South Dakota State Veterans' Home v. National Bank of South Dakota

• Decision Date: 26 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11599,11599
• Citation: 235 N.W.2d 406,89 S.D. 549
• Parties: SOUTH DAKOTA STATE VETERANS' HOME, Claimant and Appellant, v. NATIONAL BANK OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Executor of Estate, Respondent.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 406

235 N.W.2d 406

89 S.D. 549

SOUTH DAKOTA STATE VETERANS' HOME, Claimant and Appellant, v. NATIONAL BANK OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Executor of Estate Respondent.

No. 11599.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Nov. 26, 1975.

William J. Janklow, Atty. Gen., Earl Mettler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for claimant and appellant.

Allen G. Wilson, Hot Springs, for executor and respondent.

COLER, Justice.

The claim of the State Veterans' Home, Hot Springs, South Dakota, hereinafter referred to as the 'home,' duly filed against the estate of Carl Eschol Sundstrom, who died testate without surviving spouse or dependent on February 24, 1974, was contested by the executor as barred by the statute of limitations which would preclude payment by the executor. SDCL 30--21--18. Upon hearing of the contested claim, the trial court denied that part of the claim arising prior to February 24, 1968, under the limitations stated in SDCL 15--2--13(2) and the claimant appealed. We reverse.

The decedent was a member of the Veterans' Home intermittently from April 16, 1954, to the date of his death. That membership is reflected by the claim filed, which numbers the years, months and days for which the claim is made against the estate, at the rate of $2.50 per day or $75 per month. The executor acknowledged that the $7,549.46 claim, if not barred by the statute of limitations, was a valid claim timely filed under SDCL 30--21--17. SDCL 33--18--15 et seq. impose a contractual or quasi-contractual obligation, Meade County v. Welch, 1914, 34 S.D. 348, 148 N.W. 601, thus, requiring the filing of a claim as distinct from a secured creditor's claim which is not barred for failure to file. See annotations following SDCL 30--21--17, Cf. U.P.C. 3--803. The language 'retroactive from the date of admission' was added to SDCL 33--18--15 by the legislature in direct and immediate response to the holding of this court in In re Scott's Estate, 1965, 81 S.D. 231, 133 N.W.2d 1. No useful purpose would be served by retracing the history of SDCL 33--18--15 through 33--18--17 which is well documented in In re Scott's Estate, supra, and the source notes to those sections. We hold that the 1965 amendment, as carried forward in the further amendment by Ch. 191, § 6, S.L.1970, has made retroactive the provisions of SDCL 33--18--15. SDCL 2--14--21; In re Scott's Estate, supra.

The sole issue before this court, on a minimal stipulated record, is whether the retroactive language of SDCL 33--18--15, which directs the filing of a claim by the home for the full amount of unreimbursed maintenance of a member, under the above circumstances, is limited in retroactive effect by any statute of limitations. We hold that the retroactive effect is not so limited.

Essentially SDCL 15--2--2 and SDCL 15--2--13 provide that the limitations set forth within Chapter 15--2 apply unless there is some other limitation prescribed by law. Because of the multitudinous special statutes of limitations, phrased in a variety of ways and found throughout our code, we cannot unequivocally state that SDCL 15--2--13(2) specifically applies to claims presented under SDCL 33--18 nor, in light of our disposition of this case, are we compelled to do so.

As SDCL 33--18 stands, if a member of the home dies without surviving legal dependents and without a will, his property is distributed to the home 'as sole heir for the sole use and benefit of the home.' SDCL 33--18--13. The maturity of a claim for maintenance at the home is otherwise governed by such factors as whether or not there is a will or a surviving spouse or a legal dependent. If a spouse or any dependent survives the member, the claim is delayed until the death of that spouse or dependent. SDCL 33--18--13 through 33--18--17. Thus, under one set of circumstances a special escheat to the home occurs and no statute of limitations is applicable. This is true since title vests in the home instantly upon the death of the member. In re McClellan's Estate, 1913, 31 S.D. 641, 141 N.W. 965.

The maturity of a claim under SDCL 33--18 is determined by several contingencies which no statute of limitation could be meaningfully drawn to cover and could not apply at all in the case of escheat. We do not agree with the executor's position that in order to except SDCL 33--18 from the provisions of SDCL 15--2 the legislature must specifically state the interrelationship of other statutes. The executor points out, by way of illustration, that such a general reference to the effect of the statute of limitations is expressed in SDCL 27--9--13 which relates to fixing a time for the accrual of the right of action on a claim for expenses for care of a mentally ill patient. The legislative intent therein expressed and the necessity for a reference to limitation of actions arose out of an entirely different legislative history, as documented in Hamlin County v. Sadler, 1949, 73 S.D. 56, 38 N.W.2d 879. See also 1917--1918 A.G.R., pp. 324--326. Under that statute, the liability arises when the patient's expenses are not kept current, SDCL 27--9--12, and the action may be begun at any time thereafter. The central question is, when does the right of action accrue? This question must be determined...