Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v. Maronda Homes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 20-11526 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARONDA HOMES, INC. OF FLORIDA, JROD PLASTERING, LLC, Defendants-Appellants, JOSEPH MANALANSAN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
DO NOT PUBLISH
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-01305-TJC-MCR
Before BRANCH, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida, and JROD Plastering, LLC, appeal from the district court's dismissal of their motions for attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428.[1] The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Maronda's and JROD's motions because it already had dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In doing so, the district court disagreed with the reasoning of Prime Insurance Syndicate, Inc. v. Soil Tech Distributors, Inc., 270 Fed.Appx. 962 (11th Cir. 2008) an unpublished opinion of this Court.
In Prime, we held that awards of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are collateral issues to the merits of a case and are therefore "within the court's jurisdiction, even after the court [has] determined it lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit." Id. at 965. But in a published opinion twenty-four years earlier, we held that awards of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are integral to the merits, Certain British Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 534, 535 (11th Cir. 1984), which means that a district court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction to award such fees if it has already dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because we are bound by our published opinion in Jet Charter, we affirm.
On August 23, 2013, Maronda sold a house to Joseph and Chamroeun Manalansan. A few weeks later, the Manalansans sent Maronda a notice of construction defects related to the house's stucco installation. Maronda had hired JROD to perform the stucco installation, and JROD maintained a commercial general liability insurance policy with Southern-Owners that listed Maronda as an "additional insured." Maronda thus requested that Southern-Owners defend or indemnify it under JROD's policy.
Southern-Owners sued Maronda and JROD in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, seeking a declaration that its policy did not cover the stucco damage. The district court dismissed Southern-Owners's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Southern-Owners failed to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.[2]Southern-Owners did not appeal that ruling.
Maronda and JROD then filed motions for attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428.[3] Southern-Owners responded that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the motions because it already had dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The district court agreed with Southern-Owners and dismissed Maronda's and JROD's motions. It concluded that awards of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are integral to the merits and that it thus lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Maronda's and JROD's motions. Maronda and JROD timely appealed.
The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Maronda's and JROD's motions after it already had dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because awards of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are integral to the merits. [4] See Jet Charter, 739 F.2d at 536.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction" and "[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction," unless the party asserting jurisdiction proves otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Maronda and JROD argue that the district court had jurisdiction to consider their motions, even though it already had dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because awards of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are "collateral issues." See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) ().
A court may consider collateral issues after it has dismissed an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because "the determination of a collateral issue" is not "a judgment on the merits of an action," and "does not raise the issue of a district court adjudicating the merits of a over which it lacks jurisdiction."[5] Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992) (quotation omitted); see id. . In Willy, the Supreme Court held that sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 are collateral issues that a federal court may address after it has dismissed a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 137-38.
Under Florida law, Jet Charter, 739 F.2d at 536 (quoting Prudential Ins. Co v. Lamm, 218 So.2d 219, 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)); see also Smith v. Sitomer, 550 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 1989); Spiegel v. Williams, 545 So.2d 1360, 1362 (Fla. 1989). Thus, in Jet Charter, we concluded that the attorneys' fees provided for in Fla. Stat. § 627.428 are "an element of damages" and "an integral part of the merits," because such fees are not designated as costs. See 739 F.2d at 535-36 (quotation omitted); see also Fla. Stat. § 627.428(3) (1982) (). Because an award of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 is not a collateral issue, the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Maronda's and JROD's motions after it had dismissed the underlying action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146, 1157 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ().[6]
Maronda and JROD argue that Prime compels a different result. In Prime, we cited Willy to hold that a district court's "award of attorney's fees [under Fla. Stat. § 627.428] was collateral to the merits of the case and was therefore within the court's jurisdiction, even after the court determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying suit."[7] 270 Fed.Appx. at 965. But Prime is an unpublished opinion that is "not binding precedent." United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2013); see also 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (). And in Jet Charter, which was published, we held that "an award of attorney's fees under [Fla. Stat. §] 627.428 is 'an integral part of the merits' and must be part of any final judgment." 739 F.2d at 536. Even if Prime were a published opinion, "when there are conflicting prior panel decisions, the oldest one controls." Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 862 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, we are bound to apply Jet Charter and must conclude that an award of attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428 is integral to the merits.[8]
AFFIRMED.[9]
I agree that we should affirm the District Court's dismissal of Maronda Homes, Inc. of Florida and JROD Plastering, LLC's motions for attorneys' fees under Fla. Stat. § 627.428, but I arrive at this conclusion by a different road than my colleagues. At bottom, I do not believe the attorneys' fee provision of Fla. Stat. § 627.428 applies to the procedural posture in which we find the instant case. Consequently, we are not bound by Certain British Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Jet Charter Serv., Inc., 739 F.2d 534 (11th Cir. 1984) in any meaningful way as the Lead opinion suggests. Further, if Jet Charter is inapplicable, there is no need to revisit that precedent in light of intervening Florida court decisions as the Dissent suggests.
An insurer sued its insured "seeking a declaration that its policy did not cover the stucco damage." Lead Op. at 3. That means the insurer, Southern-Owners, began the process inherent in a civil suit by filing a complaint. Maronda Homes, an insured, responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), rather than by filing an answer.[1] In that motion, Maronda argued that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the amount in controversy failed to clear the required $75,000 threshold.[2] The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The significance of this ground for dismissal: the defendant insureds never argued the merits of the claim under the insurance policy, nor did the District Court decide its merits. The defendants did not file an answer responding to Southern-Owners's substantive claims. They did not file a counter claim. They only asserted that this matter was not properly before the District Court for adjudication. Therefore, in the words of Jet Charter, there were no merits for an assessment of attorneys' fees to be "an integral part of." 739 F.2d at 535. The lawsuit stalled on the runway.
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