South Suburban Hous. Ctr. v. Santefort Real Estate

Citation658 F. Supp. 1450
Decision Date28 April 1987
Docket NumberNo. 82 C 7518.,82 C 7518.
PartiesSOUTH SUBURBAN HOUSING CENTER, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation; Peter Dykstra; Thomas Gray; Stanley Clauson; Edward Brown; Joseph Agne; James Hill; Dorothy Bass and Loren Robertson, Plaintiffs, v. SANTEFORT REAL ESTATE, INCORPORATED, an Illinois Corp.; Cowing Realty Limited, an Illinois corp. and Santefort Cowing Realtors, a partnership, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Thomas H. Morsch, James R. Stinson, Linzey D. Jones, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Don H. Reuben, Rene A. Torrado, Jr., Reuben & Proctor, Bruce J. Van Heukelem, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

ORDER

NORGLE, District Judge.

This is an action for declaratory relief and money damages brought by the South Suburban Housing Center ("Center") and other named individuals. Defendants are two suburban real estate corporations and a partnership. Plaintiffs allege that defendants have engaged in illegal discrimination by practicing "racial steering." Such practices are alleged to violate the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982.1 This case comes before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 challenging plaintiffs' standing to bring this action.

Rule 56 provides for the entry of summary judgment if the record on the motion reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An opponent of a properly supported Rule 56 motion must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue does in fact exist for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The opponent of the motion receives the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences arising from the underlying facts. See generally, 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil 2d § 2727. Only reasonable inferences favoring the opponent of the motion, however, will be considered by the court. Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir.1984). In other words, the court need not displace logic or disregard inferences which unavoidably follow from the established facts. With this understanding, the court now turns to the facts established in the present case.

I.

Plaintiffs in this action are the Center, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and eight individual plaintiffs, Peter Dykstra (a white resident of Lansing), Thomas Gray (a white resident of Park Forest South), Stanley Clauson (a white resident of South Holland), Edward Brown (a white resident of Calumet City), Joseph Agne (a white resident of Harvey), James Hill (a black resident of Park Forest South), Dorothy Bass (a black resident of Calumet City) and Loren Robertson (a black resident of Harvey).

One of plaintiff Center's corporate purposes is to eliminate discriminatory housing practices in the southern suburbs of Cook County, and to develop and maintain racially integrated communities through the "testing" of real estate offices in the area for violations of fair housing laws. In addition, Center receives, investigates, and refers complaints regarding discriminatory housing practices to various agencies and private entities, and provides counseling and other referral services to help home-seekers of all races locate housing in stable, racially integrated communities. Center uses "testers" to search out discriminatory practices. Testers pose as prospective renters or purchasers of real estate and use real or fictitious names when calling on landlords or sellers. Testers return to the Center and report the test results to supervisors.

The eight individual plaintiffs named above are residents of five different communities in the southern suburbs which have allegedly been affected by the conduct of defendants. The individual plaintiffs are not testers associated with Center who were turned away from housing. Nor were they seeking to purchase homes in the target area.

Defendants are Santefort-Cowing Realtors, a partnership, which includes as general partners, defendants Santefort Real Estate and Cowing Realty. The partnership has sales offices in Dolton, South Holland, Lansing, and Calumet City. All of these communities are within the target area. Defendant Santefort-Cowing's business includes acting as a real estate broker or agent for residential property located in the southern suburbs. Santefort-Cowing is one of the major real estate brokerage firms in the southern suburbs of Cook County accounting for 33% of all residential property sales and 36% of all properties listed in the multiple listing service. (See Pltf's. Stmt. of Gen. Issues, ¶ 10, at 5).

The target area identified in the complaint is an area of south suburban Cook County which encompasses approximately 220 square miles and which has a population in excess of 400,000. Defendants' residential real estate market and Center's service area include more than 30 municipalities in two counties with a total 1980 population estimated by Center at 700,000. The geographic area within which Center conducts its testing is bounded by Harlem Avenue on the west, 127th Street on the north, the Indiana border on the east, and a line approximately three miles south of Steger Road on the south. The individual plaintiffs are residents of this geographic area, residing as far south and west as Park Forest South and as far north and west as Calumet City. The City of Chicago, population 3,000,000, is north of the region which is the subject of this complaint.

During 1981 and 1982, Center conducted 26 tests of defendants' four real estate offices located in Calumet City, Dolton, Lansing, and South Holland. These four offices were chosen because they were located in four contiguous communities that according to the 1980 Census were segregated white communities. According to plaintiffs, Dolton's population was 95.9% white, South Holland's 99.5%, Calumet City's 94.1%, and Lansing's 98.9%.

The tests were performed by "matched" black and white testers in an attempt to determine whether defendants were engaging in racial steering, i.e., attempting to influence prospective home buyers to purchase properties in different areas according to their race. According to the complaint, the results of Center's tests showed defendants attempted to influence black prospective home buyers from purchasing homes in Lansing, Lynwood, South Holland or areas of Calumet City and defendants attempted to influence white prospective buyers away from areas having a significant number of black residents.

Plaintiffs attribute defendants' continuing pattern of racial steering to specific racial comments made by defendants' sales agents to the testers. These comments allegedly were designed to discourage them from interest in certain communities or areas. Examples of comments made include the following:

a) "Harvey has bad areas, can't say why they're bad because I am not allowed to say anything racial."
b) "You don't want The Park its segregated ... not a good place to raise kids" and "you wouldn't want to even consider this, its The Park about 60 percent black now."
c) "South Holland doesn't have the type of home you're most interested in bungalow;" and "Lansing has few assumable mortgages and conventional mortgages are difficult to get there."

Further, plaintiffs allege that defendants attempted to influence prospective home buyers through housing choice recommendations and differential treatment.

In addition, Center alleges that as a result of defendants' discriminatory practices, its efforts to help homeseekers find housing in racially integrated communities have been frustrated. Center also claims it lost resources which were expended to identify and counteract defendants' alleged racially discriminatory housing practices. The individual plaintiffs claim injury in that the actions of defendants deprived or threatened to deprive them of their asserted right to enjoy the professional, economic, aesthetic, political, and cultural benefits of living in a stable, racially-integrated community.

Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment challenging plaintiffs' standing to bring this action and consequently this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants argue that no "tester" identified in plaintiffs' complaint is a party to this action. No individual who was a member of or was served by Center is a named plaintiff or is in any way involved with the tests conducted by Center. The individual resident plaintiffs do not allege that they had any contact with any defendant or salesperson of the defendants. In fact, defendants were selected for testing on a random basis without any specific complaint by the individual plaintiffs that defendants were engaging in racial steering.

Defendants further argue Center's testing program was not conducted in response to the concerns of the individual plaintiffs and would have been conducted even if the defendants did not exist. Center does not allege that any homeseeker it was assisting was discriminated against by defendants; nor do the individual plaintiffs claim defendants' conduct caused any loss in property values or harmed the tax base in any communities within the target area. Finally, defendants argue numerous other factors indigenous to the 220 square mile region explain the housing pattern in south suburban communities and that any injury suffered by plaintiffs is unrelated to defendants' alleged conduct. These plaintiffs, therefore, cannot show they have suffered injury in fact related to defendants' conduct. Defendants argue their motion...

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    ...the Supreme Court did not pass in affirming our decision, cannot stand in the face of Havens. South Suburban Housing Center v. Santefort Real Estate, Inc., 658 F.Supp. 1450 (N.D.Ill.1987), which we affirmed in part and reversed in part without issuing a published opinion citable as preceden......
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