Soto v. Pike Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 3:16-CV-2263,3:16-CV-2263 |
| Parties | SHENEQUA SHANTEL SOTO, Plaintiff, v. PIKE COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(JUDGE CAPUTO)
Presently before me is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 19) filed by Plaintiff Shenequa Shantel Soto ("Soto"). Soto was formerly employed by Defendant Pike County (the "County") in its Children and Youth Services agency. After sustaining an injury at work, Soto took medical leave and applied for workers' compensation benefits. Soto returned to work two months later, but her employment was terminated shortly thereafter. Soto challenged her discharge by filing an appeal with the Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission. One ground raised by Soto was that her termination was motivated by discrimination based on her filing for workers' compensation benefits. The State Civil Service Commission agreed with Soto, finding, inter alia, that the County did not advance a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed on appeal. Soto then commenced litigation in this Court against the County, its Commissioners, and its Director of Children and Youth Services asserting claims related to race and medical leave discrimination. Now, invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Soto seeks summary judgment in her favor, arguing that the state agency's decision as reviewed by the Commonwealth Court that the County lacked a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to terminate her is entitled to preclusive effect. The motion for partial summary judgment will be denied because the issue decided in the prior proceeding is not identical to the issue presented here.
Soto was employed as a Homemaker by the County in its Children and Youth Services agency ("Children & Youth") from December 1, 2008 until she was terminated on November 12, 2014. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 1; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 1). Defendant Shannon Wisniewski ("Wisniewski") served as the Director of Children & Youth at the time Soto was terminated. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 4; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 4). Soto is African-American. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 2; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 2).
On August 13, 2014, Soto suffered a head injury while at work on a visit to the Pike County Correctional Facility with two Children & Youth child clients. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 5; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 5). Soto did not immediately report this incident to her supervisor or Wisniewski because she did not feel any ill effects at first. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 6; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 6). After she left the prison, though, Soto developed a headache, so she called a co-worker, Jennifer D'Argenio ("D'Argenio"), to meet her to transport the two child clients. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 7; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 7). Soto ultimately pulled her car over and contacted D'Argenio a second time, who in turn notified Wisniewski. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 8-9; Defs.' SMF, ¶¶ 8-9). 911 was called and Soto was transported to an area hospital where she was diagnosed with a concussion. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 9-10; Defs.' SMF, ¶¶ 9-10). The same day, Soto completed an incident report and provided that report to Wisniewski. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 14-15; Defs.' SMF, ¶¶ 14-15).
Soto was granted an approved leave of absence under the FMLA from August 13, 2014 to October 13, 2014. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 16; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 16). Soto also filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for these injuries. (See id.). While she was on FMLA leave, Soto received a letter indicating that she was given three (3) employee warning reports: two (2) of the reports related to events that occurred priorto Soto taking FMLA leave, while the other report related to Soto's use of County property while on leave. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 17-20; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 17-20).
Soto returned to work on light duty from her FMLA leave on October 14, 2014. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 21; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 21). Two days later, Soto received two (2) additional warning reports for conduct that occurred after returning from FMLA leave. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 22-24; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 22-24).
On November 12, 2014, a hearing was held before the Pike County Commissioners, i.e., Defendants Matthew Osterberg ("Osterberg"), Richard Caridi ("Caridi"), and Karl Wagner ("Wagner"), to address Soto's employment status with the County. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 25; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 25). Wisniewski recommended at the hearing that the Commissioners fire Soto. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 26; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 26). At the conclusion of the hearing, the Commissioners unanimously agreed to terminate Soto's employment due to their concern about the safety of the children, a reference to Soto's decision to transport her child clients after she was injured at the prison. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 27; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 27). Also that day the County notified Soto by letter that her employment with Children & Youth was terminated effective immediately. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 28; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 28).
During her approximately six (6) years of employment with the County, Soto received eight (8) written warnings, a verbal warning, and a one (1) day suspension. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 29; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 29). D'Argenio, who is not African-American, received sixteen (16) disciplinary notices during her eight (8) years of employment with Children & Youth. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 30-31; Defs.' SMF, ¶¶ 30-31). D'Argenio, like Soto, had a hearing before the Commissioners in November 2014 to discuss her employment status, but unlike Soto, D'Argenio was not terminated and instead received a ninety (90) day probationary period. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶¶ 32-34; Defs.' SMF, ¶¶ 32-34).
After she was terminated, Soto filed an appeal with the State Civil Service Commission ("SCSC") alleging, inter alia, that she was discriminated against forfiling her workers' compensation claim. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 35; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 35). Thus, one issue before the SCSC was whether the County's decision to terminate Soto was "motivated by discrimination related to her claim for workers' compensation." (Pl.'s SMF, Ex. "A", 23).2
In its Adjudication, the SCSC found that Soto presented sufficient evidence to satisfy her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. (See id. at 33). The SCSC noted that Soto's claim for workers' compensation was followed closely by the imposition of five (5) warnings, that this number of warnings in such a short period was troubling given the sparse number of warnings before the claim was filed, and that D'Argenio, despite receiving many more warning reports, received much less discipline. (See id.).
Because Soto met her burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination, the SCSC next considered whether the County met its burden of producing a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for removal . . . ." (Id.). After reviewing the record, the SCSC found that the County did not offer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Soto's termination because: (1) it did not substantiate that Soto transported her child clients unsafely; and (2) the reasons offered for removing Soto but not D'Argenio failed to establish legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for removal. (See id. at 35). Thus, since Soto made out a prima facie case of discrimination which the County failed to rebut, the SCSC concluded that Soto established her claim of discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act. (See id. at 36). Among other relief, the SCSC ordered that Soto "be reimbursed such wages and emoluments as would have been received between her removal, effective November 12, 2014, and her reinstatement, less wages earned and benefits received, if any, . . ."(Id.).3
The County appealed the decision of the SCSC to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. (See Pl.'s SMF, ¶ 51; Defs.' SMF, ¶ 51). The Commonwealth Court affirmed the decision of the SCSC, holding that Soto presented a prima facie case of discrimination that "she was terminated due to filing a workers' compensation claim" and that the County "failed to set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Soto." (See Pl.'s SMF, Ex. "Q", 13-14).
Soto then commenced this action on November 9, 2016. (See Doc. 1, generally). Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, (see Doc. 8, generally),4 the following claims remain in this action: (1) race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the County only (Count I); (2) race discrimination in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 P.S. § 951 et seq., against all Defendants (Count II); (3) race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all Defendants (Count III); violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution against all Defendants (Count IV); conspiracy to violate civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against all Defendants (Count V); and discrimination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., against all Defendants (Count VI).
Soto filed a motion for partial summary judgment against all Defendants on her claims in Counts I-IV and Count VI of the Complaint on November 30, 2017. (See Doc. 19, generally). In her supporting brief, Soto argues that the SCSC's finding thatthe County did not have a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her is entitled to preclusive effect in this litigation. (See Doc. 21, generally). Defendants submitted their opposition to Soto's motion on December 21, 2017. (See Docs. 23-24, generally). Soto filed a reply brief in further support of her motion on January 4, 2018. (See Doc. 25, generally). Soto's motion for partial summary judgment is now fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)...
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