Soto v. United States, Civ. A. No. 73-1410.
Decision Date | 15 November 1973 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 73-1410. |
Citation | 369 F. Supp. 232 |
Parties | Jose Juan SOTO v. UNITED STATES of America. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Jose Juan Soto, pro se.
Robert N. deLuca, Asst. U. S. Atty., Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
Jose Juan Soto was convicted on charges of aiding and abetting the sale of heroin, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4704, 4705 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. He was given concurrent sentences of five years imprisonment on one count of the indictment and two years on another. Soto has filed this petition under 28 U.S.C. § 22551 to vacate or set aside the sentences on the ground that the court violated his constitutional and statutory rights by requiring him to proceed to trial represented by two court-appointed attorneys, after he had expressed dissatisfaction with their representation.
Soto, along with three other persons, was indicted by a federal grand jury on April 29, 1971, on various charges relating to the sale of heroin.2 On August 4, 1971, the court appointed Mrs. Marilyn Mauskopf to represent Soto. A short time later, Aaron D. Blumberg, an associate of Mrs. Mauskopf in the firm of Pepper, Hamilton and Scheetz, joined her in representing Soto3 and they worked together thereafter. During the ten months' period between appointment and trial, counsel filed several significant pretrial motions which they argued and in support of which they filed memoranda of law. They attacked, inter alia, the "bare bones" nature of the indictment, and requested the minutes of the proceeding before the grand jury and the production of documents for the purpose of formulating a defense to the vague charges. (Document 14) They challenged the constitutionality of the "John Doe" indictment, contending that such a procedure amounted to a general warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Document 25) They argued further that the indictment should be quashed for misjoinder, alleging that separate offenses against several persons were improperly connected without a conspiracy charge. To dissipate the "taint of association," they requested that petitioner's trial be severed. (Document 31) The court ruled against their contentions on the constitutional objections, but as a result of counsel's efforts, two counts against Soto were dismissed, and the remaining counts were severed for trial.
On the day the case was called for trial, June 1, 1972, Soto's attorneys asked leave to withdraw as counsel, citing "a growing realization" on their part that Soto had "become displeased with their representation." As stated by Mauskopf, Soto had registered two fundamental objections. First, as a result of alleged discussions with attorneys in New York, he had decided that his attorneys were not raising all possible constitutional claims. Second, because the case was listed for trial, Mauskopf and Blumberg had told petitioner to contact them daily so they could advise him of the progress of the case on the court's trial list. Petitioner apparently viewed this request as a form of harassment and, according to Mauskopf, complained to Puerto Rican social agencies in the city that he was being mistreated. (N.T.3)
Following this statement by counsel, the court engaged in this colloquy with Soto:
The court went on to make it clear to petitioner that his attorneys were not at fault for requiring him to call in daily; that they were merely complying with the court's instructions in order to keep its calendar moving and to avoid unnecessary delays. (N.T.6-8) Immediately following this exchange, Soto waived his right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the court, with the resultant finding of guilt on the charges of aiding and abetting sale of heroin. Counsel filed an appeal, which was unsuccessful, the conviction being affirmed sub nom, United States v. Santiago, 474 F.2d 1337 (3d Cir. 1972), and a petition for certiorari which was denied, Soto v. United States, 411 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 1535, 36 L.Ed.2d 197 (1973). Thereafter, Soto filed this § 2255 petition.
Soto alleges that the court, in dealing with counsel's request to withdraw from the case, committed several errors which necessitate that sentence be vacated. Specifically, he argues first that the right to proceed pro se is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution and by 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and that the court was under a duty to advise him of that right. He charges further that the court erred in not ascertaining from him, rather than from his counsel, the basis of his dissatisfaction with counsel's representation, and that by requiring him to go to trial with counsel he distrusted, the court deprived him of due process. Read liberally, Soto's petition also states a complaint of ineffective assistance of counsel during trial.4
I address first Soto's claims touching upon the right to proceed pro se. Although there is a continuing debate over whether the right of self-representation is constitutionally based,5 there is no dispute that it is a fundamental right. It is squarely guaranteed by 28 U.S.C. § 1654,6 a statute whose roots can be traced back directly to the Judiciary Act of 1789. As the Supreme Court has stated, "the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942).
Although I firmly believe that a defendant in a criminal case greatly reduces his chances of acquittal by the decision to dispense with counsel,7 I recognize that it is within his power to do so if, after having been apprised of the risks, he voluntarily and intelligently waives the right to counsel and manifests a firm desire to "go it alone." Like most fundamental freedoms, the right to proceed pro se derives from the belief that respect for human dignity is best served by respect for individual freedom of choice. "Even in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice `with eyes open.'"8 United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom, Di Blasi v. McMann, 384 U.S. 1007, 86 S.Ct. 1950, 16 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1966). Moreover, "the denial of that right is not to be redeemed through the prior estimate of someone else that the practical position of the defendant will be enhanced through representation by another . . . ." United States v. Dougherty, 154 U.S. App.D.C. 76, 91, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (1972).
In the instant case, however, these basic principles concerning self-representation were not called into issue. The transcript makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner at no time made any statement which could in any way be construed as a request to dispense with counsel and go to trial pro se. One of the stated reasons for the discontent with his attorneys was Soto's concern, arising from alleged discussions with unnamed attorneys, that his court-appointed counsel were not making all conceivable constitutional arguments. When the court asked Soto: "What arrangements, if any, have you made to get another attorney?", his response was: "I haven't made no arrangement yet." (N.T.3) From this exchange, the only fair inference which could be drawn was that Soto might be contemplating a change of counsel, not that he desired to dispense with counsel and represent himself. At no time did Soto give any other indication, despite the fact that he did speak several times in reference to other matters. (N.T.5) The law requires "an unequivocal request" to waive counsel by the defendant who wishes to act as his own lawyer. United States v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1966); Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1973).9 On this record, to have permitted Mauskopf and Blumberg to withdraw and to have required, or permitted, Soto to go to trial without counsel would have constituted clear, reversible error. See, e. g., United States v. Fay, supra; United States v. Curtiss, 330 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1964); Meeks v. Craven, supra.
Soto's petition does not seem to dispute that an unequivocal request is required. Rather, his grievance is that the court was obligated to, and did not, advise him of the right to proceed pro se. This claim is based on the principle that a waiver of fundamental rights ordinarily entails "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."...
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