Southern Indiana Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana

• Decision Date: 02 April 1909
• Docket Number: 21,250
• Citation: 87 N.E. 966,172 Ind. 113
• Parties: Southern Indiana Railway Company et al. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

87 N.E. 966

172 Ind. 113

Southern Indiana Railway Company et al. v. Railroad Commission of Indiana

No. 21,250

Supreme Court of Indiana

April 2, 1909

From Lawrence Circuit Court; James B. Wilson, Judge.

Suit by the Railroad Commission of Indiana against the Southern Indiana Railway Company and another. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

W. T Abbott, Carl E. Wood, Frank S. Jones, Gardiner, Tharp &amp Gardiner, Robert N. Palmer, Robert S. Alcorn and Edward Barton, for appellants.

Charles E. Thompson and Henry P. Pearson, for appellee.

OPINION

Hadley, J.

The railroads of appellants, Southern Indiana Railway Company (hereinafter called the Southern) and the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railway Company (hereinafter called the B. & O.), intersect at Bedford, Indiana, at which place said companies maintain proper interchanging switches. The United States Cement Company, a large consumer of coal, operates a cement factory at Lehman, a switch station on the line of the B. & O., two and one-half miles south of Bedford. The cement company got its coal supply from the Linton fields in Greene county, Indiana. Such coal was transported over the Southern as the initial carrier in car-load lots to its side-tracks at Bedford, from which tracks it was switched in the same cars by the B. & O. to the cement plant at Lehman. The service performed by the B. & O. in the transportation of such coal was known as switching service, and the compensation therefor was audited and paid by the Southern, and not by the cement company.

In August, 1907, the cement company filed with appellee its petition asking for a modification and reduction of the freight charges being made against it for transporting said coal from Linton to Lehman. After due notice to appellants, a hearing was given on the petition, and on September 15, 1907, the commission made a finding to the effect that the charges made for transporting said coal from Linton to Lehman were excessive, and entered an order that appellants should not charge or receive a sum in excess of fifty cents per ton for carrying coal between said points, and also ordered that appellants should adopt, and continue in force, a joint rate of not exceeding fifty cents per ton between said points, to be in force and effect for two years from September 19, 1907. The order did not specify which of the companies should furnish the equipment, nor what part of said fifty-cent rate each carrier should receive. A certified copy of the order was served upon each of the appellants, as required by law, and appellants, failing to bring an action in a circuit court, challenging the validity of said order, and refusing, for more than thirty days after the same became effective, to comply therewith, this suit was instituted by the commission to enjoin appellants from charging, jointly or severally, for the shipment of coal from Linton to Lehman, an aggregate rate in excess of that fixed by appellee's final order.

Separate demurrers to the complaint were overruled. The B. & O. answered in three affirmative paragraphs, and the Southern in one affirmative paragraph, to each of which a demurrer was sustained. Appellants refusing to plead further, a decree was entered, enjoining them, in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, for the term of two years. The points made against the sufficiency of the complaint are that the statute and final order of the railroad commission, upon which the complaint rests, are in violation of both the federal and state Constitutions.

For reasons that will appear, we shall first consider the demurrers to the several answers.

The point made by appellee against the answers is to the effect that, as said answers set up a state of facts arising upon the merits of the cement company's complaint, and no action having been brought by appellants in a circuit court to test the validity of the railroad commission's final order, as prescribed by the statute, a presentation of such defenses in this proceeding for an injunction is not permissible, because a collateral attack upon the final order of the commission.

It has been found to be impracticable for the General Assembly on the one hand, and the regularly constituted courts on the other, to provide for and administer all the details essential to the speedy and efficient conduct of public affairs in counties and smaller governmental agencies. Hence, it has many times been held by this court that the legislature has power to confer upon agents authority to do certain things which are legislative, or quasi-judicial, in their nature, and when performed within the limits of the jurisdiction or power conferred, and in the manner pointed out by the statute, may be res judicata or conclusive, and hence beyond question by any other jurisdiction, except for fraud, or cause that renders the act absolutely void.

