Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas
Decision Date | 17 February 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 07-50632.,07-50632. |
Parties | Harvey Leroy SOSSAMON, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The LONE STAR STATE OF TEXAS; Christina Melton Crain, Chairman, Texas Criminal Justice Board; Cathy Clement, Assistant Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division Region VI; Brad Livingston, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Doug Dretke, Executive Director, Correctional Institutions Division; Reverend R.G. Murphy, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division Region VI Chaplaincy Regional Program Admin.; Senior Warden Robert Eason, French M. Robertson Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division; Assistant Warden Stacy L. Jackson, French M. Robertson Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Correctional Institutions Division; Chaplain Paul J. Klien, French M. Robertson Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice— Correctional Institutions Division, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
John Kuchera (argued), Waco, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Marjolyn Carol Gardner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Law Enforcement Defense Div., David Eugene Brice (argued), Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before WIENER, GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
We are asked today to resolve a number of questions concerning the extent to which, based on the special considerations we afford the government in its role as jail-keeper, we will excuse the intrusion of a state, here Texas, on the free exercise of religion by prisoners. We must also address several issues surrounding the remedies available when such an intrusion proves too great to excuse. Convinced that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") demands less intrusion than Texas exercised in one area, we reverse and remand in part; but, discerning no error otherwise, and taking note of the accommodations that Texas has offered the Plaintiff-Appellant Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III during the pendency of this appeal, we also affirm in part and dismiss some of his claims as moot with instructions to vacate.
Sossamon is an inmate of the Robertson Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the "TDCJ") — Correctional Institutions Division. He alleges that (1) he has been deprived of access to Robertson's chapel for purposes of his Christian worship (the "chapel-use" claim or policy) and (2) while on cell restriction, he was forbidden to attend any worship services at all (the "cell-restriction" claim or policy).
Concerning the chapel-use claim, Sossamon provided competent summary judgment evidence that he is denied access to Robertson's chapel for Christian worship and that the venues for such worship offered as alternatives to the chapel do not have Christian symbols or furnishings, such as an altar and cross, which "have special significance and meaning to Christians." This, he insists, prevents him from "kneeling at the alter [sic] in view of the Cross, to pray, or receive holy communion in obedience to Christ Jesus['s] command, to observe the Lord's Supper, by Christian ceremony, in remembrance of the divine sacrifice the Lord God made, for the atonement of plaintiff's sins at Calvary." Sossamon contends that even if this were not so, services and Bible study at the alternative venues are frequently interrupted by security personnel or noise from the prison yard. He alleges that if worshipers refuse to end their prayer or devotion and return to work when ordered, they are subjected to harassment and retaliation by prison guards, such as by strip searches.1 He surmises that the prison has "evict[ed] and throw[n] God[ ] out of his house." According to Sossamon, this is not so for Muslim prisoners, whom he claims are provided special accommodations for worship, along with special meals, that Christians are not.
Concerning the cell-restriction claim, Sossamon has provided competent summary judgment evidence that inmates on cell restriction for disciplinary infractions were not permitted to attend religious services at all, even though they were permitted to attend work, to eat, to shower, to have medical lay-ins, to attend educational classes, to use the law library, and to participate in other secular activities. On September 15, 2005, Sossamon, who had been found guilty of a minor rule infraction, was placed on cell restriction for fifteen days. During that time, he was twice denied permission to attend religious services.
Based on these allegations, Sossamon proceeded pro se against the "Lone Star State of Texas" and a number of individuals involved in the TDCJ2 (collectively referred to as "Texas") under: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of his First, Eighth,3 and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) RLUIPA;4 and (3) the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("TRFRA").5 He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities, along with compensatory and punitive damages from them in their official and individual capacities.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On the cell-restriction policy, Texas noted that after Sossamon filed a grievance on this issue, the warden at Robertson amended the local cell-restriction policy by allowing prisoners at Sossamon's custody level (G-3) to attend worship services while on cell restriction. The Director of the Correctional Institutions Division of the TDCJ, Nathaniel Quarterman, submitted an affidavit during the pendency of this appeal advising that the TDCJ has adopted Robertson's relaxation of the cell-restriction policy for all Texas correctional facilities.
On the chapel-use claim, Texas concedes that Sossamon — like all other prisoners — has been denied access to the Robertson chapel for congregational religious services during the entirety of his incarceration at Robertson. In fact, all religious worship is now prohibited at the chapel. The Senior Warden of Robertson, Robert Eason, submitted an affidavit justifying this restriction on safety and security grounds. He averred that Robertson has a policy of physically segregating prisoners in different buildings based on a number of factors. In addition to assignment based on custody level, the prison attempts to suppress gang activity by assignments to different buildings based on gang affiliations. Warden Eason contends that allowing prisoners to gather in one location would undercut his policy of segregating hostile gang members. Also, moving prisoners from building to building taxes the staff and creates security risks, problems that are exacerbated by Robertson's security-personnel staffing levels, which are typically below authorized strength because the work is difficult and the pay is low. By providing religious services at alternative locations6 — such as in Building 4 of Robertson, where Sossamon is currently housed — prisoners need not be moved from one building to another, thereby relaxing the demands on security personnel and reducing the amount of interaction among segregated prisoners.
Warden Eason also averred that the chapel poses special security concerns. Chaplains and religious volunteers would have to walk through groups of prisoners to lead services from the front of the room. If an incident were to occur, the religious personnel could be trapped. The location of the chapel in the main administrative building also exposes the non-security personnel of the prison (such as secretaries and support staff) to the risk of an incident. Further, the main administrative building has storage spaces that could be used for hiding weapons and contraband. Warden Eason based his concerns in part on his personal experience: While serving as a captain at a correctional facility, a difficult-to-control riot broke out in a chapel with a design similar to that of the Robertson chapel.
Finally, Warden Eason noted that the Robertson chapel can hold only around 75 people at a time, which makes it too small to hold the number of prisoners who routinely attend non-Roman Catholic Christian services. Instead, according to Warden Eason, the prison uses the chapel as a library for religious books, a meeting place for staff, and a facility for teleconferencing. Regarding the merits of Sossamon's claimed need for access to the chapel, the prison chaplain averred that "it is not a basic tenant [sic] of the Christian faith that services must be held in particular locations."
Sossamon replied to Warden Eason's assertions. In an affidavit, he contended that a number of the non-religious purposes for which the chapel is used present the same security risks as would religious services. For example, he contends that the chapel is used for "teaching convicted sexual predators and child molesters how to practice safe sex at TDCJ-sponsored `Peer Education' classes." These classes are taught by a "small petite" female security officer who is "left alone with a group of men, and groups of men attending these classes are some times [sic] left unsupervised in the chapel." He also contends that prisoners Prisoners who obtain a GED are given a celebration inside the chapel, "including contact visits with free world members of their family and with friends." Finally, he alleges that prisoners are permitted to use the chaplain's office to make phone calls at night, but not to enter the chapel and pray at the cross.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that (1) Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars Sossamon's claims for monetary relief from Texas and the defendants in their official capacities, ...
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