South Texas Implement & Mach. Co. v. Anahuac Canal Co.

• Decision Date: 29 January 1925
• Docket Number: (No. 8579.)<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 269 S.W. 1097
• Parties: SOUTH TEXAS IMPLEMENT & MACHINERY CO. et al. v. ANAHUAC CANAL CO. et al.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

269 S.W. 1097

SOUTH TEXAS IMPLEMENT & MACHINERY CO. et al. v. ANAHUAC CANAL CO. et al.

(No. 8579.)^*

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.

January 29, 1925.

Rehearing Denied March 12, 1925.

Error from District Court, Harris County; W. E. Monteith, Judge.

Bill by the Standard Rice Company interpleading the South Texas Implement & Machinery Company, the Anahuac Canal Company, and others. Judgment for the Anahuac Canal Company and others, and the South Texas Implement & Machinery Company and others bring error. Affirmed.

Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood and Hunt & Teagle, all of Houston, for plaintiff in error, R. B. George.

B. F. Louis, of Houston, for defendants in error.

GRAVES, J.

This cause involves a controversy between a number of rival claimants to a fund of $4,174.19 in possession of the Standard Rice Company, and representing the proceeds of the sale to it by G. E. Barrow of his rice crop grown during the year 1921 on a farm he was cultivating in Chambers county, Tex. After buying the rice but before paying for it, the rice company being besieged by different creditors of Barrow — one of them having run a garnishment on it out of the district court of Chambers county — went into the district court of Harris county, and, by bill of interpleader, sued Barrow and all these claimants under him, saying that it held the fund as disinterested stakeholder only, that it claimed no beneficial interest therein except for expenses in bringing the suit, and asking the court to enjoin the prosecution of the garnishment suit in the meanwhile and to determine to whom it should pay the money, less its expenses, depositing the full sum in the registry of the court.

After a temporary injunction restraining further action in the Chambers county garnishment suit, pending the trial of this one, had been issued, all the parties thus sued by the rice company other than Barrow himself, who wholly defaulted, appeared and answered, setting up their several claims against the fund so in court including their different contentions as to the order in which they should be allowed. These parties were: South Texas Implement & Machinery Company; R. B. George, doing business as the R. B. George Machinery Company; the Humble Oil & Refining Company; the Anahuac Canal Company; and the Chambers County State Bank.

The trial court allowed the claims of the Humble Oil Company, the canal company, and the rice company for its court expenses, to be paid out of the fund in court, the balance of the same to go to the bank, denying the machinery company and George any interest in it, but giving each a personal judgment against Barrow.

The machinery company and George, as plaintiffs in error, bring the cause here, agreeing between themselves that the former's claim is ahead of the latter's but jointly and severally contending that both are prior to that of the bank; they do not appeal from the lower court's decree in favor of the rice company, which accordingly became final as there determined; and both also concede it to be immaterial on appeal that the trial court gave the claims of the oil and canal company priority over them, since the fund is sufficient in amount to pay those claims as well as their own in full. The contest in this court is therefore between the two plaintiffs in error, who make common cause upon the one hand, and the Chambers County State Bank upon the other.

In limine, however, it seems to this court that both sides in one respect mistake and misconstrue the legal effect of the trial court's judgment in giving the bank's claim priority over those of the plaintiffs in error, in that both appear to assume that this action was in part at least based upon the garnishment proceedings pending in the district court of Chambers county. We do not so interpret the decree. On the contrary, this judgment, while reciting that the bank had obtained a judgment against Barrow for its debt in the district court of Chambers county, which it recognizes by directing the application as a payment thereon of the amount awarded the bank here, expressly enjoins the latter from further prosecution of the garnishment suit and independently grants it a recovery, reciting in that connection that its original mortgage from Barrow, together with testimony in support of the same, was in evidence; in other words, it thus appears that the trial court, having before it all the necessary parties and evidence, determined upon its own findings, independently of the garnishment proceedings in the sister court, that the bank was entitled to the recovery here had by virtue of its original mortgage. It then merely directed that the amount of such recovery be credited on the bank's judgment against Barrow, which it found the Chambers county district court had rendered.

These garnishment proceedings and all problems that might arise out of them may, therefore, be laid out of the case as now presented. The question here then is reduced to one of whether or not the court erred in giving priority to the bank's mortgage of date June 17, 1920, over that of the machinery company dated April 14, 1921, or that of R. B. George of date September 17, 1921.

In turn, we think the solution of that inquiry depends upon whether or not the bank's mortgage, since it was earlier in time and its validity in other respects was not challenged, may be properly held, in the circumstances appearing, to have created a valid lien between the parties and as against the machinery concerns upon Barrow's rice crop for 1921, from which the fund in court was derived.

Plaintiffs in error insist that it does neither because of no sufficient description of or reference to the crop for that year, which at the date of the instrument had not been planted, and that it is absolutely void as to subsequent creditors and lienholders like themselves, citing and relying upon these as their main authorities: Barrow v. San Angelo National Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 142, at page 144; Williams v. King et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 206 S. W. 106; Dupree v. McClanahan, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. §§ 594 to 595; Richardson v. Washington & Costley Bros., 88 Tex. 339, 31 S. W. 614; Mitchell v. Winslow, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 9673, 527, at page 533, 2 Story, 635; Butt v. Ellett, 19 Wall. 546, 22 L. Ed. 183; McDavid et al. v. Phillips, 100 Tex. 73, 94 S. W. 1131, 1132; Watson v. Paddleford & Son (Tex. Civ. App.) 220 S. W. 779; Id., 110 Tex. 525, 221 S. W. 569; McKinney v. Ellison et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 75 S. W. 55; Hamilton Nat. Bank v. Harris (Tex. Civ. App.) 260 S. W. 318; McConnell et al. v. Langdon, 3 Idaho (Hasb.) 157, 28 P. 403; Pennington v. Jones, 57 Iowa, 37, 10 N. W. 274; Barr v. Cannon, 69 Iowa, 20, 28 N. W. 413.

We cannot agree with them, but think that, as applied to the facts here shown, the cited case of Richardson v. Washington, 88 Tex. 339, 31 S. W. 614, rules the question presented adversely to their contention.

Barrow in the chattel mortgage in question, bearing date June 17, 1920, filed and duly registered in the county clerk's office of Chambers county on June 30, 1920, for a named consideration paid by the Chambers County State Bank, bargains, sells, and conveys to the bank:

"The following described personal property now located and situated in the county of Chambers, state of Texas, to wit:

"My interest in about 200 acres of rice now being watered by me, with this season, being of blue rose variety." (Then follows a provision as to cattle and other live stock.) "Also all other crops which I may raise, acquire, cultivate or have cultivated in said county or any other county in Texas, except such crops as are specially excepted herein. In the case of crops...