Among the agencies thus created and empowered by the legislature are boards of county commissioners, drainage commissioners, city councils, trustees of incorporated towns, and the like. The act of drainage commissioners in the location and construction of drains cannot be questioned collaterally. Anderson v. Baker (1884), 98 Ind. 587, 590; Sunier v. Miller (1886), 105 Ind. 393, 395, 4 N.E. 867. City councils and boards of trustees of incorporated towns are created and endowed to do certain things in carrying forward the municipal governments, some of which are administrative, and others legislative, in their nature; but, when exercised within the powers conferred, are unquestionable in a collateral attack. Cason v. City of Lebanon (1899), 153 Ind. 567, 55 N.E. 768; McEneney v. Town of Sullivan (1890), 125 Ind. 407, 410, 25 N.E. 540.

In Cason v. City of Lebanon, supra, it is said: "The law is that all questions which are properly triable on appeal, or by some tribunal authorized to try the same, or created for that purpose, must be so tried, and not by injunctions."

Boards of county commissioners as governmental agents, have limited, though extensive powers of an administrative and quasi-judicial character. All the proceedings of such boards in the establishment of public highways, except as to jurisdiction, are conclusive as against collateral attack. Gold v. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. (1899), 153 Ind. 232, 53 N.E. 285; Helms v. Bell (1900), 155 Ind. 502, 58 N.E. 707.

Such boards have the power to hear all claims against the county. They hear, on behalf of the county, in an administrative capacity. The county may investigate and determine the validity of claims to enable it thus to discharge its legal obligations without the intervention of courts. In such cases, if the claimant is dissatisfied with the decision of the board, he may carry his case to the circuit court, by appeal or complaint, within thirty days, and have the questions decided by the board reviewed and determined judicially in a court of law. This is his legal remedy, provided by the legislature, and no other is open to him. In such cases, the undisturbed decision of the board of commissioners is as conclusive against collateral attack as the judgment of the circuit court. Spurgeon v. Rhodes (1906), 167 Ind. 1, 78 N.E. 228; Board, etc., v. Heaston (1896), 144 Ind. 583, 55 Am. St. 192, 41 N.E. 457; § 6019 Burns 1908, Acts 1885, p. 80.

The power conferred upon the railroad commission is analogous to the power of boards of commissioners just noticed. It is authorized to hear complaints, strike down existing rates, and create new ones. The power is in no sense judicial, but administrative or legislative in its nature, and the permission of the statute, permitting the aggrieved party to bring his action in the circuit court within thirty days, is but the legislative scheme to have the decisions of the commission judicially determined, if desired, before their enforcement; and evidently it was the legislative intent that the circuit court, reached in the statutory and regular way, is the forum where all defenses, arising on the merits, must be presented.

Nothing is better settled than, when the legislature specifically prescribes an adequate legal remedy, that alone is open to the litigant. Couchman v. Prather (1904), 162 Ind. 250, 70 N.E. 240; State, ex rel., v. Black (1906), 166 Ind. 138, 76 N.E. 882, and cases cited; State, ex rel., v. Indiana State Board, etc. (1909), Ind. .

Appellants having failed to avail themselves of the opportunity presented to assail the order, and having, without cause, permitted the time for the commencement of proceedings in the circuit court to elapse, the final order of the commission as to them must be held conclusive in a court of equity, except against a cause that renders the order void. Stone v. Fritts (1907), 169 Ind. 361, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1147, 82 N.E. 792. It follows that the demurrers to the answers of appellants, setting up, in a collateral proceeding, defenses arising upon the merits of the cement company's complaint, were properly sustained.

Each of the affirmative answers, however, alleged that the statute upon which the final order of the commission rested, was void, because in conflict with various specified provisions of the federal and state Constitutions. If the order is void, even though there was a failure to seek relief against it in the regular way, the party affected is not deprived of the right to defend, when such order is attempted to be enforced in a court of equity. And such a defense may be presented under the general denial, which was pleaded by both appellants. Cheney v. Unroe (1906), 166 Ind. 550, 77 N.E. 1041; Jeffersonville Water Supply Co. v. Riter (1897), 146 Ind. 521, 526, 45 N.E. 697. Hence, for this reason, the sustaining of the demurrers to the affirmative paragraphs...