Southern Michigan Cedar & Lumber Co. v. McDonald

• Decision Date: 10 June 1885
• Parties: SOUTHERN MICHIGAN CEDAR & LUMBER CO. v. MCDONALD and others.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

24 N.W. 87

57 Mich. 292

SOUTHERN MICHIGAN CEDAR & LUMBER CO. v. MCDONALD and others.

Supreme Court of Michigan

June 10, 1885

Appeal from Cheboygan.

Bell & Adams and Humphrey & Perkins, for complainant.

John Atkinson, for defendants.

COOLEY C.J.

The bill of complaint in this case sets forth:

That on November 17, 1882, the defendants Daniel D. McDonald and Hugh McDonald entered into a contract in writing, a copy ^[1] of which is given with the bill, whereby Daniel, in consideration of three dollars per thousand feet agreed to permit Hugh to go upon certain described lands and cut and remove all white pine timber, except such part thereof as would make board timber, and run and drive the same down the rivers, but not below the locks at McArthur Smith & Co.'s mill, until Daniel had been paid the stumpage price therefor; the logs to be paid for before delivery to any mill or to any other parties, and Daniel retaining the absolute title and ownership until payment. That on the same day, and after the execution of the above-mentioned contract, Hugh entered into another contract ^[1] in writing with complainant, whereby he agreed to sell to it all the logs and timber so to be cut by him, and to run, drive, and deliver the same at a place to be designated on the Cheboygan river, above the locks, at the sum of eight dollars and fifty cents per thousand feet, board measure; payment to be made as specified in the contract with him, a copy of which is also given.

That the two contracts above mentioned were entered into substantially at one time, and as one transaction, and the effect was that Daniel and Hugh, in concert, were to furnish and deliver the logs to complainant,--Daniel furnishing the standing timber, and Hugh the necessary labor; and Daniel was therefore bound by a clause in complainant's contract with Hugh, whereby complainant was to have a lien upon the logs to cover all advances and payments by complainant under that contract. That the contracts having been made, Hugh and Daniel, acting in concert, proceeded to put a large quantity of logs into the river, and complainant made payments and advances to Hugh which, on May 16, 1883, had amounted to $3,059.73, for which complainant claims a lien on the logs superior to any lien of said Daniel. That on or about said sixteenth day of May, 1883, some misunderstanding occurred between said Hugh and said Daniel, in consequence of which Hugh surrendered his interest in his contract to Daniel, and Daniel assumed its performance and informed complainant of that fact, at the same time requesting complainant not to pay the orders of Hugh except as they should be marked by him for payment; that complainant agreed to this, and afterwards paid Hugh's orders, with Daniel's mark upon them, to the amount of $1,144.03.

That complainant, about July 3, 1883, finding it had paid nearly the contract price for the logs, declined to pay any more, and thereupon Daniel declined to run the logs any further; that complainant then put on men to run them; that the logs were mixed in the stream with timber of said Daniel, and complainant expended in running them the sum of $2,301.07, which is chargeable to said Hugh and Daniel, making in all $6,504.83; that the logs, when they reached their destination, only amounted to 657,000 feet, or thereabouts, which was very much less than the complainant had been told by said Hugh when he was obtaining advances, so that complainant has paid about $1,000 more than the contract price for the logs; that Daniel has made a bill of sale of the logs to John W. McGinn, and that said Daniel, Hugh and John have combined and conspired to cheat and defraud complainant out of the logs, and of the moneys paid for them; that William M. McDonald, and 16 other persons named, claim to have labor liens on the logs, for different sums of money, for labor in cutting, running, hauling, and driving the logs, and some of them have levied attachments on the logs, and proceeded to judgment and execution, and William Harrington, sheriff of the county of Cheboygan, who holds said executions, threatens to sell said logs thereon. The liens are alleged to be void, and the law under which they are claimed is alleged to be unconstitutional.

The bill makes Daniel and Hugh McDonald, McGinn, Harrington, and all the parties claiming liens, defendants, and prays that "the said defendants may come to a just and fair account touching the amounts paid by your orators aforesaid, and various other matters herein set forth; and that by the writ of injunction to be issued out of and under the seal of this honorable court, and by the final decree of this court, the said defendants may be restrained perpetually from bringing any suit or suits at law to remove from your orators the possession of said logs, and from bringing any suits at law to enforce any of said pretended liens, and from in any way whatsoever interfering with your orators in their possession and use of said logs, and removing them to their mill or any other place, and disposing of the same as they see fit; and that, by the final decree of this honorable court, all of such pretended liens, judgments, and executions may be set aside as against your orders and as against said logs, and your orator's title to said logs, free of all liens, may be declared and established; and that your orators may have such other and such further relief in the premises as shall be agreeable to equity and good conscience."

The defendants who claimed labor liens appear to have answered in the case; but as they have not appealed from the decree, which was in favor of complainant as against all of the defendants, their defense requires no notice. The only defendants who have appealed are Daniel McDonald and McGinn. Their answer, while admitting the two contracts, denies that they had any connection which made Daniel McDonald a party to the contract with complainant; denies that Daniel ever took upon himself the performance of the last-mentioned contract, or that he ever gave complainant to understand he had done so; denies that he has received from Hugh the payment for the timber, or any part thereof, or that Daniel has ever waived any right thereto.

The case was heard on pleadings and proofs. Defendants insisted that the case was one for a court of law, but this view was not sustained. We think it should have been.

Daniel McDonald claimed the logs by virtue of having the legal title as security for the payment of the sum to be paid to him as stumpage. McGinn claimed under him, and stood in the same right. The question of this title was purely legal, and we do not discover in the case any embarrassment that could possibly attend its trial and determination in a court of law, unless the existence of the labor liens could create such embarrassment. But the labor liens could give no jurisdiction to a court of equity. These, also, if valid, were legal claims, and they were not dependent upon the rights of Daniel McDonald, or upon any equities that might exist as between him and the complainant. Their great number, under such circumstances, instead of being a reason in support of equitable interference, was a reason against it; for each asserted lien rested upon its own facts, and the only matter in which the claimant had a common interest was the question of the validity of the lien law; and as to this, Daniel and Hugh McDonald and McGinn were not concerned with them. This suit, therefore, is an attempt to bring into a court of equity a large number of legal controversies, which rest neither upon the same states of fact nor the same questions of law. It could not, therefore, diminish either the number of controversies or the number of issues to be tried, and it was neither a bill of peace, nor a proper bill to prevent multiplicity of actions.

But, as has been stated, the cases of labor liens are not before us and the printed record does not inform us on what issues they were disposed of. We have reason to suppose, however, that proofs were not gone into on those claims. As Daniel McDonald and McGinn did not demur, except by demurrer clause in their answer, we have examined the evidence, and shall now dispose of the case upon the merits. We find in the record no evidence which puts upon Daniel McDonald responsibility for the contract of Hugh with complainant. That contract was made...