South Camden Citizens v. N.J. Dept. of Env. Prot.

• Decision Date: 10 May 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 01-702.,CIV. A. 01-702.
• Citation: 145 F.Supp.2d 505
• Parties: SOUTH CAMDEN CITIZENS IN ACTION, Geneva Sanders, Pauline Woods, Barbara Pfeiffer, Julita Gilliard, Oscar Lisboa, Shirley Rios, Phyllis Holmes, Gwen Peterson, Latoya Cooper, and Julio Lugo, Plaintiffs, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION and Robert C. Shinn, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, in his official capacity, Defendants, and St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C., Defendant-Intervenor.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

145 F.Supp.2d 505

SOUTH CAMDEN CITIZENS IN ACTION, Geneva Sanders, Pauline Woods, Barbara Pfeiffer, Julita Gilliard, Oscar Lisboa, Shirley Rios, Phyllis Holmes, Gwen Peterson, Latoya Cooper, and Julio Lugo, Plaintiffs, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION and Robert C. Shinn, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, in his official capacity, Defendants and St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C., Defendant-Intervenor.

No. CIV. A. 01-702.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

May 10, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Olga D. Pomar, Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc., Camden, NJ, Jerome Balter, Michael Churchill, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, Luke W. Cole, Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment, San Francisco, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, James M. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Trenton, NJ, Attorneys for Defendants, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Robert C. Shinn, Jr., Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

Brian S. Montag, Catherine A. Trinkle, Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, LLP, Morristown, NJ, Attorneys for the Defendant-Intervenor, St. Lawrence Cement Co., L.L.C.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

ORLOFSKY, District Judge

                                             TABLE OF CONTENTS
                  I.  Introduction .......................................................................508
                 II.  Procedural History .................................................................510
                III.  Discussion .........................................................................513
                      A. Introduction ....................................................................513
                      B. The Supreme Court's Decision In Sandoval ........................................513
                      C. Whether Plaintiffs May Assert A Claim for Disparate Impact Discrimination
                          in Violation of the EPA's Implementing Regulations Promulgated
                          Pursuant to § 602, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ............................516
                         1. Sandoval Does not Preclude Such a Claim ......................................516
                         2. The Governing Legal Standard for Determining Whether a "Right"
                              Can be Enforced Under § 1983 ..........................................518
                

                         3. The Differences Between the Cort v. Ash Implied Right of Action
                              Test and the Blessing v. Freestone § 1983 Test ........................520
                      D. Application of § 1983 Analysis to this Case ................................524
                         1. The Plaintiffs' Claim: The EPA's Implementing Regulations Promulgated
                            Under § 602 Create a Federal Right to Be Free of Adverse
                            Disparate Impact Discrimination By Recipients of Federal Funds
                            Pursuant to Title VI .........................................................524
                         2. Elements of the § 1983 Claim ............................................525
                         3. A History of the Implementing Regulations Promulgated by Federal
                              Agencies Pursuant to § 602 of Title VI ................................529
                         4. The Blessing Test: Whether the EPA's § 602 Implementing Regulations
                              Confer a Federal "Right" on Plaintiffs which is Enforceable
                              Under § 1983 ..........................................................535
                            a. Whether the Regulations Promulgated Under § 602 Were
                                Intended to Benefit Plaintiffs ...........................................535
                            b. Whether "the Right Assertedly Protected by the Provision is so
                               `Vague and Amorphous' That its Enforcement would Strain
                               Judicial Competence" ......................................................539
                            c. Whether the Provision "Unambiguously Imposes A Binding Obligation
                               on The States" ...........................................................541
                         5. Whether Congress Has Expressly or Impliedly Foreclosed Plaintiffs'
                             Ability to Enforce the EPA's Disparate Impact Regulations, Promulgated
                             Pursuant to Title VI, Under § 1983 ....................................542
                IV. The Availability of Injunctive and Declaratory Relief in this Case ..................547
                 V. Conclusion ..........................................................................549
                

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 19, 2001, this Court granted Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and a declaratory judgment based upon the allegation that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") and NJDEP Commissioner Robert Shinn ("Shinn") had violated § 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, and the EPA's implementing regulations thereto, codified at 40 C.F.R. § 7.10 et seq., by failing to consider the potential adverse, disparate impact of their decision to grant St. Lawrence Cement Co.'s ("SLC") application for air permits to operate its proposed facility. See South Camden Citizens in Action ("SCCIA"), et. al. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, et. al., ("SCCIA I"), 145 F.Supp.2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001)(Orlofsky, J.). That determination was based upon the assumption that an implied private right of action existed under § 602 of Title VI, a cause of action which had recently been recognized in this Circuit in Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1046, 120 S.Ct. 579, 145 L.Ed.2d 482 (1999). SCCIA I, 145 F.Supp.2d at 472. I noted in SCCIA I that the precise question of whether an implied private right of action was available to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI was pending before the Supreme Court. Id.; see Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir.1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305, 121 S.Ct. 28, 147 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2000). I concluded, however, in SCCIA I, that I was bound by the Third Circuit's decision in Powell to recognize such a claim. Id.

On the morning of April 24, 2001, five days after this Court filed its Opinion and Order in SCCIA I, the Supreme Court held that § 602 does not provide an implied private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated by federal agencies pursuant to § 602. See Alexander v. Sandoval, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517, 2001 WL 408983 (April 24, 2001).

On the afternoon of April 24, 2001, this Court convened a telephone conference call on the record with all counsel to address the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval on this case. See Transcript of Conference Call I ("Trans. Conf. Call I"), April 24, 2001. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval, the parties were asked to brief the following two questions: (1) Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief on the ground that the NJDEP and Commissioner Shinn intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of race, color, or national origin, in violation of § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and (2) Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983,¹ specifically, whether the disparate impact regulations promulgated to enforce Title VI can be enforced through a § 1983 action.

The Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval clearly held that private individuals can no longer sue directly under § 602 to enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The question presented to this Court for the first time, and perhaps for the first time to any federal court, is whether the same disparate impact regulations which can no longer be enforced through a private right of action brought directly under § 602 of Title VI, can be enforced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

For the reasons set forth below, I conclude that: (1) the Supreme Court's decision in Sandoval does not preclude Plaintiffs from pursuing their claim for disparate impact discrimination, in violation of the EPA's implementing regulations to Title VI, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief based upon a claim for disparate impact discrimination in violation of the EPA's implementing regulations to Title VI, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.² Accordingly, SLC's motion to vacate this Court's Opinion and Order of April 19, 2001 (SCCIA I), granting Plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction, or in the alternative, seeking a stay of that Order pending appeal, is denied. Therefore, this Court's Order of April 19, 2001 shall remain in full force and effect.³

I incorporate the findings of facts and conclusions of law set forth in SCCIA I except as noted below. My application of the Third Circuit's test for preliminary injunctive relief is unchanged by this Supplemental Opinion, except insofar as I assumed, in SCCIA I, that Plaintiffs were entitled to bring a private cause of action under § 602 itself, and have now concluded that Plaintiffs are entitled to assert the same claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In considering Plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunctive relief, I specifically note that the following findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in SCCIA I are incorporated into, and unaltered by, this Supplemental Opinion: (1) Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the NJDEP's facially neutral policy resulted in adverse disparate impact discrimination against Plaintiffs in violation of the EPA's Title VI implementing regulations; (2) Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm to their health and environment in the absence of an injunction; (3) Neither NJDEP, nor SLC will be irreparably harmed through the grant of preliminary injunctive relief; and (4) the granting of Plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunctive relief is in the public interest.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 19,...