Southard v. State

Decision Date23 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 1-181A3,1-181A3
Citation422 N.E.2d 325
PartiesSteven W. SOUTHARD, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Michael A. Howard, Smith, Pearce & Howard, Noblesville, Russell D. Millbranth, Winamac, for defendant-appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

NEAL, Presiding Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal by defendant-appellant Steven W. Southard (Southard) from his conviction, following a trial by jury, of the offense of voluntary manslaughter, Ind.Code 35-42-1-3 (Supp.1980), in the Boone Circuit Court.

We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The evidence most favorable to the state is as follows. On February 17, 1980, the decedent, John Cicco (Cicco), and his wife drove to a Holiday Inn near Lebanon, Indiana. Some time later, Cicco entered the Holiday Inn and collapsed from four gunshot wounds; he died shortly afterwards in a hospital. The police, having been informed of Southard's presence at the scene, put out a bulletin and Southard was later apprehended by the LaPorte County police. In Southard's car police found the following items: a fully loaded .32 caliber colt revolver and 90 grams of cocaine, both of which Southard had attempted to hide; $1,114.80 in cash; several unused cartridges; and three spent cartridges, one of which had misfired. The car and Southard were bloodstained. It was determined that Cicco's death resulted from four bullets fired variously from a range of one to twelve inches. Ballistics tests revealed that the bullets had been fired from Southard's revolver.

Southard made a statement to the police shortly after his arrest which was admitted into evidence. In that statement he said that he had gone to Lebanon to purchase one-half ounce of cocaine from Cicco, and had taken along $1,000 to pay for it. The cocaine was opened with Southard's knife so he could sample it, which he did. There were two bags of cocaine present which weighed a total of 90 grams. Southard stated that Cicco pulled a gun and said that he was going to take the $1,000 for a prior debt owed him by Southard. Southard pushed Cicco's gun down and pulled out his own gun, the aforementioned colt revolver. Cicco grabbed Southard's gun and it fired, striking Cicco. They continued to struggle and the gun went off several more times. Cicco then jumped out of the car and ran, taking his gun but leaving the cocaine behind. Southard was scared, loaded his revolver, and took off for home as fast as he could.

Southard's testimony at trial and a videotaped statement taken the day following the shooting related an account of the altercation that differed significantly from that contained in his original statement. An account of that evidence follows. Southard had known Cicco for about two and one-half years, and had purchased cocaine from him on six or eight occasions. In the summer of 1979, Southard obtained from Cicco for resale two ounces of cocaine for $3,400 on credit. Southard tried unsuccessfully to sell it. He was pressed by Cicco for the money, and had eventually whittled the sum owed to $1,700. In late October or November, 1979, Cicco solicited Southard to sell and transport cocaine for him. Upon Southard's refusal, Cicco made threats to his, and to his fiancee Kathy's safety. They quarrelled. They met again in January, 1980, whereupon Southard paid Cicco $600, and Cicco renewed his efforts to get Southard to sell and transport cocaine. The next time they met was on the day of the killing, February 17, 1980. Cicco had telephoned Southard and told him he wanted the balance of the debt, $1,100. They agreed to meet at the Holiday Inn. Cicco entered Southard's car and Southard told him he had the money for him. Southard declined Cicco's renewed offer to sell cocaine, or to use some there. He did loan Cicco his knife to open the package of cocaine and show it to him. Southard told Cicco he wanted nothing more to do with the cocaine trade. Cicco hinted some harm might befall Kathy, Southard's girlfriend. Southard was carrying a .32 caliber colt revolver which he had recently acquired because he was afraid of Cicco. He pulled out the gun, pointed it at Cicco and told him to get out of the car. Cicco was unarmed. Cicco struck Southard in the head and then went for the gun. They struggled for the gun and it went off, but he did not know how many times. Cicco got out of the car and ran for the motel. Southard reloaded the gun and started home immediately. When the police stopped him he attempted to hide the cocaine and the gun.

