CEPA is remedial legislation and must therefore be construed liberally in employees' favor.” Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2016). CEPA prohibits retaliatory action by an employer against an employee who objects to or refuses to participate in an activity, policy, or practice that the employee reasonably believes violates a law, rule, or regulation; is fraudulent or criminal; or is contrary to public policy involving public health, safety, welfare, or the environment. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c). To establish a CEPA retaliation claim, the employee must demonstrate that (1) they reasonably believed that the employer's conduct violated a law, regulation, or clear mandate of public policy; (2) they performed a whistleblowing activity; (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against them; and (4) there was a causal nexus between the whistleblowing activity and adverse employment action. Greenman v. City of Hackensack, 486 F.Supp.3d 811, 829-30 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2020) ().
Important to the initial prong of the analysis is the employee's objectively reasonable belief of the employer's action is illegal or contrary to public policy and that, if the violation is of a policy, that that...
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