Soudelier v. PBC Mgmt., Inc.

• Decision Date: 26 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 16–CA–39.,16–CA–39.
• Citation: 194 So.3d 1178
• Parties: Jeffrey L. SOUDELIER, Jr. v. PBC MANAGEMENT, INC., Florida Marine Transporters, Inc. and Florida Marine, LLC.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

194 So.3d 1178

Jeffrey L. SOUDELIER, Jr.

v.PBC MANAGEMENT, INC., Florida Marine Transporters, Inc. and Florida Marine, LLC.

No. 16–CA–39.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.

May 26, 2016.

Lawrence N. Curtis, Attorney at Law, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Anthony J. Staines, Jason R. Kenney, Corey P. Parenton, Attorneys at Law, Metairie, LA, for Defendant/Appellee.

Panel composed of Judges SUSAN M. CHEHARDY, JUDE G. GRAVOIS and STEPHEN J. WINDHORST.

STEPHEN J. WINDHORST

, Judge.

The plaintiff, Jeffrey L. Soudelier, Jr., filed this maritime action after he was injured in a work-related accident aboard defendants' vessel. Defendants, PBC Management, Inc., Florida Marine Transporters, Inc. and Florida Marine, LLC, filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending that Mr. Soudelier failed to produce any evidence to support a finding of liability under either general maritime law or Jones Act. After the trial court granted defendants' motion, it certified the judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.

On November 11, 2011, defendants owned and operated a fleet of vessels, including the towboat M/V Steven M. Bryan. Mr. Soudelier was its captain. He was instructed to move a large, steel-reinforced, cross-over hose from Barge 3180 to the towboat, so that it could be transported to shore. According to Mr. Soudelier, there was material remaining in the hose that should not have been there, adding extra weight to the already heavy hose. While he and four other persons were moving the hose, he felt a pop in his hip and experienced pain immediately. He instructed the crew to wait, and rested for a few moments. Although the pain did not subside, he and the men moved the hose. After the task was completed, he realized that he was injured.

Mr. Soudelier filed his petition on May 9, 2012, seeking recovery under the “Savings to Suitors” clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333

, the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and unseaworthiness pursuant to the general maritime law, as well as a claim for maintenance and cure. Mr. Soudelier alleged that the accident of November 11, 2011 caused injury necessitating multiple surgeries, and causing severe and disabling injuries which could be permanent. Mr. Soudelier also contended that he was obligated to perform heavy physical work resulting in cumulative trauma. Mr. Soudelier contended that defendants' boat was unseaworthy and defendants were negligent in failing to provide alternative methods to move the hose, and in failing to train employees on safety issues.

Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that plaintiff could not bear his burden of proving either negligence under the Jones Act or unseaworthiness. Defendants argue that Mr. Soudelier's deposition shows that he was in charge of the method of moving the hose, and as captain, he was responsible for all the safety procedures aboard the ship.

The trial court found in favor of defendants, stating that:

This Court has reviewed the documentation submitted in support of and in opposition to defendants' motion. The Accident and Injury Report fails to mention any condition that was out of the ordinary that may have contributed to the incident and provides no evidence of any condition of negligence. In addition, plaintiff's deposition testimony confirms that there was nothing that anyone did which was wrong, there was no missing equipment, and there were no unsafe conditions surrounding the movement of the cross-over hose. Plaintiff seeks additional time for discovery; however, the nature of the evidence in support for defendants' motion is clear and convincing and needs no further explanation. (The Court notes that the alleged incident occurred in 2011 and that this matter has been pending for quite some time.)

In this appeal, Mr. Soudelier contends that the trial court erred “in finding no genuine issue of material fact in the face of direct evidence showing that Soudelier was injured because (1) he was asked to lift a hose that had not been properly ‘blown out’ and was therefore significantly heavier than he could reasonably have expected, and (2) Florida Marine did not provide proper instruction regarding a safe method for lifting and carrying heavy objects.”

DISCUSSION

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA–C.C.P. art. 966

. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's role is to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact with all doubts being resolved in the non-moving party's favor. Hines v. Garrett, 04–0806 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765 ; Blanda v. Kathryn Rae Towing, Inc., 10–96 (La.App. 5 Cir. 07/27/10), 43 So.3d 355, 357. A material fact is one that potentially insures or prevents recovery, affects a litigant's ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the lawsuit. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93–2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751.

Appellate courts review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Hines, 876 So.2d at 765

; Blanda, 43 So.3d at 357. The Jones Act provides a cause of action in negligence for “any seaman” injured “in the course of his employment.” Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 354, 115 S.Ct. 2172, 132 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995)

(citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) ). Seamen are allowed to bring their Jones Act claims in state court pursuant to the “Saving to Suitor” clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which permits state courts to have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal district courts. Foster v. Destin Trading Corp., 96–0803 (La.5/30/97), 700 So.2d 199, 209.

Pursuant to the Jones Act, an employer has a continuing duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to use ordinary care to maintain the vessel in a reasonably safe condition. Ordoyne v. Octopus Towing, L.L.C., No. 15–3052, 2016 WL 1437773, *2, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48960, *5–6 (E.D.La. Apr. 12, 2016)

, footnote 15, citing Lett v. Omega Protein, Inc., 487 Fed.Appx. 839, 843 (5th Cir.2012). This duty can implicate “negligence questions related to maintaining reasonably safe equipment and appliances [and] requiring unreasonably dangerous work or unsafe work methods.” Ordoyne, at page 5–6, footnote 15, 2016 WL 1437773, citing Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Mar. Law § 6–22 (5th ed. 2015).

Under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, a seaman's employer is liable for damages if the employer's negligence caused the seaman's injury, in whole or in part. Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir.1997)

(en banc ). In Clay v. ENSCO Offshore Co., No. 14–2508, 146 F.Supp.3d 808, 2015 WL 7306436, *, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156568, *19, 2016 AMC 130 (E.D.La.2015), the court said:

Once the seaman had demonstrated the duty of care, under the normal rules of statutory construction, and retaining the usual and familiar definition of ordinary prudence, the seaman must prove that a breach of that duty caused his injuries, in whole or in part. An employer is liable under the Jones Act if the negligence of its employees played “any part, even the slightest” in causing the injury or death for which damages are sought. [Gautreaux, 107 at 335] (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)

). Even so, the Fifth Circuit clarified that the employer's standard of care is not greater than that of ordinary negligence under the circumstances. Id. at 339. “[A] Jones Act employer is not an insurer of a seaman's safety; the mere occurrence of an injury does not establish liability.” Marvin v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 554 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 769, 54 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978). To recover damages for his employer's negligence, a seaman must prove that the employer breached its duty of care; ordinary prudence under the circumstances is the standard for the duty of care owed by an employer to a seaman. Gautreaux, 107 F.3d at 335–36.

As with the employer, the seaman is held to a reasonably prudent standard:

The Jones Act simultaneously obligates the seaman to act with ordinary care under the circumstances. [Gautreaux], at 339. The seaman must act with the care, skill, and ability expected of a reasonable seaman in like circumstances. Id. Thus, comparative negligence applies under the Jones Act, “barring an injured party from recovering for the damages sustained as a result of his own fault.” Miles v. Melrose, 882 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir.1989)

aff'd sub nom.

Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). “[T]he defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent

and that such negligence was the proximate cause in producing his injury.” Id. If an accident is caused solely by the plaintiffs own fault, there can be no recovery. Miles, 882 F.2d at 984

.

Gaylor v. Canal Barge Co., No. 14–2398, 2015 WL 5321756, at *2–3, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121322, at *5, (E.D.La.2015)

Unseaworthiness is a distinct concept from negligence. Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 91 S.Ct. 514, 27 L.Ed.2d 562 (1971)

. The State's duty regarding seaworthiness is “only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness[.]” Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550, 80 S.Ct. 926, 933, 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960). Thibodeaux v. State, 13–893 (...