South Florida Lumber Mills v. Breuchaud

Citation51 F.2d 490
Decision Date05 August 1931
Docket NumberNo. 6080.,6080.
PartiesSOUTH FLORIDA LUMBER MILLS v. BREUCHAUD.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

N. B. K. Pettingill and Howard P. Macfarlane, both of Tampa, Fla. (Macfarlane, Pettingill, Macfarlane & Fowler, of Tampa, Fla., of counsel), for appellant.

G. E. Mabry, O. K. Reaves, and Morris E. White, all of Tampa, Fla., and Geo. W. Scofield, of Inverness, Fla. (E. C. Johnson and Mabry, Reaves & White, all of Tampa, Fla., of counsel), for appellee.

Before FOSTER, SIBLEY, and HUTCHESON, Circuit Judges.

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, plaintiff below, brought its suit to charge defendant on an oral promise to pay the first maturing of several notes executed by Breuchaud as president of Inverness Company, dated November 18, 1926, and due January 1, 1928, 1929, et seq. Plaintiff offered the note and the oral testimony of Rankin and Fechtig, officers and owners of the plaintiff company. It proved that during the land boom in Florida plaintiff through Fechtig had sold Inverness Company, Breuchaud, president and owner, a tract of land there subject to a first mortgage for $25,000, taking back notes secured by second mortgage on the land and indorsed by Breuchaud for $250,000; that, the boom breaking, the fictitious values suddenly collapsing, Breuchaud, realizing that he had tremendously overbought himself, commenced negotiations to bring the notes into relation to the real value of the property purchased.

Rankin testified, in substance: That at a meeting in New York City between him, Fechtig, and Breuchaud, Breuchaud demanded that the obligation on the notes be cut in half. "Also we were to allow him to leave his name off the new notes. The reason for his asking this was he wanted to borrow money at the Bank and to be able to make a statement to the bank that he was not liable on the notes. If he were on the notes he could not make the statement. He offered me personally if I would let him have the notes that he endorsed, he would pay the new notes. He told me that time and time again. He said that he would not have to show the $150,000 liability to the bank though he was going to pay it. His words were "If you will relieve me of my endorsement on the $250,000 and accept my personal promise to pay these new notes, it will relieve me from having to put them in my statement to the bank and will enable me to borrow money that I need to borrow." Further testifying, he said: "At the time the notes for $250,000 were surrendered to him, he (Breuchaud) did say that he would pay the $150,000 worth of notes that were taken in lieu. But this was not the reason of the exchange. I was induced to make the exchange by Dr. Fechtig who was a long time friend of Breuchaud's; if it had not been for Fechtig's insistence I would never have consented. In making it I relied upon Breuchaud's promise to pay the $150,000 of notes but that promise was not the inducement for the exchange because I already had his endorsement on the $250,000. Dr. Fechtig told me that he knew Breuchaud would carry out what he had agreed to do as he was a man of honor. Breuchaud said he would be embarrassed by showing this liability in going to the Bank. He also said he wanted to go to the Bank to get the money to pay the $25,000 which was the note that he paid on November 18, 1926, on the first mortgage. He said that though he agreed to pay the $150,000 he would not have to show that to the Bank as that was the kind of obligation that did not have to go into the bank statement."

Dr. Fechtig testified: "The agreement was that Mr. Breuchaud was to be released from his personal warranty because he said he could not go to the bank with all those signatures out and borrow any money. Mr. Rankin turned over the old notes and Mr. Breuchaud again stated that he would pay the amount of the new ones. The only reason Mr. Breuchaud said his obligation should be reduced and his signature released was that he could not go to the bank and get the money with his signature on $250,000 worth of notes. He said if Rankin would make this arrangement he would pay these notes himself. There was nothing said in conversation about paying the first mortgage or giving South Florida Lmbr. Mills other mortgages." He also testified that, after Breuchaud said he would pay these notes, the papers were exchanged, new notes were given, and the old notes surrendered.

