South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 1358

Decision Date24 January 1989
Docket NumberNo. 1358,1358
Citation299 S.C. 14,382 S.E.2d 11
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesSOUTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent, v. Dorothy MUMFORD, Joseph Bill McLamb, Jr., Canal Insurance Company, and North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Company, Defendants. of whom North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Company and Canal Insurance Company are Appellants. Appeal of NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY and Canal Insurance Company. . Heard

Mary Layton Wells, of Hyman, Brown, Jeffords, Rushton & Hatfield, J. Boone Aiken, III, of Coleman, Aiken & Chase, and Brown W. Johnson, of Clarke & Johnson, Florence, for appellants.

Louis D. Nettles, of Nettles & Nettles, Florence, for respondent.

Harry R. Easterling, of Goldberg & Easterling, Bennettsville, for defendants.

BELL, Judge:

This is an action for a declaratory judgment. It arises out of an automobile collision involving Dorothy Mumford and Joseph Bill McLamb, Jr. The South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company is Mumford's third party liability insurance carrier. The North Carolina Farm Bureau Insurance Company provides uninsured motorist coverage for McLamb. The Canal Insurance Company provides collision coverage for McLamb. South Carolina Farm Bureau commenced this action against the other parties seeking a declaration that its policy provided no liability coverage for Mumford because the collision comes within the "intentional acts" exclusion of its policy. The circuit court held that the policy excludes liability on the facts of this case and that the exclusion clause is valid. North Carolina Farm Bureau and Canal appeal. We reverse.

The facts of the case are straightforward. On October 18, 1985, Mumford drove her automobile across the center line of a highway and struck McLamb's truck, which was approaching in the oncoming lane. Mumford saw the truck and deliberately collided with it in an attempt to commit suicide. She was under medical treatment for depression at the time. The collision caused personal injuries and property damage to McLamb.

Mumford's liability policy provides coverage for bodily injury or property damage for which the insured "becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident." It also contains the following exclusion clause:

We do not provide Liability Coverage for any person ... [w]ho intentionally causes bodily injury or property damage.

The circuit court found that the injuries and damages to McLamb were intentionally caused by Mumford. Since there is evidence to support this finding of fact, 1 we affirm it on appeal. The court then held that the intentional act exclusion of South Carolina Farm Bureau's policy excluded coverage for the collision.

This appeal presents a question of first impression in the South Carolina courts: does the Financial Responsibility Act 2 mandate coverage for intentional acts of the insured? If it does, then the Act prevails over the terms of the insurance contract and the collision with McLamb is covered by Mumford's liability insurance policy with South Carolina Farm Bureau. See Hogan v. Home Insurance Company, 260 S.C. 157, 194 S.E.2d 890 (1973) (if provision in automobile policy excluding coverage conflicts with requirements of statute, statute controls).

We hold that the Act does mandate coverage in this case. The statute requires any automobile insurance policy issued in this State to insure against "loss from liability imposed by law" for damages arising out of the use of a covered motor vehicle. Code Section 38-77-140. It draws no distinction between intentional acts and negligent acts of the insured--if liability for damages is "imposed by law," coverage must be provided. Without question, the law imposes liability on one who intentionally uses an automobile in a manner that causes damage to another. See M R & R Trucking Company v. Griffin, 198 So.2d 879 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1967), cert. dismissed, 206 So.2d 210 (1968); Denton v. Arnstein, 197 Or. 28, 250 P.2d 407 (1952). Therefore, by the plain terms of the statute, the insurance policy must provide coverage for McLamb's damages.

This interpretation of Section 38-77-140 is supported by other provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act. Code Sections 56-9-20(7)(c) and 38-77-220 list certain exclusions which may properly be placed in an automobile liability policy. Neither section lists an intentional acts exclusion. This omission suggests such an exclusion is not valid. See Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Parker, 282 S.C. 546, 320 S.E.2d 458 (Ct.App.1984) (exceptions made in a statute give rise to strong inference that no other exceptions were intended).

Additionally, Code Section 38-77-310 expressly authorizes an intentional acts exclusion for personal injury protection coverage. This raises a presumption that the Legislature would expressly authorize the same exclusion for third party liability coverage if it intended to permit insurance carriers to disclaim liability for intentional acts of the insured. See Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 309 (1979) (where a section of a statute contains a given provision, the omission of that provision from a similar section is significant to show a different intention existed).

The decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964), also supports our conclusion. In that case, the Court held that a North Carolina statute, identical in wording to South Carolina's, required the insurer to cover injuries to a third party intentionally inflicted by the insured through use of his automobile. Because it conflicted with the statute, an exclusion clause in the insurance policy was held to be unenforceable against the injured third party. We find the Roberts decision especially persuasive because our Legislature has directed us to construe the South Carolina Act so as to make uniform the laws of those states which enact substantially identical legislation. Section 56-9-120, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976.

Relying on Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company v. Dawkins, 551 F.Supp. 971 (D.S.C.1982), South Carolina Farm Bureau argues that the Financial Responsibility Act requires only that "accidents" be covered by a third party liability insurer. The Bureau contends that reasonable exclusionary clauses which do not conflict with the plain wording or legislative purpose of the Act are permissible. Moreover, it asserts that to invalidate an "intentional acts" exclusion in the insurance contract violates the well established public policy that prohibits persons from insuring themselves against their own intentionally harmful acts.

These arguments overlook both the actual wording of the statute and a...

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