Southern Exp. Co. v. Platten

• Decision Date: 21 February 1899
• Docket Number: 727.
• Parties: SOUTHERN EXP. CO. v. PLATTEN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

93 F. 936

SOUTHERN EXP. CO. v. PLATTEN.

No. 727.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

February 21, 1899

John F Hartridge, for plaintiff in error.

H. P Logan, J. W. Brady, and F. M. Hammond, for defendant in error.

Before PARDEE, Circuit Judge, and SWAYNE and PARLANGE, District judges.

SWAYNE District Judge.

This is an action originally brought by John J. Platten, Jr. defendant in error, against the Southern Express Company, a corporation under the laws of the state of Georgia, plaintiff in error, to recover damages for personal injury inflicted upon him by reason of an assault with deadly weapons committed by certain employes of the defendant company. The suit was originally brought in the circuit court, Pope county, Fla., but was afterwards removed by the defendant company into the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of Florida. The facts alleged by the plaintiff in his declaration, and proved on trial, except as hereinafter qualified, are as follows: That on or about the 1st day of April, 1897, the office of the defendant company situated in the town of Bartow, Fla., was robbed of the sum of $2,500, and that shortly thereafter the defendant company sent its agents, W. T. Sherrett and C. L. Myers, to the town of Bartow aforesaid, for the purpose of investigating the said robbery, and to procure, if possible, evidence sufficient to convict the person or persons who perpetrated the same; that the said W. T. Sherrett and C. L. Myers were especially selected by the defendant company for this purpose, and in pursuance of their employment, and in the investigation of the said alleged robbery, the said C. L. Myers, together with N.W. Buxton, and two other persons to the plaintiff unknown, were employed by the said agents to make an assault with deadly weapons upon the plaintiff, and to seize him, throw him down, and by brute force deprive him of his personal liberty, with intent to compel the said plaintiff to confess and admit that he had perpetrated the robbery upon the defendant above referred to; that the said agents and employes of the defendant company did endeavor to kidnap the plaintiff and carry him to a secluded spot, where they were to hang him up by a rope furnished by the officers of the company for that purpose; and that the object of the company in committing this assault was to compel the plaintiff to admit and confess that he had perpetrated the robbery above mentioned. There is a second count in this declaration, alleging a conspiracy between the defendant corporation, by its officers, agents, and special representatives selected and chosen to investigate the robbery above referred to, and other officers, agents, and representatives of the defendant company unknown to plaintiff, to commit the assault for the purpose hereinbefore set forth. To this declaration the defendant company demurred, which demurrer being overruled by the trial court, error was assigned; and the first question to be determined here is whether or not the court below erred in rendering judgment on this demurrer, sustaining defendant in error's declaration.

The three questions raised by the demurrer are: (1) Does the declaration show, by relation of fact, any connection between the defendant company and the assault complained of? (2) Were the employes of the defendant corporation, in committing the assault, acting within the scope of their employment? (3) Is it necessary that in such an action against a corporation the names of the parties who actually committed the assault be given?

To the first question it is alleged by the declaration that the defendant company selected, and sent to the vicinage of the robbery, its special agents and representatives, W. T Sherrett and C. L. Myers; that these agents were specially instructed to investigate the alleged robbery, and that the said agents, in pursuance of their employment and in the investigation of the alleged robbery, acting within the scope of their employment, committed the trespass, to recover compensation for which this action was brought. The assault upon the defendant in error by these agents of the express company was committed to further the investigation of the robbery, and the wrong to defendant in error was committed by the agents of the defendant company, therefore, in carrying out the purposes of their employment. It is true that if the assault alleged had been committed willfully by the agents of the corporation, and in the performance of an act not within the scope of their employment, then these agents, who were merely the servants of the stockholders of the corporation, could not by their conduct render the corporation liable. In the case at bar certain persons were employed by the defendant company for the lawful and commendable purpose of ascertaining who was guilty of the robbery set forth in plaintiff's declaration. They were clothed by the defendant company with the power to exercise their discretion as to the methods to be adopted in ferreting out the crime. Acting under this authority, clothed with this discretion, seeking to accomplish the ends for which they were employed, the agents of the defendant company did the wrong to plaintiff set forth in the declaration. It would not be contended otherwise than that a natural person, standing in the same relationship to the active wrongdoers in the case at bar as did the defendant company towards these agents, would be liable under the circumstances set forth. At common law a corporation could not be made a defendant to an action of battery, or such-like personal injuries, for, in its corporate capacity, it could neither beat or be beaten, a corporation being, in the language of Sir Edward Coke, 'invisible, and existing only in intendment and consideration of law,' and wholly devoid of...