Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc.

Decision Date09 September 2013
Docket NumberCiv. No. 10–2082(PG).
PartiesAddiel SOTO–FELICIANO, Plaintiff, v. VILLA COFRESI HOTELS, INC., et. al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Juan M. Frontera–Suau, Carlos J. Jimenez–Torres, Ufret & Frontera Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Israel Roldan–Gonzalez Aguadilla, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ–GIMENEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff Addiel Soto Feliciano (hereinafter Plaintiff or “Soto”) filed this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA or the Act), 29 U.S.C. § 623, against his former employer Villa Cofresí Hotels, Inc., (“VCH” or “the Hotel”) and Sandra Caro (collectively referred to as Defendants), alleging discrimination on the basis of age and retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. See Docket No. 1. Specifically, Soto claims that he was suspended and terminated because of his age and in retaliation for complaining of age discrimination.1See id. The Plaintiff also pleads supplemental state law claims for age discrimination under Puerto Rico's anti-discrimination statute, Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 (Law No. 100), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146, et seq., and Puerto Rico's wrongful termination statute, Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976 (Law No. 80), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185 et seq.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 22) and Plaintiff's Opposition thereto (Dockets No. 24–25). After a close examination of all the evidence on record and a careful review of the applicable statutory and case law, the Court GRANTS the Defendants' motion for summary judgment for the reasons explained below.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows disposition of a case if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660 (1st Cir.2000). A factual dispute is “genuine” if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and “material” if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. See Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir.2004).

To be successful in its attempt, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact in the record, see DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997), through definite and competent evidence. See Maldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994). Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). If the non-movant generates uncertainty as to the true state of any material fact, the movant's efforts should be deemed unavailing. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000). Nonetheless, the mere existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, “summary judgmentmay be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina–Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

At the summary judgment juncture, the Court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging that party with all possible inferences to be derived from the facts. See Rochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 287 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2002). The Court must review the record “taken as a whole,” and “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). This is so, because credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Id.

II. FACTUAL FINDINGS

Before setting forth the facts found by this Court to be undisputed and relevant to the matter at hand, we must first address several compliance issues presented to the court when reviewing Defendants' and Plaintiff's statements of facts.

“Documents supporting or opposing summary judgment must be properly authenticated.” Carmona v. Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 131 (1st Cir.2000) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(e)). To be admissible at the summary judgment stage, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e). See 10a Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2722 (3d ed.1998). “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), on summary judgment, the parties in their supporting affidavits shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” Hoffman v. Applicators Sales And Service, Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2006). “Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” Id. “The failure to authenticate a document properly precludes its consideration on a motion for summary judgment.” Robinson v. Bodoff, 355 F.Supp.2d 578, 582 (D.Mass.2005) (striking all exhibits that were submitted without affidavits).

After a careful review of the record, the court found that Exhibits 1 and 2 to the Defendants' statements of uncontested fact, which were respectively a memo of suspension and the memo of termination, lacked an authenticating affidavit. However, the court will consider these exhibits in the disposition of the pending motion to the extent the Plaintiff agreed to stipulating the same, see Docket No. 31.

The court also found that many of the portions of the Plaintiff's deposition testimony that the parties' cited to in support of proposed statements of fact were simply unintelligible. In addition to the constant interruptions between deposing attorney and the Plaintiff, the latter mostly spoke in incomplete sentences or phrases. Moreover, the multiple interjections and filler words that the Plaintiff utilized made some of his answers to the deposition questions incomprehensible to this court. As a result, the court did not consider the proposed factual statements that were supported by portions of the Plaintiff's deposition testimony, which, despite much effort, we could not understand.

Finally, Local Rule 56(c) states that [a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall ... shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as required by this rule.” Local Rule 56(e) then states that [f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” Taking these rules into consideration, the court finds that the Plaintiff failed to properly deny many of the facts set forth by the Defendants. In response to the Defendants' statements of fact, the Plaintiff repeatedly responded as follows:

Denied. It is Plaintiff's [sic] contention that at the time of his dismissal there had not been any event in which Plaintiff had been admonished because of being slow at the cooking line or that anyone had a complaint about his work. Exhibit 2 at page 108 L8–13; 108 L14–19. The only time that plaintiff was admonished was on February 18, 2010 when Ms. Sandra Caro called him to a meeting in which she told Plaintiff “I understand that you are old to work at the cooking line and that your co-workers are also saying that you are old to work at the line.” Exhibit 2 page 72 L12–25; 91 L13–20; 95 L16–19; 96 L10–14. In the February 18, 2010 meeting Ms. Sandra Caro told Plaintiff “You are no longer capable to work at the line because you are old.” Exhibit 2 page 72 L12–25; 91 L13–20; 95 L16–19; 96 L10–14. In the February 18, 2010 meeting Ms. Sandra Caro told Plaintiff that he was slow. Exhibit 2 page 96 L10–14. In the February 18, 2010 meeting Ms. Sandra Caro told Plaintiff that she was going to bring in a new chef. Exhibit 2 pages 72 L12–25; 91 L13–20. In the February 18, 2010 meeting Ms. Sandra Caro told Plaintiff you need some long vacations. Exhibit 2 pages 73 L1–7; 91 L13–20.

See Docket No. 25. The above-cited paragraph, or some mildly modified version of it, appears over fifteen times in the Plaintiff's opposing statement of material facts. See id. The same is used to deny or qualify many of the Defendants' purported facts, even when it doesn't address the content of the moving parties' original statement. What is more, in support of this opposing statement, the Plaintiff cites to portions of his deposition where he states that no previous complaints had been lodged as to his lack of speed in the cooking line; however, this assertion is belied by other segments of his own deposition testimony in which he describes incidents with his supervisors where they asked him to hurry up or expressed some other complaint about his work. See Docket No. 31–1 at pages 39, 41, 43–45. As a result, the court will deem admitted all statements of fact that are supported by record citations and improperly denied or not denied at all.2

Despite the foregoing, the Court found the following relevant facts were undisputed:

1. Defendant Sandra Caro is the General Manager in charge of Banquet and Human Resources of the Hotel since May 1996.

2. The Hotel is owned by the Caro family.

3. Sandra Caro's sister, Rita M. Caro Caro, is the...

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2 cases
  • State v. R.I. Comm'n for Human Rights
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • 17 d5 Outubro d5 2014
    ...of favor can support a reasonable inference of pretext." Harrington, 668 F.3d at 34; see also Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 529, 540-41 (D. Puerto Rico 2013) ("Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contr......
  • State, Department of Mental Health v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Superior Court
    • 17 d5 Outubro d5 2014
    ... ... See R.I. Temps, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & ... Training, 749 A.2d 1121, ... 34; see also Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, ... Inc. , 967 F.Supp.2d ... ...
2 books & journal articles
  • Pleading
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases. Volume 1-2 Volume 2 - Practice
    • 1 d1 Maio d1 2023
    ...cannot use those facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. For example, Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc ., 967 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D.P.R. 2013) rev’d, 779 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015), the age discrimination plaintiff attempted to oppose summary judgment with evidence that h......
  • Summary Judgment Practice and Procedure
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases. Volume 1-2 Volume 2 - Practice
    • 1 d1 Maio d1 2023
    ...Cir. Feb. 2, 2015); • Nigro v. Sears, Roebuck & Co ., 2015 WL 774633 (9th Cir. 2015); Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc ., 967 F. Supp. 2d 529 (D.P.R. 2013) rev’d, 779 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015); Sanders v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P ., 2006 WL 2128870 (N.D. Okla. 2006); • Maga......

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