Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wynn, 6 Div. 606

• Citation: 266 Ala. 327,96 So.2d 159
• Decision Date: 25 April 1957
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 606
• Parties: SOUTHERN COTTON OIL COMPANY, Inc. v. Henry WYNN.
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Page 159

96 So.2d 159

266 Ala. 327

SOUTHERN COTTON OIL COMPANY, Inc. v. Henry WYNN.

6 Div. 606.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 25, 1957.

Rehearing Denied June 27, 1957.

Jas. S. Mead, Birmingham, for appellant.

Harry B. Cohen, Birmingham, for appellee.

GOODWYN, Justice.

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 253 et seq. as amended) brought in the circuit court of Jefferson County by Henry Wynn against The Southern Cotton Oil Company to recover benefits for a disability allegedly resulting from an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment by said Company. The trial court granted compensation. The case is here for review on certiorari which we granted on the Company's petition.

The Company's insistencies here may be summarized as follows:

I. That the suit was not brought within the time allowed by the Workmen's Compensation Act, § 296, Tit. 26, Code 1940.

II. That an amendment to the complaint introduced a completely new cause of action which should not have been allowed over the Company's objection.

III. (a) That the trial court's finding that the employee's disability resulted from a cerebral hemorrhage brought about by the employee's physical exertion is not based on evidence.

(b) That 'even if the physical exertion engaged in by the employee contributed to a condition which brought about the hemorrhage, it was not an accident and not compensable within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act because the employee was engaged in the ordinary and regular performance of his duties; there was no overexertion and no extra hazardous circumstance which contributed to the injury.'

(c) That 'if the ordinary and uneventful physical exertion of the employee in the performance of ordinary duties produced the hemorrhage, the employee was already totally and permanently disabled in that he suffered from a pre-existing infirmity and the disability claimed would not have resulted had the earlier infirmity not existed.'

IV. That excessive compensation was awarded.

I.

To the extent here applicable, § 296, Tit. 26, Code 1940, supra, provides as follows:

'In case of a personal injury all claims for compensation under articles 1 and 2 of this chapter shall be forever barred unless within one year after the accident the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under articles 1 and 2 of this chapter, or unless within one year after the accident one of the parties shall have filed a verified complaint as provided in section 304 of this title. * * * In case of physical or mental incapacity, other than minority of the injured person or his dependents, to perform or cause to be performed any act required within the time in this section specified, the period of limitation in any such case shall be extended to become effective one year from the date when such incapacity ceases.'

The trial court found that 'the stroke left the person and mind of the plaintiff in a weak and impaired condition, and that he from the time of the stroke was physically and mentally incapacitated to perform or to cause to be performed the filing of a verified complaint for workmen's compensation within one year after the accident complained of, and that less than one year has elapsed from the date when such incapacity ceased.'

The rule of review in cases of this kind has been stated many times to be as follows:

'On certiorari to review judgments in compensation cases, this court will not look to the weight of the evidence as to any fact found by the trial court, but simply to see if there is any evidence to support facts found by the trial court, and this rule applies when the award or compensation is denied as well as where there has been a judgment favorable to the plaintiff. Our review here on certiorari is confined to questions of law apparent upon the face of the record. * * *

'Where testimony is conflicting, but there is testimony supporting the finding of the trial court in proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such finding is conclusive. * * *' Bass v. Cowikee Mills, 259 Ala. 391, 393, 67 So.2d 12, 13, and cases there cited.

The foregoing principle applies in reviewing the trial court's finding of fact with respect to the employee's 'physical or mental incapacity * * * to perform or cause to be performed' the act of filing a verified complaint (§ 304, Tit. 26) the same as other findings of fact. Taylor v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co., 219 Ala. 614, 615, 123 So. 78.

There is ample evidence to support the finding that the employee was physically and mentally incapacitated from filing a complaint within the one year provided by § 296, supra, so as to bring the time of filing within the influence of the exemption declared in said section.

II.

