Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int'l, LLC, SC 19832, (SC 19833)

• Citation: 202 A.3d 262,331 Conn. 53
• Decision Date: 19 March 2019
• Docket Number: SC 19832, (SC 19833)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Donna L. SOTO, Administratrix (Estate of Victoria L. Soto), et al. v. BUSHMASTER FIREARMS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.

331 Conn. 53

202 A.3d 262

Donna L. SOTO, Administratrix (Estate of Victoria L. Soto), et al.

v.BUSHMASTER FIREARMS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et al.

SC 19832, (SC 19833)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 14, 2017

Officially released March 19, 2019

Opinion

PALMER, J.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY...273

II. ALLEGED FACTS...275

III. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT...278

IV. WRONGFUL DEATH AND CUTPA: ISSUES OF STATE LAW...283

A. CUTPA Standing ...285

B. Statute of Limitations...291

1. Procedural History...292

2. Legal Principles...293

C. Connecticut Product Liability Act Preemption...295

D. CUTPA Personal Injury Damages...296

V. WRONGFUL DEATH AND CUTPA: ISSUES OF FEDERAL LAW...300

A. PLCAA Overview...300

B. The Plain Language of the Statute...301

1. The Predicate Exception...302

2. The Statutory Framework...303

3. The Statement of Findings and Purposes...308

4. Absurd Result...311

C. Extrinsic Evidence of Congressional Intent...312

1. Canons of Statutory Construction...312

a. Clear Statement Requirement...312

b. Ejusdem Generis...313

c. Statutory Exceptions To Be Construed Narrowly...317

2. Related Legislation......317

3. The Legislative History of PLCAA... 318

VI. CONCLUSION...324

On December 14, 2012, twenty year old Adam Lanza forced his way into Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown and, during the course of 264 seconds, fatally shot twenty first grade children and six staff members, and wounded

two other staff members.

Lanza carried out this massacre using a Bushmaster XM15-E2S semiautomatic rifle that was allegedly manufactured, distributed, and ultimately sold to Lanza's mother by the various defendants' in this case. There is no doubt that Lanza was directly and primarily responsible for this appalling series of crimes. In this action, however, the plaintiffs—administrators of the estates of nine of the decedents—contend that the defendants' also bear some of the blame. The plaintiffs assert a number of different legal theories as to why the defendants' should be held partly responsible for the tragedy. The defendants' counter that all of the plaintiffs' legal theories are not only barred under Connecticut law, but also precluded by a federal statute, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901 through 7903 (2012), which, with limited exceptions, immunizes firearms manufacturers, distributors, and dealers from civil liability for crimes committed by third parties using their weapons. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7902 (a) and 7903 (5) (2012).

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we agree with the defendants' that most of the plaintiffs' claims and legal theories are precluded by established Connecticut law and/or PLCAA. For example, we expressly reject the plaintiffs' theory that, merely by selling semiautomatic rifles—which were legal at the time¹ —to the civilian population, the defendants' became responsible for any crimes committed with those weapons.

The plaintiffs have offered one narrow legal theory, however, that is recognized under established Connecticut law. Specifically, they allege that the defendants' knowingly marketed, advertised, and promoted the XM15-E2S for civilians to use to carry out offensive, military style combat missions against their perceived enemies. Such use of the XM15-E2S, or any weapon for that matter, would be illegal, and Connecticut law does not permit advertisements that promote or encourage violent, criminal behavior. Following a scrupulous review of the text and legislative history of PLCAA, we also conclude that Congress has not clearly manifested an intent to extinguish the traditional authority of our legislature and our courts to protect the people of Connecticut from the pernicious practices alleged in the present case. The regulation of advertising that threatens the public's health, safety, and morals has long been considered a core exercise of the states' police powers. Accordingly, on the basis of that limited theory, we conclude that the plaintiffs have pleaded allegations sufficient to survive a motion to strike and are entitled to have the opportunity to prove their wrongful marketing allegations. We affirm the trial court's judgment insofar as that court struck the plaintiffs' claims predicated on all other legal theories.

IPROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiffs brought the present action in 2014, seeking damages and unspecified injunctive relief.² The defendants' include the Bushmaster defendants' (Remington),³ one or more of which is alleged to have manufactured the Bushmaster XM15-E2S semiautomatic rifle that was used in the crimes; the Camfour defendants',⁴ distributors that allegedly purchased the rifle from Remington and resold it to the Riverview defendants'; and the Riverview defendants',⁵ retailers that allegedly sold the rifle to Adam Lanza's mother, Nancy Lanza, in March, 2010.⁶ The gravamen of the plaintiffs' claims, which are brought pursuant to this state's wrongful death statute, General Statutes § 52-555,⁷ is that the defendants' (1) negligently entrusted to civilian consumers an AR-15 style assault rifle⁸ that is suitable for use only by military and law enforcement personnel, and (2) violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.,⁹ through the sale or wrongful marketing of the rifle.

The defendants' moved to strike the plaintiffs' complaint, contending that all of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by PLCAA. The defendants' also argued that, to the extent that the plaintiffs' claims sound in negligent entrustment, the plaintiffs failed to state a legally valid negligent entrustment claim under Connecticut common law, and, to the extent that their claims are predicated on alleged CUTPA violations, they are legally insufficient because, among other things, (1) the plaintiffs lack standing to bring a CUTPA action, (2) the plaintiffs' claims are time barred by CUTPA's three year statute of limitations; see General Statutes § 42-110g (f) ; (3) personal injuries and death are not cognizable CUTPA damages, and (4) the plaintiffs' CUTPA claims are simply veiled product liability claims and, therefore, are barred by General Statutes § 52-572n (a), the exclusivity provision of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (Product Liability Act).¹⁰

In response, the plaintiffs argued that PLCAA does not confer immunity on the defendants' for purposes of this case because two statutory exceptions to PLCAA immunity—for claims alleging negligent entrustment (negligent entrustment exception)¹¹ and for claims alleging a violation of a statute applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms (predicate exception)¹² —apply to their claims. The plaintiffs further argued that, for various reasons, the defendants' state law negligent entrustment and CUTPA arguments were ill founded.

Although the trial court rejected most of the defendants' arguments, the court concluded that (1) the plaintiffs' allegations do not fit within the common-law tort of negligent entrustment, (2) PLCAA bars the plaintiffs' claims insofar as those claims sound in negligent entrustment, and (3) the plaintiffs lack standing to bring wrongful death claims predicated on CUTPA violations because they never entered into a business relationship with the defendants'. Accordingly, the court granted in their entirety the defendants' motions to strike the plaintiffs' amended complaint.

On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge each of those conclusions.¹³ For their part, the defendants' contend, as alternative grounds for affirmance, that the trial court improperly rejected their other CUTPA arguments. We conclude that the majority of the plaintiffs' claims were properly struck insofar as those claims are predicated on the theory that the sale of the XM15-E2S rifle to Lanza's mother or to the civilian market generally constituted either negligent entrustment; see part III of this opinion; or an unfair trade practice. See part IV B of this opinion. We also conclude, however, that the plaintiffs have standing to prosecute their CUTPA claims under Connecticut law. See part IV A of this opinion. We further conclude that PLCAA does not bar the plaintiffs from proceeding on the single, limited theory that the defendants' violated CUTPA by marketing the XM15-E2S to civilians for criminal purposes, and that those wrongful marketing tactics caused or contributed to the Sandy Hook massacre.¹⁴ See part V of this opinion. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

IIALLEGED FACTS

Because we are reviewing the judgment of the trial court rendered on a motion to strike, we must assume the truth of the following facts, as alleged by the plaintiffs.¹⁵ Lanza carried out the Sandy Hook massacre using a Bushmaster XM15-E2S rifle. That rifle is Remington's version of the AR-15 assault rifle, which is substantially similar to the standard issue M16 military service rifle used by the United States Army and other nations' armed forces, but fires only in semiautomatic mode.

The AR-15 and M16 are highly lethal weapons that are engineered to deliver maximum carnage with extreme efficiency. Several features make these rifles especially well suited for combat and enable a shooter to inflict unparalleled carnage. Rapid semiautomatic fire "unleashes a torrent of bullets in a matter of seconds." The ability to accommodate large capacity magazines allows for prolonged assaults. Exceptional muzzle velocity makes each hit catastrophic. Indeed, the plaintiffs contend, bullets fired from these rifles travel at such a high velocity that they cause a shockwave to pass through the body upon impact, resulting in catastrophic injuries even in areas remote to the direct wound

. Finally, the fact that the AR-15 and M16 are lightweight, air-cooled, gas-operated, and magazine fed, enabling rapid fire with limited recoil, means that their lethality is not dependent on good aim...