South Dakota Mining Ass'n v. Lawrence County

Decision Date26 September 1997
Docket NumberNo. CIV. 97-5013.,CIV. 97-5013.
Citation977 F.Supp. 1396
PartiesSOUTH DAKOTA MINING ASSOCIATION; Homestake Mining Company of California; Wharf Resources, a Montana General Partnership; Golden Reward Mining Company Limited Partnership; Naneco Minerals, Inc.; and Fred J. Gali and Iwalana I. Gali; Plaintiffs, v. LAWRENCE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision of the State of South Dakota, Defendant, v. Jack COLE, Intervenor. In re STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA and Action for the Environment, Amicus Curiae.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota

Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Fuller, Tellinghuisen, Gordon & Eckrich, P.C., Spearfish, SD, Marvin D. Truhe, Linden R. Evans, Truhe, Beardsley, Jensen, Helmers & VonWald, Rapid City, SD, for South Dakota Mining Ass'n, Inc., Homestake Mining Co. of California, Wharf Resources, Golden Reward Mining Co. Ltd. Parntership, Naneco Minerals, Inc., Fred J. Gali, Iwalana I. Gali.

Robert D. Hofer, Riter, Mayer, Hofer, Wattier & Brown, Pierre, SD, John H. Fitzgerald, Lawrence County State's Atty., Deadwood, SD, for Lawrence County, South Dakota.

Roxanne Giedd, Atty. General's Office, Pierre, SD, for State of South Dakota, amicus.

William G. Taylor, Jr., Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, P.C., Sioux Falls, SD, for Action for the Environment, amicus, Jack Cole, amicus.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BATTEY, Chief Judge.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶ 1] On November 5, 1996, an initiated ordinance amending ordinance Number 1 of section 5.11 of the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance was approved by 51 percent of the electorate of Lawrence County. PlaintiffsSouth Dakota Mining Association (SDMA), Homestake Mining Company of California ("Homestake"), Wharf Resources ("Wharf"), Golden Reward Mining Company Limited Partnership ("Golden Reward"), Naneco Minerals, Inc. ("Naneco") and Fred and Iwalana Gali ("Galis") — have filed a complaint for declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. The complaint alleges in part that this ordinance preempts state and federal law because the ordinance conflicts with federal and state mining laws (Count I). Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to Count I of their complaint.1

[¶ 2] The State of South Dakota ("the State") and Action for the Environment ("Action") both were granted leave to file an amicus curiae brief as to Count I of plaintiffs' complaint. The State has filed a brief in support of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Action has filed a brief opposing plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Jack Cole intervened asserting his interest as a property owner affected by the ordinance. Cole joined in Action's brief opposing the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. All parties have responded to plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.

II. FACTS

[¶ 3] Ordinance section 5.11 added the following language to section 6 of the Lawrence County Zoning Ordinance, Ordinance Number 1:

No new permits or amendments to existing permits may be issued for surface metal mining extractive industry projects in the Spearfish Canyon Area.

The ordinance defined "Spearfish Canyon" by legal description.2 The area of land defined as "Spearfish Canyon" ("Spearfish Canyon" or "prohibited area") includes approximately 40,000 acres of Lawrence County extending from one to four miles east and west of Spearfish Canyon, encompassing approximately 10 percent of the total land area of Lawrence County. See Affidavits of Vernon Baker,3 Carol Jean Miller,4 and John Begeman.5

[¶ 4] Approximately 90 percent of the land defined as Spearfish Canyon is within the Black Hills National Forest and under the control and supervision of the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, and the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management. This land contains unpatented mining claims or properties which are open to the public for mineral development. The other 10 percent contains privately owned patented mining claims. See Affidavits of Begeman, C.J. Miller, and Donald Murray.6 Spearfish Canyon consists of some of the most beautiful land in the Black Hills.

[¶ 5] The land contained in the prohibited area may be classified into the following three categories:

(1) lands within the Black Hills National Forest that are open to mineral location and development; (2) unpatented mining claims within the Black Hills National Forest which are held by mining companies and other private parties; and (3) privately owned lands which consist mostly of patented mining claims.

Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts (Docket # 13); Affidavit of Murray. The third category includes:

(1) lands that are part of an active mining operation under local, state, and federal permits (e.g., the Wharf Mine); (2) lands with a state mine permit that are not currently being mined (e.g., Naneco's Johnson Gulch property); and (3) lands owned by individuals who lease their mineral rights to mining companies while retaining mineral royalty rights (e.g. Galis' mining claims).

Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts; Affidavit of Murray.