Petitioner insists that error was committed in allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint by adding paragraphs 3a and 3b. The original complaint alleged that plaintiff had fallen from the coal pile and struck his head upon a concrete floor causing a brain concussion. The evidence at the hearing tended to show that plaintiff had never actually fallen from the pile, but had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in the course of his employment and as a direct result of the performance of his duties. The amendment was made to meet this evidence. Petitioner insists that such amendment constituted a complete change of the cause of action and should not have been allowed over defendant's objections.

We see little merit in this argument. As this court has often said, compliance with technical rules of pleading is not required in Workmen's Compensation proceedings. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Dill, 248 Ala. 5, 7, 26 So.2d 88; Humphrey v. Poss, 245 Ala. 11, 12-13, 15 So.2d 732. Moreover, it seems to us that the amendment, instead of stating a new cause of action, merely restates the accident set out in the original complaint in such a manner as to conform to the evidence introduced by the defendant. It is apparent from the answer to the original complaint that the defendant was aware of the true nature of plaintiff's injury, as the version of the accident set out in the defendant's answer was substantiated by the evidence and the trial court's findings of fact. The defendant in this type of case should not be heard to question an amendment which, in effect, affirms defendant's own version of the facts in the case. We find no error in allowing the amendment, which related back to the filing of the original complaint. See § 239, Tit. 7, Code 1940, allowing amendments while cause is in progress and providing that amendment 'shall relate back to the commencement of the suit.'

III.

(a) Petitioner's next insistence is that there is no evidence to support the trial court's finding of a causal relation between plaintiff's employment and his injury.

It is clear that the plaintiff has the burden of reasonably satisfying the trial court by competent evidence that the injury was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Davis Lumber Co. v. Self, 263 Ala. 276, 279, 82 So.2d 291; Wooten v. Roden, 260 Ala. 606, 610, 71 So.2d 802; Alabama Pipe Co. v. Wofford, 253 Ala. 610, 613, 46 So.2d 404, 406. As this court has often said, in order to show that the injury was caused by an accident 'arising out of' employment, the plaintiff must establish a logical causal connection between his work and the injury. This requirement has been expressed as follows in several of our cases:

'The phrase 'arising out of' employment denotes employment as the source and cause of accident and we have said in order to satisfy this requisite the rational mind must be able to trace the resultant injury to a proximate cause set in motion by the employment and not otherwise. * * *' Alabama Pipe Co. v. Wofford, supra; Wooten v. Roden, supra.

The trial court's findings on this point are as follows:

'We find that the immediate cause of the plaintiff's collapse and paralysis was the sudden giving way or rupture of a blood vessel in the left side of the plaintiff's head and proximately resulted in paralysis of his right side.

We further find that the immediate cause of the breaking or rupture of the said vessel was the muscular strain and exertion employed by the plaintiff in the ordinary shoveling of the steam coal from the spout as aforesaid.'

The question presented is whether there is any legal evidence to support this finding.

The evidence tended to show that the plaintiff had been shoveling coal for about three hours when he was stricken by a cerebral hemorrhage. The only expert witness, Dr. Magruder, who was called by the defendant, testified to the effect that a cerebral hemorrhage was the rupture of a blood vessel in the head, that such a rupture was the result of high blood pressure, that any exertion would tend to increase the blood pressure, and that the exertion of shoveling coal could have caused the cerebral hemorrhage suffered by the plaintiff.

Petitioner's argument is that the expert medical testimony went only so far as to show that the exertion could have caused the hemorrhage, and that the trial court's finding of a causal relation between the work and the injury was, therefore, a mere guess or conjecture and cannot be sustained.

It is true that testimony as to mere possibilities is generally insufficient to sustain an award under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and that the defendant cannot be guessed into liability. Alabama Pipe Co. v. Wofford, supra. It is equally clear, however, that all of the essential facts in a workman's compensation case, including the question of causal relation, can be proved by circumstantial evidence (Davis Lumber Co. v. Self, supra; Gulf States Creosoting Co. v. Walker, 224 Ala. 104, 106, 139 So. 261), and if there is any reasonable view of the evidence that will support the conclusion reached by the trial court, its finding and judgment will not be disturbed here. Davis...