South Dakota Subsequent Injury Fund v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange

Decision Date03 December 1998
Docket NumberNo. 20531,20531
Citation1999 SD 2,589 N.W.2d 206
PartiesSOUTH DAKOTA SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND, Appellant, v. CASUALTY RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE and Dakota Truck Underwriters, Appellees. . Considered on Briefs
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Timothy E. Reilly, Assistant Attorney General and Division Counsel South Dakota Division of Insurance, Pierre, for appellant.

Susan Jansa Brunick and Dana M. Van Beek of Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for appellees.

AMUNDSON, Justice.

¶1 Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) appeals the circuit court's decision affirming Department of Labor's (Department) determination that both Casualty Reciprocal Exchange (CRE) and Dakota Truck Underwriters (DTU) established claims for reimbursement from SIF. We affirm.

FACTS

¶2 Two cases were combined for consideration because they involve similar facts and present the same legal issue.

Casualty Reciprocal Exchange/Niederman

¶3 Darlene Niederman was employed as a cook for Employer, Lumberyard Restaurant, Inc. On July 21, 1986, Niederman reported a work-related back injury. During the treatment of her back injury, Niederman was diagnosed with a somatoform pain disorder 1 in addition to the mechanical back pain disorder. Niederman had sustained a number of physical, mental and substance abuses during the years preceding her back injury, which resulted in a preexisting psychological condition. This preexisting psychological condition increased her chances of developing somatoform pain disorder.

¶4 The claim for workers' compensation benefits was ultimately settled through a Compromise Agreement approved by Department. The agreement provided that Niederman's disability was the result of the low-back injury combined with the aggravation of a preexisting psychological condition, resulting in somatoform pain disorder. The agreement provided for a lump-sum payment of $100,000. This payment was in addition to disability benefits of $28,657.56, and medical expenses of $20,701.30 paid to Niederman prior to settlement.

¶5 On April 10, 1996, CRE filed a claim for reimbursement from the SIF. CRE claimed Niederman suffered from a preexisting psychological condition and her subsequent injury was the low-back injury in July 1986. On November 19, 1996, the SIF denied CRE's claim, stating there was no disability or impairment rating attributable to the employee's alleged preexisting psychological condition. Therefore, no subsequent injury to employee.

Dakota Truck Underwriters/Bush

¶6 Everett Bush was employed as a truck driver by Midwest Coast Transport, L.P. On August 28, 1995, Bush reported a work-related injury to his back. Bush was examined and treated by several doctors, but his condition did not improve. Subsequent X-rays revealed Bush had a compression fracture, as well as significant osteopenia. 2 Bone density testing revealed marked osteoporosis. 3 With regard to Bush's condition, Dr. Robert Suga stated, "the fracture, in my opinion, would have to be considered a pathologic 4 fracture related to his osteopenia which was documented on bone densitometry. The fracture was however, incurred as a result of his work related activity."

¶7 Bush's workers' compensation claim was settled. The compromise agreement, approved by Department, paid a lump sum of $23,000 in addition to the disability already paid. The lump sum also includes $1,400 as an advance toward future medical expenses. Total indemnity benefits paid to Bush over the course of the claim were $33,616.64 and total medical expenses were $2,810.99.

¶8 DTU filed a claim for reimbursement from SIF. SIF denied DTU's claim under the rationale that no disability or impairment rating existed that was attributable to the preexisting condition of osteopenia and, as a result, there had been no subsequent injury to the employee.

¶9 CRE and DTU filed a petition for hearing with Department on December 5, 1996. 5 Department determined that, under the 1995 amendment to SDCL 62-4-34, a preexisting injury need not have resulted in a disability to obtain reimbursement from the SIF. Therefore, Department approved CRE and DTU's claims for reimbursement. The circuit court affirmed. SIF now appeals, raising the following issues for review:

¶10 1. Whether an eligible claim for reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Fund must show that a prior injury or preexisting condition be of a disabling quality.

¶11 2. Whether claimants have demonstrated that their respective employees have received subsequent injuries within the meaning of the Subsequent Injury Fund.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The issue on appeal is a statutory interpretation of the 1995 amendment to SDCL 62-4-34. On issues of statutory interpretation, this Court reviews Department's decision de novo. Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, p 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539.

DECISION

¶13 1. Whether an eligible claim for reimbursement from the Subsequent Injury Fund must show that a prior injury or preexisting condition be of a disabling quality.

¶14 The Subsequent Injury Fund was set up to assist workers with some type of preexisting disability, condition or handicap, to obtain employment notwithstanding the liability exposure of an employer who would hire such worker in the event of a second injury. See 5 Larson, Worker's Compensation Law, § 59.30 (1998). SIF reimburses an employer for two-thirds of compensation paid due to a subsequent injury had there been no preexisting injury or condition. SDCL 62-4-34.