Defendant proved by Rankin and by Fechtig that, after the conversation with Breuchaud had taken place in New York, they concluded to make substantially the concession first required by defendant that the notes be reduced in amount and Breuchaud released from liability on them, and that Rankin made out a slip which, among other things, contained these words, "$25,000 a year; 7%; Release from notes; $25,000 mortgage 7%; $8000 on garage; $4000 on three houses; $2500 on other two houses"; that the matters were to be finally closed in Florida.

These negotiations, begun in New York, concluded in Florida, resulted in the execution at Tampa on November 18, 1926, of the following papers:

An indenture which, after describing the property and reciting the execution of the original notes for $250,000, provided that the clause in the mortgage with reference to these notes should be modified to show $150,000 in lieu of $250,000; that new notes with new terms should be substituted for the old notes. It further provided that interest should be paid to January 1, 1927, on the original $250,000 of notes, and that the proceeds of the first note, due January 1, 1927, were to be applied to the discharge of the first mortgage note, and in lieu of that note, the proceeds of which were to be so used, Inverness would make six other notes aggregating the sum of $25,000 secured on other property owned by Inverness Company.

A letter from defendant to plaintiff agreeing that the first mortgage was to be paid off, not on January 1, 1927, as stated in the contract, but immediately, and the first maturing note was to be surrendered at the time, and then the Inverness notes for $250,000 to be surrendered upon delivery of the smaller notes called for in the agreement.

Also a letter from defendant to plaintiff containing his personal agreement to furnish the abstracts securing the new small notes, to deliver the insurance policies paid in advance for three years, and to be personally responsible for the payment of interest on the $250,000 on January 1, 1927. The defendant, to show plaintiff's own understanding that not Breuchaud, but Inverness alone, was responsible on the notes, offered a letter from Rankin to Inverness, dated December 8, 1927, demanding payment of the notes, and a telegram from Rankin reading in part, "South Florida Lbr. Mills asked only assurance from Breuchaud that adjusted payments should be met which assurance was given in consideration of their reducing the payments and relieving him from personal liability."

At the conclusion of its proof the defendant filed its motion to strike the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses that the defendant had orally promised to pay, because (1) the parties having finally integrated their negotiations into writing, these writings constituted their agreement; (2) because the testimony presented an effort in violation of the statute of frauds, section 5779, Comp. Gen. Laws Fla. 1927 (a) to charge defendant with the debt and default of another (b) to charge him upon an agreement not to be performed within one year from its making. The motion was sustained upon the first ground, and the testimony stricken.

Thereafter plaintiff, in support of its position that the writings were not constitutive of the entire agreement, offered by Rankin, its president, to orally explain and limit the purpose and effect of the Breuchaud letters executed contemporaneously with and as a part of the contract of November 18, 1926. Defendant objecting, the offer was properly rejected. Cargill v. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1, 198 N. W. 536; Fentress v. Steele, 110 Va. 578, 66 S. E. 870; Chute Co. v. Latta, 123 Minn. 69, 142 N. W. 1048; Note 70 A. L. R. page 754. Thereupon the witness testified that he had refused to accept the documents executed by the plaintiff and the Inverness Company until the two letters had been written and executed by Breuchaud. This concluding the testimony, the court upon motion instructed a verdict for the defendant. From the judgment following, this appeal is prosecuted. Appellant here vigorously presents that the issue tendered by its pleadings and its evidence, that defendant orally promised to pay the note, should have been sent to the jury; that neither is the case one within the statute of frauds nor one of an attempt to orally impeach a written contract.

As to the statutory defense, it maintains that the promise sued on is direct and immediate, not collateral and mediate, Meinrath Brokerage Co. v. Collins (C. C. A.) 298 F. 377; Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Cole et al. (C. C. A.) 258 F. 169, and that the fact of the delivery up by plaintiff of the original notes which defendant had indorsed constituted such performance on its part as to change the contract from an executory to a partly executed one, and therefore to take it out of the time section of the Florida statute. Wilson v. American Co. (C. C. A.) 33 F.(2d) 812, to which defendant makes reply: (1) If the claimed promise of Breuchaud has any import other than a mere moral assurance that he...

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