ISSUES

Southard raises four issues for review. We have consolidated these into three issues and restate them as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of drug transactions between the decedent, Cicco, and third parties.

II. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction on circumstantial evidence where part of the evidence was circumstantial and part direct.

III. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Southard has interposed the defenses of self-defense and accident as justification for his shooting of Cicco. In order to aid in our analysis, we shall briefly discuss the nature and elements of those defenses before considering the issues raised by Southard.

The defense of self-defense is codified at Ind.Code 35-41-3-2 (Supp.1980). That section states in relevant part:

"Use of force to protect person or property

(a) A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect himself ... from what he reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself....

(d) Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) of this section, a person is not justified in using force if:

(1) he is committing, or is escaping after the commission of, a crime ;

(2) he provokes unlawful action by another person, with intent to cause bodily injury to the other person; or

(3) he has entered into combat with another person or is the initial aggressor...." (Emphases added.)

The elements of the defense of homicide by accident or misadventure were first delineated in Indiana in Gunn v. State, (1977) Ind.App., 365 N.E.2d 1234, 1238, and are that:

1. The killing must be unintentional, or without unlawful intent or evil design on the part of the accused,

2. the act resulting in death must not be an unlawful act,

3. nor an act done recklessly, carelessly, or in wanton disregard of the consequences."

This court further determined in Gunn that the defenses of self-defense and accident are not inconsistent as a matter of law, and may be raised simultaneously.

Against this background we proceed to review Southard's allegations of error.

Issue I. Exclusion of evidence

Southard testified that at a time prior to February 17, 1980, Cicco came to his home and there they discussed privately the $1,700 Southard owed him. Cicco told Southard he needed the money badly. Southard attempted at trial to relate a story Cicco had told him during their conversation concerning an event that occurred in Miami, Florida. Earlier in the trial, the State filed a motion in limine, which was granted, to exclude any evidence of Cicco's drug dealings with third parties. The State objected to this evidence on the bases that it was hearsay and that it was within the parameters of the evidence sought to be excluded in the motion in limine.

In an offer to prove by further interrogation, outside the presence of the jury, Southard related Cicco's account of his Miami problem which caused him to need the money. Some two weeks prior to their meeting at Southard's home, Cicco had flown to Miami, and at the airport was questioned by security police, ostensibly because of his appearance. He became scared and flushed a half-pound of cocaine down a toilet at the airport. Cicco said that he was not going to fly down to Miami anymore to pick up cocaine; instead, he planned to have someone else drive to Miami, meet him, and drive the cocaine back. He offered Southard $1,000 to do this. Southard declined that job, and declined to sell any more cocaine for Cicco.

The trial court considered the evidence of Cicco's Miami confrontation not to be relevant and excluded that evidence. The court, however, permitted Southard to testify that: (1) he knew Cicco needed the money dearly to pay a debt, (2) Cicco attempted to persuade Southard to sell drugs or deal in drugs, (3) Cicco threatened to harm Southard and his girlfriend if he did not agree to deal in cocaine, and (4) Cicco offered Southard $1,000 credit on his debt to transport cocaine.

Southard's challenge to the exclusion of the evidence is consistent with the basic premise of his defense, here as well as under Issue III, infra, which is essentially as follows: Cicco was a drug dealer, was desperate for money, was dangerous, and had threatened to harm Southard and his girlfriend. Therefore, Southard was afraid and had a right to take a gun to the meeting and use it in self protection.

The State objected to the proffered testimony on the grounds of hearsay and relevancy. We agree with Southard that the evidence was not inadmissible hearsay, because it was not offered to prove the truth of Cicco's account of his experiences in Miami but rather to show what Cicco had said to Southard.

Southard relies on Nuss v. State, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 396, 328 N.E.2d 747, and Gunn, in support of his assertion that all circumstances known to him regarding Cicco were relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of Southard's apprehension of harm. In Nuss, this court reiterated the right of an accused who proceeds under a theory of self-defense to " 'prove every fact and circumstance known to him and...

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