Sousa v. Wegman, CASE NO. 1:11-CV-01754-MJS (PC)
| Decision Date | 27 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:11-CV-01754-MJS (PC) |
| Parties | JUAN SOUSA, Plaintiff, v. C. WEGMAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN
THIRTY (30) DAYS
Plaintiff Juan Sousa is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed October 21, 2011 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)
The Complaint is now before the Court for screening.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous, malicious," or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the 'deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Plaintiff is a practitioner of a Mexican Indian (Aztec/Mayan/Toltec) religion (Compl. at 3.) Defendant correction staff members at Kern Valley State Prison (KVSP), applying California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) religious accommodation policy1 , determined that Plaintiff failed to make a showing of religious structure and doctrine sufficient for recognition of a Mexican Indian religious program at KVSP. They required Plaintiff instead use an existing Native American religious services program.
Plaintiff contends his religion is distinct from Native American religion. He claims Defendants have violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). (Id. at 3-13, 39-40.)
He names as Defendants (1) C. Wegman, KVSP Community Resource Manager, (2) M.D. Biter, KVSP Warden. (Id. at 3.)
He seeks injunctive relief ordering that Mexican Indian religion be recognized as a religion and allowed to use the prison sweat lodge. (Id. at 3-4.)
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legalconclusions are not. Id. at 1949-50.
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each individually named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the term "supervisory liability," loosely and commonly used by both courts and litigants alike, is a misnomer. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant, through his or her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 1948-49.
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts linking any individual Defendant to the decision by the KVSP Religious Review Committee denying accommodation of Plaintiff's Mexican Indian religion.2
As noted Defendants can not be held liable under § 1983 solely because of supervisory capacity. Moreover, Defendants can not be held liable for their involvement in review of prison appeals. "Inmates lack a separate constitutional entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) ().
Plaintiff may not proceed against Defendants for alleged rights violation by the KVSP Religious Review Committee unless he alleges facts plausibly showing how eachDefendant personally violated, or knowingly directed a violation of, his constitutional rights by the Committee.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants have prevented him from exercising his Mexican Indian religion.
"[A] prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his [or her] status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). "[R]easonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972).
In order to implicate the Free Exercise Clause, the prisoner's belief must be both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008). "[O]nly those beliefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature are entitled to constitutional protection." Id. (citing DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3rd Cir. 2000). "The free exercise right, however, is necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security." McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 883-84.
In analyzing the legitimacy of regulation of prisoners' religious expression, the court should consider the following factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987):3
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient information about his Mexican Indian religion and proposed religious program to enable the Court to evaluate it under the above criteria and determine the plausibility of his claim that his beliefs are sincerely held, religious in nature, and distinct from the Native American religious program. See Scott v. Ozmint, 467 F.Supp.2d 564, 572 (D.S.C. 2006) ().
Plaintiff's pleading does not address the Turner factors. He has not alleged facts suggesting that Defendants' religious program policy is other than reasonably related to legitimate penological purposes. Significantly, Plaintiff fails to allege he has been denied "all means of religious expression." Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 351-52); see Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2008) (). Indeed, his pleading reveals that he has been allowed to utilize Native American Services providing outside grounds and sweats.
Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable First Amendment claim. He will be given leaveto amend. If he chooses to amend, Plaintiff must allege facts that would satisfy all the above elements of a First Amendment claim based on religion.
Plaintiff alleges he has been denied religious accommodation because he is a Mexican Indian and that he has been treated differently from similarly situated Native Americans. The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a protected class (Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001)), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th...
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