¶15 In 1995, the statute governing reimbursement to employers was amended. SDCL 62-4-34, as amended, provides in relevant part:

If an employee who has previously sustained an injury or suffers from a preexisting condition, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial or permanent total disability so that the degree or percentage of disability caused by the combination of the subsequent injury and the preexisting injury or condition is substantially greater than that which resulted from the last injury, considered alone; and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer shall pay all medical and hospital expenses and compensation provided by this title. The employer shall be reimbursed from the "subsequent injury fund" for two-thirds of all compensation, medical and hospital expenses paid to or on behalf of the injured employee due to the subsequent injury. ... (Emphasis added.)

The previous version of SDCL 62-4-34 provided, in relevant part:

If an employee who has previously sustained an injury which resulted in disability from any cause or origin irrespective of compensability, receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial or permanent total disability so that the degree or percentage of disability caused by the combined injuries is substantially greater than that which resulted from the last injury, considered alone; and if the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the combined disabilities, the employer shall pay all medical and hospital expenses and compensation provided by this title. The employer shall be reimbursed from the "subsequent injury fund" for all compensation, medical and hospital expenses, paid in excess of the compensation paid for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability. ... (Emphasis added.)

¶16 CRE and DTU argue the 1995 amendment to SDCL 62-4-34 eliminated the requirement that the preexisting injury or condition result in disability. SIF, conversely, argues the preexisting condition must have resulted in a disability before reimbursement from the SIF is appropriate.

¶17 The rules of statutory construction adopted by this Court state:

"The purpose of rules regarding the construction of statutes is to discover the true intention of the law, and said intention is to be ascertained by the court primarily from the language expressed in the statute. In applying legislative enactments, we must accept them as written. The legislative intent is determined from what the legislature said, rather than from what we or others think it should have said.

While it is fundamental that we must strive to ascertain the real intention of the lawmakers, it is equally fundamental that we must confine ourselves to the intention as expressed in the language used. To violate the rule against supplying omitted language would be to add voluntarily unlimited hazard to the already inexact and uncertain business of searching for legislative intent.

One of the primary rules of statutory ... construction is to give words and phrases their plain meaning and effect. This court assumes that statutes mean what they say and that legislators have said what they meant. When the language of a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, and the court's only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed in the statute."

Delano v. Petteys, 520 N.W.2d 606, 608 (S.D.1994) (quoting In re Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 884-85 (S.D.1984)).

¶18 Long ago the effect of amending a statute was recognized:

It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction to give effect to the legislative intent where possible. It is further an established principle of statutory construction that, where the wording of an act is changed by amendment, it is evidential of an intent that the words shall have a different construction.

In re Dwyer, 49 S.D. 350, 353-54, 207 N.W. 210, 212 (1926). When an amendment is passed, it is presumed the legislature intended to change existing law. Delano, 520 N.W.2d at 609; John Morrell & Co. v. Dep't of Labor, 460 N.W.2d 141, 145 (S.D.1990); Rosander v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Butte County, 336 N.W.2d 160, 161 (S.D.1983). An amendment indicates a change in rights:

The courts have declared that the mere fact that ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
31 cases
  • South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
    • May 17, 2002
    ...in the statute." American Meat Institute v. Barnett, 64 F.Supp.2d 906, 915 (D.S.D.1999), (quoting South Dakota Subsequent Injury Fund v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 1999 SD 2, ¶ 17, 589 N.W.2d 206, 209 (1999)), (quoting Delano v. Petteys, 94 SDO 700, 520 N.W.2d 606, 608), (quoting in turn......
  • Peterson, ex rel. Peterson v. Burns
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 24, 2001
    ...malpractice, including both personal injury and death.14 We are also mindful of the rule against supplying omitted language. South Dakota SIF v. CRE, 1999 SD 2, ¶ 17, 589 N.W.2d 206, 209. However, the term "an action" is broad enough to encompass both personal injury and death without addit......
  • Moeller v. Weber
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • October 6, 2004
    ...evidence concerning any mitigating circumstances." [¶ 49.] We assume that statutes mean what they say. South Dakota Subsequent Injury Fund v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 1999 SD 2, ¶ 17, 589 N.W.2d 206, 209. Quite clearly, § 23A-27A-2 means that the jury is to hear all relevant evidence that......
  • Hanig v. City of Winner
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • January 19, 2005
    ...license applications. We have said repeatedly that the Legislature said what it meant and meant what it said. S.D. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 1999 SD 2, ¶ 22, 589 N.W.2d 206, 210. Nevertheless, based upon case law from other states with their own liquor statutes......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • THE LIFE AND LEGAL LEGACY OF JUSTICE STEVEN L. ZINTER.
    • United States
    • South Dakota Law Review Vol. 65 No. 2, June 2020
    • June 22, 2020
    ...v. S.D. Subsequent Injury Fund, 504 N.W.2d 107, 109 (S.D. 1993). (54.) See. e.g., S.D. Subsequent Injury Fund v. Cas. Reciprocal Exch., 1999 SD 2, [paragraph] 12, 589 N.W.2d 206, 208, abrogated by Holscher v. Valley Queen Cheese Factory, 2006 SD 35, [paragraph] 28, 713 N.W.2d 555, 564 (demo......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT