South Haven v. Van Buren Cty. Bd. of Com'Rs

• Decision Date: 11 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 131011 (Calendar No. 8).,131011 (Calendar No. 8).
• Citation: 734 N.W.2d 533,478 Mich. 518
• Parties: CITY OF SOUTH HAVEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VAN BUREN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and Van Buren County Treasurer, Defendants-Appellants, and Van Buren County Board of County Road Commissioners, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

734 N.W.2d 533

478 Mich. 518

CITY OF SOUTH HAVEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VAN BUREN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and Van Buren County Treasurer, Defendants-Appellants, and Van Buren County Board of County Road Commissioners, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 131011 (Calendar No. 8).

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued April 11, 2007.

Decided July 11, 2007.

Law, Weathers & Richardson, P.C. (by Michael J. Roth), Grand Rapids, for the City of South Haven.

Schuitmaker, Cooper, Schuitmaker & Cypher, P.C. (by Harold Schuitmaker and M. Brian Knotek), Paw Paw, for the Van Buren County Board of Commissioners and the Van Buren County Treasurer.

PER CURIAM.

At issue in this case is whether defendants violated MCL 224.20b by presenting and securing voter approval of a road millage proposal and, if so, what remedy is available. We affirm the Court of Appeals decision that the millage proposal in this case violated the allocation provisions of MCL 224.20b, but reverse the Court of Appeals order remanding the case because, under the facts presented, plaintiff is not entitled to any of the remedies it seeks.

I

The statute at issue in this case is MCL 224.20b,¹ which permits county boards of commissioners to propose tax levies, also known as millage proposals, for roads and bridges, but requires the proceeds of such a levy to be distributed to cities and villages for their roads, as well as to the county, according to a specific formula unless the governing boards of the cities and villages agree with the county to a different distribution. The statute also expressly states that proposals must conform to this distribution requirement and unless they do, they are not properly before the voters.

Despite this fund distribution requirement, the voters of Van Buren County in 2003 were presented with and approved a road millage that had no provision for distributing funds to cities and villages. It simply gave one mill for five years to the Van Buren County Road Commission to repair and reconstruct county roads,² with no mention of city or village roads. No city or village objected even though the statutory requirements in MCL 224.20b had not been followed. Moreover, going back to 1978, six other millages with the same flaw—no distribution provision—had been approved in six separate elections, and the funds derived had also been used exclusively by the Van Buren County Road Commission for the purpose of maintaining and repairing primary county roads and local county roads. Because plaintiff city of South Haven had no county roads within its municipal limits, it did not receive any of the funds from the six millages for road building and repair.

However, in 2004, South Haven for the first time objected to the county's failure to allocate to it any of the millage proceeds. It brought a five-count complaint, alleging that the defendants violated MCL 224.20b, and seeking a constructive trust, restitution of plaintiff's portion of the tax levies plus interest and costs, an order of mandamus requiring defendants to remit the money owed to plaintiff, and a declaratory judgment that plaintiff is entitled to its portion of the tax levies in the future.

Both the city and the road commission moved for summary disposition. The trial court first found that the Michigan Tax Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction, and therefore granted the road commission's motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4). It nonetheless went on to also find that the road commission was not a proper party because it owed no duty to the city, and that the allocation formula in MCL 224.20b(2) was inapplicable as a matter of law because the ballot language clearly indicated that only the county would get the funds.

The Court of Appeals reversed much of this decision.³ First, it held that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court, not the Tax Tribunal, because the case did not involve assessment, valuation, rates, special assessments, allocation, equalization, a refund, or a redetermination of a tax. Second, the Court agreed that the road commission was not a proper party because it played no role in the alleged misallocation of the funds; its role was merely ministerial and thus summary disposition in its favor was proper. Finally, the panel concluded that, contrary to the county's argument that the specificity of the millage proposal eliminated the need to allocate funds to cities and villages, the requirement of subsection 2 to distribute funds to cities and villages could only be avoided if an agreement was formed between the cities and villages and the county road commission in accordance with MCL 224.20b(2). Because there was no such agreement, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred and funds did need to be allocated as provided in the statute.⁴ However, the panel stopped short of ordering restitution, noting that "using revenues approved by the voters for a specific purpose for some other purpose would be unlawful."⁵ Having pointed out the conundrum, the Court of Appeals then remanded to the trial court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."⁶

This Court granted leave to appeal, limited to consideration of whether the city was entitled to any of the tax proceeds. Specifically, we ordered the parties to address whether the ballot proposal violated the statute and, if so, what remedy might be available; and whether the parties by their conduct "otherwise agreed" to a different allocation than that required by statute.⁷

II

This case requires us to interpret the language set forth in MCL 224.20b. This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory construction.⁸ Unambiguous statutes are enforced as written.⁹

III

MCL 224.20b establishes a mandatory system for the collection and allocation of taxes levied under that statute, unless otherwise agreed to by the relevant cities and villages. MCL 224.20b(1) states:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the board of commissioners of any county by proper resolution may submit to the electorate of the county at any general or special election the question of a tax levy for highway, road and street purposes or for 1 or more specific highway, road or street purposes, including but not limited to bridges, as may be specified by the board.

This subsection permits the county board to submit for voter approval a millage "for highway, road and street purposes or for 1 or more specific highway, road or street purposes . . . ." MCL 224.20b(2) states:

Unless otherwise agreed by the governing bodies of the cities and villages and the board of county road commissioners the revenues derived from the tax levy authorized by this section shall be allocated and distributed by the county treasurer as follows . . . .

The statute then specifies a formula for the allocation of funds collected.¹⁰ MCL 224.20b(2) indicates that all funds collected under the statute "shall be allocated" according to the delineated formula, "[u]nless otherwise agreed by the governing bodies of the cities and villages . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The term "shall" indicates that the formula for allocating funds is mandatory. Finally, MCL 224.20b(4) emphasizes and underscores the mandatory nature of the allocation formula established in subsection 2:

[A] board of county commissioners shall not submit to the electorate of the county the question of a tax levy for any highway, road or street purpose, including but not limited to bridges, nor submit the question of borrowing money for any such purpose, to be voted upon at any election held on or after September 1, 1971 unless the revenues or proceeds are allocated and distributed in the same manner as the revenues derived from a tax levy authorized by this section. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, the statute requires that taxes collected under its auspices must be allocated in conformity with the formula established in MCL 224.20b(2), unless the cities and villages reach an agreement with the board of county road commissioners to allocate the funds in a different manner.

Because defendants never allocated the tax levies received in accordance with the requirements of MCL 224.20b, and no agreement existed between the cities and villages and the board of county road commissioners, defendants violated MCL 224.20b.

Defendants argue that only "general" road millages are subject to allocation and distribution in accordance with the statute. However, MCL 224.20b(1) applies to millages "for highway, road and street purposes and for 1 or more specific highway, road or street purposes . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The phrase "for highway, road, and street purposes" indicates that tax levies for "general" highway, road, and street purposes are subject to the requirements of MCL 224.20b. Nothing in the remainder of the statute alters these requirements: subsection 3 says that the proceeds must be used "exclusively for highway, road and street purposes" and subsection 4 reiterates and emphasizes that millage proposals must conform to the allocation formula set forth in subsection 2, without distinguishing between general and specific projects.

Defendants also argue that the term "any" in the phrase "for any highway, road or street purpose" in MCL 224.20b(4) indicates that only tax levies for "general" purposes must follow the statutory requirements. "Any" is defined as "every; all." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). Contrary to defendants' argument, the term "any" indicates that every tax millage—whether "general" or "specific"—established under MCL 224.20b must comply with the allocation formula established in that statute.

Accordingly, the language of the statute clearly states that counties must either allocate proceeds in accordance with the formula or get the local governing bodies to agree to a different distribution. "`If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written.'"¹¹ The...