Soupal v. Shady View, Inc., Docket No. 123698.
Decision Date | 11 December 2003 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 123698. |
Citation | 469 Mich. 458,672 N.W.2d 171 |
Parties | James SOUPAL, Geri Soupal, Alan Hay and Sandra Hay, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SHADY VIEW, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Carey & Jaskowski, P.L.L.C. (by William L. Carey), Grayling, for the plaintiff.
Cox, Hodgman & Giarmarco, P.C. (by William H. Horton and Kaveh Kashef), Troy, for the defendant.
The question before the Court is whether an association of multiple families may provide a communal access to Higgins Lake notwithstanding the local zoning ordinance that permits only single-family uses on the property owned by the association. We conclude that the association's communal use of the property violates the zoning ordinance. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with the zoning ordinance and this opinion.
Plaintiffs are the owners of the riparian properties that are adjacent to lot 139 of Woodlawn Subdivision on Higgins Lake. Lot 139 is zoned "Residential District 1" (R-1) according to the Gerrish Township Zoning Ordinance. Defendant, a nonprofit association of numerous families, owns lot 139. It was authorized to issue twenty shares of stock, nineteen of which were sold to individual shareholders who are owners of other nonlakefront lots in the subdivision. Defendant bought lot 139 specifically to provide communal access to the lake for use by its nonriparian shareholders. Among the modifications to the property made by the defendant was the construction of a dock that was 160 feet long with twenty boat slips. A cabin on the lot, which had been used by prior titleholders as a single-family seasonal cottage, was converted to function as a community center for defendant's shareholders.
In June 1996, plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant's construction of a dock and operation of a marina on lot 139. Plaintiffs alleged (1) that such use of lot 139 was in violation of the zoning ordinance, which designates lot 139 as R-1, and (2) that such use was a nuisance per se that disturbed the peace and reasonable uses of plaintiffs' property.1
Following a bench trial, the circuit court ruled that defendant's use constituted a "marina" as defined by the zoning ordinance,2 that the zoning ordinance did not allow that use, and that defendant's use was unreasonable, and constituted a nuisance in fact and a nuisance per se. The court enjoined defendant from placing a dock longer than seventy-five feet, from mooring more than five boats, and from having more than two families at any time use the facility.
In a divided, unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court, and ruled that the zoning ordinance does not prohibit the operation of marinas on property classified as R-1, that defendant's marina is not a commercial enterprise,3 and that the dock is neither a nuisance per se nor a nuisance in fact.4 The majority held in part that the circuit court's issuance of the injunction was error requiring reversal because "it was based on an erroneous finding that the dock was a nuisance."
The Court of Appeals dissenter would have held that defendant's combination of uses of the property ("forming a corporation, soliciting funds, selling stock in the corporation, purchasing land, constructing a twenty-slip marina, using the existing structure on the land as a community center, and charging yearly dues to use the marina and the community center") violated the zoning ordinance, and that the "noise," "unsightly condition," and "excessive traffic" amounted to a nuisance per se. The dissenter concluded that "[a]ll marinas are commercial in some respect" and that
This Court reviews de novo matters of statutory construction, including the interpretation of ordinances. Gora v. Ferndale, 456 Mich. 704, 711, 576 N.W.2d 141 (1998).
Article IV, § 4.1 of the Gerrish Township Zoning Ordinance provides in part:
Except as is hereinafter provided, no buildings shall be erected, altered, or moved and no lands or buildings shall be used for any purpose other than the types and uses permitted in the respective District in which such lands or buildings are located. [Emphasis added.]
Article VI of the ordinance governs "Residential Districts," and art VI, part A, § 6.1 governs the R-1 classification, which applies to lot 139. As is relevant here, the R-1 classification permits "dwellings," "[a]ccessory buildings or structures," and "[a]ccessory uses and activity related to principal use." It is apparent from the trial testimony that the cabin on lot 139 was designed to be a single-family dwelling and was so used until purchased by defendant.
The zoning ordinance's definitions are contained in article III, § 3.1. "Dwelling, One-Family," is defined as 5 Id. "Family" is defined as:
Article VI, part A, § 6.1 of the ordinance is entitled "Buildings and Uses Permitted." Section 6.1(b) permits accessory buildings or structures such as "[g]arage[s], and storage buildings," but only if "used ... as an accessory to the main dwelling." Section 6.1(b) additionally permits "[s]tructures such as steel towers, antenna masts, antennas, [and] flagpoles," as well as "[a]ccessory uses and activity related to principal use." (Emphasis added.) The ordinance defines "Principal Building or Use" as "the principal or primary purpose for which a building or parcel of land may be designed, arranged, intended, maintained or occupied." Art III, § 3.1. Article VI, part A, § 6.8, "Parking Storage," provides that "[t]he owner or owners of boats may park or store such boats on his or their property providing that said property is zoned for residential use and occupied by residential dwellings."
In considering the alleged violation of the zoning ordinance, the threshold issue is whether defendant's use is consistent with the uses permitted in an R-1 district. Those uses are limited under art III, § 3.1, and art VI, part A, § 6.1 to activities and buildings related to single-family use. The Court of Appeals failed to address this threshold issue, focusing instead on the...
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