Southern Christian Leadership Conf. v. Siegelman

• Decision Date: 07 June 1989
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-D-0462-N.
• Citation: 714 F. Supp. 511
• Parties: SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE OF ALABAMA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Don SIEGELMAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

714 F. Supp. 511

SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE OF ALABAMA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Don SIEGELMAN, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 88-D-0462-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

June 7, 1989.

J. Richard Cohen and Elizabeth Johnson, Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiffs.

Fournier J. Gale, III, Maynard, Cooper, Frierson & Gale, Birmingham, Ala., David R. Boyd, Balch & Bingham, Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Susan E. Russ, Asst. Atty. Gen., Montgomery, Ala., for State of Ala., Siegelman, Torbert, Browder, Hobbie, Florence and Reynolds.

James C. Wood, Simon, Wood & Crane, Mobile, Ala., for L.W. Noonan.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DUBINA, District Judge.

There are two motions presently pending in this cause: the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, filed herein on November 7, 1988, on the ground that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 ("section 2"), does not apply to judicial elections; and the defendants' motion for partial reconsideration of this court's order granting dismissal without prejudice of certain of the plaintiffs' claims, also filed on November 7, 1988. On November 14, 1988, defendant L.W. Noonan, Probate Judge of Mobile County, Alabama, filed a separate motion for partial summary judgment and a supporting memorandum of law. In support of and in opposition to the pending motions, the parties have submitted detailed memorandum briefs and other documentary evidence. Additionally, on January 12, 1989, the parties presented oral arguments in support of their respective positions.

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 11, 1988, the plaintiffs filed the instant action, asking this court to enjoin violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs allege that these provisions are violated by the State of Alabama's use of numbered place, at-large elections for state circuit and district judges. They seek, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from maintaining the current system of elections, which they allege impermissibly dilutes the right of blacks to vote and prevents them from electing candidates of their choice.

On October 28, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint in this cause in which they allege, inter alia, that the boundary lines established by the Alabama Legislature for the judicial circuits have been drawn in a way that fragments concentrations of the state's black population, dilutes black voting strength, and results in a denial or abridgement of the rights of the plaintiffs to vote. The plaintiffs base this claim on section 2, the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition to the relief sought in the original complaint, the plaintiffs seek, inter alia, permanent injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from utilizing the present judicial circuit districting scheme and a court order requiring them to redistrict the circuits to provide all Alabama citizens with equal access to the political process.

On October 27, 1988, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice their claims challenging the numbered place, at-large election system for certain circuits and districts, as described in their attached appendix. On October 28, 1988, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss without prejudice. Further, on January 9, 1989, the court entered an order, pursuant to Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P., granting the plaintiffs' motion for certification of a plaintiff class and subclasses and designating certain individuals to serve as class representatives in this cause.

II. FACTS

The State of Alabama currently has thirty-nine (39) judicial circuits and sixty-seven (67) judicial districts. All judges in these circuits and districts are elected at-large. When more than one judge serves in any given circuit or district, judicial candidates qualify to run for numbered places. See Ala. Const. amend. 328, § 6.13; Ala.Code §§ 12-17-21, 12-17-62 (1975).

At least as early as 1819, Alabama established judicial circuits and provided that each circuit would have a single judge. See Ala. Const. art. V, § 5 (1819). Early in this century, the state began to add additional judges in some circuits. See, e.g., Ala. Act. No. 712 (September 25, 1915); Ala.Code § 12-17-20 (1975). The district court system was structured similarly when it was created by the Judicial Article in 1973 and fleshed out by the Judicial Article Implementation Act two years later. See Ala. Const. amend. 328, § 6.05; Ala. Code § 12-17-61 (1975).

Of Alabama's thirty-nine (39) judicial circuits and sixty-seven (67) judicial districts, eight (8) circuits and fifty-two (52) districts elect only one judge. The plaintiffs' challenge to Alabama's election scheme does not extend to these latter circuits and districts.¹ Of the remaining thirty-one (31) circuits and fifteen (15) districts, twenty-one (21) circuits and eleven (11) districts have been dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to this court's October 28, 1988, order granting the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss those circuits and districts.² Accordingly, at the present time there are ten (10) circuits³ and four (4) districts⁴ remaining in this lawsuit.

III. THE STANDARD FOR GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides that summary judgment may be granted only:

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, when considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must refrain from deciding any material factual issues. Instead, the court's sole function on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether there exist issues of material fact to be tried and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Dominick v. Dixie Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 809 F.2d 1559 (11th Cir.1987); Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949 (11th Cir.1986); Keiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.1980). Moreover, in performing this function, inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. In other words, all doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Tippens v. Celotex, 805 F.2d 949: Carlin Communication, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir.1986).

As to the burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment, it is clear that the movant bears the exacting responsibility of showing both that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Combs v. King, 764 F.2d 818 (11th Cir.1985). In clarifying the proper allocation of this burden, the United States Supreme Court has stated as follows:

The inquiry involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits.... We do not suggest that the trial court should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 2 and its Application to Judicial Elections.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, absolutely prohibits racial discrimination in voting. It provides as follows:

(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color....

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.

42 U.S.C. § 1973.

Before this court can address the ultimate issue of whether Alabama's system for electing circuit and district judges dilutes minority voting strength under the "results" test of section 2,⁵ it must first conclude that the amended section 2 in fact applies to judicial elections, and specifically to judicial elections as they have evolved in the State of Alabama. As far as this court is able to determine, this issue is one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.1988), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S....