Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee
| Decision Date | 18 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 84-0297. |
| Parties | Lani SOULES, Lafrance Kapaka, Paul Lemkey, Carol Lemkey, Clara G. Rapozo, Alice Souza, Deane B. Abben, Lois A. Birnbaum, Margaret Littman, Masao Mixumo, Registered Voters of the County of Kauai, on behalf of themselves and all other voters of the County of Kauai, Committee to Save Nukolii, Plaintiffs, v. KAUAIANS FOR NUKOLII CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE, Jerome Y.K. Hew, in his official capacity as Clerk of the County of Kauai, County of Kauai, Kauai County Council, Does I Through X, Defendants, and Graham Beach Partners, Intervenor Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Robert Harris, Harris & Smith, Honolulu, Hawaii, Sidney M. Wolinsky, Robert L. Gnaizda, Anita P. Arriola, Public Advocates, Inc., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Yoshio Shigezawa, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Kauaians for Nukolii.
Michael J. Belles, Co. Atty., Warren C.R. Perry, Second Deputy Co. Atty., Lihue, Hawaii, for Jerome Y.K. Hew, County of Kauai and Kauai County Council.
Michael N. Nii, Lihue, Hawaii, for Kauai Chamber of Commerce, et al.
Edward A. Jaffe, Milton M. Yasunaga, Wallace Fujiyama, Paul H. Sato, Honolulu, Hawaii, Walton D.Y. Hong, Lihue, Hawaii, for Graham Beach Partners.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART MOTIONS TO STRIKE AND GRANTING INTERVENOR'S AND DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is an action brought in the federal court to challenge a special initiative election held in the County of Kauai on February 4, 1984.
Plaintiffs have sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the following relief for the alleged violations of their equal protection, due process, and First Amendment rights: (1) a declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201; (2) an order invalidating the election or the results of the special election; (3) general and special damages to plaintiffs for expenditures in being forced to campaign in the allegedly unconstitutional and illegal election; and (4) costs and attorney's fees.
On July 10, 1984, two motions came on for hearing before this court: First, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants and all persons in active concert with them from treating as valid, from effectuating or certifying or allowing action to be taken based upon the validity of the results of the election. Second, defendants and intervenor sought summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the grounds of res judicata and laches.
The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs on their claim to invalidate the election, on the grounds that the doctrine of laches barred such equitable relief. The court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment against plaintiffs on their claims for declaratory relief and damages, on the grounds that such relief was unavailable in the limited action before the Hawaii Supreme Court, and the doctrine of res judicata does not bar plaintiffs' claims.
On December 3, 1984, the court filed its "Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Intervenor's and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction," which included extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court incorporates into its present order all such findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court also hereby amends its order of December 3, 1984, to state that plaintiffs claim "that the defendants' conduct violated plaintiffs' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (rather than under 28 U.S.C. § 1983)."
The present set of motions came on for hearing before this court on December 17, 1984. Anita Arriola appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. Edward A. Jaffe, Milton M. Yasunaga, and Walton D.Y. Hong appeared on behalf of intervenor Graham Beach Partners. Yoshio Shigezawa appeared on behalf of Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee ("Kauaians for Nukolii"). Warren C.R. Perry appeared on behalf of Jerome Y.K. Hew, the County of Kauai, and the Kauai County Council ("County Council").
The intervenor and defendants (sometimes collectively referred to as "defendants") have filed the following motions:
First, defendants now move to strike portions of plaintiffs' affidavits, on the grounds that they do not satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(e).
Second, defendants move for summary judgment against plaintiffs on the remainder of plaintiffs' claims. Defendants argue that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Finally, the County defendants (Jerome Y.K. Hew, the County of Kauai, and the Kauai County Council) additionally argue that their respective immunities entitle them to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Defendants object to extensive portions of the affidavits offered by plaintiffs in support of their opposition memorandum, on the ground that the affidavits do not comply with the requirements of Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e), which states that the affidavits "shall be based on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."
Defendants argue that portions of the affidavits are improper, because they consist of hearsay, conclusions of law, assertions, arguments, or unsupported speculation; and because they are made upon belief, information, and understanding, rather than personal knowledge.
The court finds defendants' motions to be well taken, and the court will disregard those portions of the affidavits which the court finds to be in noncompliance with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motions to Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavits be, and the same are, granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs claim that Article V, § 5.07(C) of the Kauai County Charter is "void for vagueness" and violates plaintiffs' rights to due process, to freedom of expression, and to vote on the following grounds: (1) its commands do not clearly charge the persons responsible for its administration; (2) it infringes upon plaintiffs' rights to freedom of expression and to vote, by making such rights contingent upon the "totally uncontrolled will" and the "undefined and standardless discretion" of local government officials; and (3) it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Kauai County Council. In all three claims, plaintiffs attack § 5.07(C) of the County Charter as unconstitutional on its face, because it does not provide sufficient standards for special elections.
Defendants now move for summary judgment, on the grounds that the "void for vagueness" and "improper delegation of legislative authority" doctrines do not apply to § 5.07(C), because it is a constitutional provision that delegates a legislative function to a legislative body.
Under the "void for vagueness" doctrine, "a statute is fatally vague only when it exposes a potential actor to some risk or detriment without giving him fair warning of the nature of the proscribed conduct (emphasis added)." Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 740, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 1492, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970). Further, although the doctrine may be applicable to civil and criminal actions, it is applicable only where "the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard ... was so vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all ... In short, the exaction must strip a participant of his rights (emphasis added)." Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 123, 87 S.Ct. 1563, 1566, 18 L.Ed.2d 661 (1967).
Further, courts have found an "improper delegation of legislative power" in the context of a delegation of power by the legislature to a non-legislative body, which is not directly responsible to the people. The underlying rationale is that "a congressional delegation must be accompanied by discernible standards, so that the delegatee's action can be measured for its fidelity to the legislative will." City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 2363, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944).
The court now looks to the nature of Article V, § 5.07(C) of the Kauai County Charter.
Article VIII, section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii states as follows:
Each political subdivision shall have power to frame and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits and under such procedures as may be prescribed by general law (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii has spoken on the role of county charters as follows:
In drafting such a charter the commission is required to delineate the structure of the county government. In so acting it must necessarily enumerate the powers and functions of each county department, board, commission and agency in local affairs within such relevant limits prescribed by HRS § 50-6. Upon the adoption of the charter, it shall become the organic law of the county superseding any existing charter and all laws affecting the organization and government of the county which are in conflict therewith (emphasis added).
Hawaii Government Employees' Association v. County of Maui, 59 Hawaii 65, 79, 576 P.2d 1029 (1978).
The court concludes, therefore, that the Kauai County Charter can best be characterized as the constitution of the County. The Charter, as adopted by the people, is "the organic law of the county;" its provisions allocate governmental powers — legislative, executive, and administrative — to the various parts of the County government. Article V, § 5.07(C) is one such constitutional provision, and it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Committee
...appellees' motion for sanctions against appellants for an allegedly frivolous opposition to the Developers' intervention in the case, 623 F.Supp. 657. The Committee and its members timely appealed. We now affirm in part and reverse in EQUAL PROTECTION A Standing Appellees contend on appeal ......