[¶ 6] During the past fifteen years, five mining companies have had active surface mining operations within Lawrence County. Two of the plaintiffs, Wharf and Golden Reward, either had or currently have active surface mining operations only. See Affidavit of Begeman. Both Wharf and Golden Reward have properties within the prohibited area in the form of patented and unpatented mining claims. Id. Currently, Wharf's and Golden Reward's unpatented mineral properties within the "Spearfish Canyon" area are undergoing active mineral exploration pursuant to state and federal law. Id. Some of Wharf's privately owned patented mining claims within the prohibited area are also part of Wharf's active surface mining operation which is operating under federal, state, and local laws. Id.

[¶ 7] Two members of the SDMA who are not plaintiffs, LAC Minerals (U.S.A.) Inc. ("LAC Minerals"), and Brohm Mining Corp. ("Brohm"), also either had, or currently have, surface mining operations only. See Affidavit of Ronald D. Everett.7 LAC Minerals owns or controls patented and unpatented mineral properties within the prohibited area. Id. From 1988 to the fall of 1993, LAC Minerals operated the Richmond Hill Mine which was an active gold and silver surface mining operation. Id. The mine is currently undergoing reclamation activities. Id. LAC Minerals does not own or operate an active underground mine within South Dakota. Id. Brohm owns or controls the Gilt Edge Mine which is an active gold and silver surface mining operation. Affidavit of Randy E. Beck.8 Brohm does not have an active underground mine within South Dakota.

[¶ 8] Plaintiff Homestake has both an active surface mine and an active underground mine in Lawrence County. Affidavit of Baker. Homestake has both patented and unpatented mining claims within the area defined as Spearfish Canyon. Id. Naneco currently holds a state surface mine permit but has not begun mining. Affidavit of C.J. Miller. Naneco also owns or controls privately owned lands which consist of mostly patented mining claims which are located within the prohibited area. Id.

[¶ 9] The Galis own patented mining claims in Lawrence County within the area defined as Spearfish Canyon. Affidavit of Fred Gali. The Galis currently lease these mineral rights to mining companies while retaining a royalty. Id.

[¶ 10] Defendant Lawrence County did not object to the statement of facts set forth by plaintiffs. Intervenor Cole's objections to plaintiffs' statement of facts were not material.9 As far as whether plaintiffs have patented or unpatented land in the prohibited area, Cole stated that he "has no basis to determine the accuracy of representations regarding mineral ownership in the area subject to the ordinance, and therefore accepts the same as truthful for purposes of this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." See Intervenor's Reply to Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

III. JURISDICTION10

[¶ 11] Article III of the Constitution and the Declaratory Judgment Act [hereinafter "Act"] restricts the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual ongoing cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. See also Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1515 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990); Arkansas AFL-CIO v. F.C.C., 11 F.3d 1430, 1435 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc)); Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 804 F.Supp. 1199, 1204 (D.S.D.1992). Independent of the Act, a plaintiff must allege that a district court has jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction to proceed independent of the Act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

[¶ 12] The Court has considered the parties' submissions as to ripeness and concludes this matter is ripe for consideration. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983); Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers AFL-CIO-CLC, 32 F.3d 1297, 1299 (8th Cir. 1994).

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

[¶ 13] The posture of this case is appropriate for summary judgment.11 Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a movant is entitled to summary judgment if the movant can "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [the movant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."12 In determining whether summary judgment should issue, the facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the burden is placed on the moving party to establish both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that such party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio...

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1 cases
  • South Dakota Min. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lawrence County
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • September 16, 1998
    ...that the ordinance was preempted by the Federal Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-26 (1994). See South Dakota Mining Ass'n v. Lawrence County, 977 F.Supp. 1396, 1405-07 (D.S.D.1997). Cole, who intervened on the side of defendant Lawrence County, argues that the ordinance is not preempted.......
2 books & journal articles
  • STATE SURFACE OWNER PROTECTION LAWS: TALES OF PREEMPTION, FEDERALISM, AND A CHANGING WEST
    • United States
    • FNREL - Special Institute Surface Use for Mineral Development in the New West (FNREL)
    • Invalid date
    ...196 U.S. 119 (1905) (holding that states may regulate the location of mining claims); South Dakota Mining Ass'n v. Lawrence County, 977 F. Supp. 1396, 1403 (D.S.D. 1997) (noting that "[i]t is established that state or local regulation supplementing the [federal] mining laws is permissible")......
  • AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION ISSUES AS THEY RELATE TO PRIMARY PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES IN THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE
    • United States
    • FNREL - Special Institute Uranium Exploration and Development (FNREL) (2006 Ed.)
    • Invalid date
    ...the basis of environmental considerations have been overturned in several states. E.g., South Dakota Mining Ass'n v. Lawrence County, 977 F. Supp. 1396 (D. S.D. 1997) (preemption based on Mining Act of 1872); Rusk County Citizen Action Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 552 N.W.2d 110 (W......

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