Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles
| Citation | 922 F.2d 498 |
| Decision Date | 04 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-55100,89-55100 |
| Parties | SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY; George Gregson; Patricia Gregson Millington; and Edwin J. Gregson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES; and California Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Thomas F. Winfield, III and Vicki E. Land, Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Patricia V. Tubert, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.
Christopher Hiddleson, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee, California Dept. of Transp.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before NELSON, NORRIS and O'SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
The mandate of this court, issued October 1, 1990, is recalled.
The amended opinion filed November 9, 1990 is hereby withdrawn and the attached opinion is filed in its stead.
OVERVIEW
Appellants own real property in the City of Los Angeles which once was dedicated as a railroad right-of-way. The right-of-way was formally abandoned, and the city subsequently applied a zoning designation to the property which indicates that it may be used for surface parking only. Appellants complain that by this action the city, in conspiracy with other public agencies, took their property without just compensation and violated their rights to due process and equal protection.
The district court dismissed the complaint as to defendant California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) on eleventh amendment grounds. The court then entered summary judgment in favor of all other defendants, finding that the just compensation claims were not "ripe" for federal adjudication and that no genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the due process and equal protection claims.
The district court was correct in concluding that plaintiffs' just compensation claims were unripe. The correct disposition of unripe claims is dismissal. Therefore, as to plaintiffs' as-applied takings, equal protection and due process claims and plaintiffs' facial takings claim, we vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm the judgment as to plaintiffs' facial due process and equal protection claims.
Appellants own real property in the City of Los Angeles which once consisted of part of a railroad right-of-way. The former right-of-way was laid out in two long, narrow strips; one parallels Santa Monica Boulevard from the Beverly Hills city limit west to Sepulveda Boulevard, and the other parallels Sepulveda Boulevard from Santa Monica Boulevard south to Pico Boulevard. 1 Each of these strips is broken into numerous segments by cross streets. The strip which parallels Santa Monica Boulevard averages 50 feet in width, while the Sepulveda strip is 40 feet wide.
In the early 1980s, the railroad right-of-way bore a variety of residential, commercial, and industrial zoning designations, generally consistent with adjacent zoning in the neighborhoods through which the railroad ran. These designations had little practical effect as long as the rails were in use, since the property could not be physically developed anyway.
By 1983, rail traffic on these routes had become very light, and Southern Pacific petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for permission to abandon the right-of-way.
In September 1983, the Los Angeles City Council responded to the petition for abandonment by initiating proceedings to rezone the properties to the [Q]P-1 zone, which permits surface parking only. The proposal was sent to the City Planning Department, and hearings were held. Appellants opposed the rezoning in those hearings, but the record does not indicate that they forwarded a development proposal or suggested any alternatives other than continuance of the preexisting zoning.
On October 4, 1985, the City Council adopted ordinances implementing the rezoning. The Council made written findings which indicate that the reasons for the rezoning included concern for the unique shape and configuration of the properties, a lack of adequate parking facilities in the vicinity of the properties, and continuity with existing uses on the properties, some of which had been converted to parking use after abandonment of the railroad.
Appellants assert that these findings do not reflect the City's real reasons for the rezoning. They claim that the City and the other public agency appellees were exploring the possibility of acquiring the subject properties for transportation projects, and that the downzoning was intended to depress the value of the properties and prevent the construction of buildings so as to reduce the cost of acquisition. The record does indicate that various public agencies had been considering transportation improvements along the Santa Monica Boulevard corridor for years, and that these agencies were concerned about losing the opportunity to acquire this property if it were developed. The record also reflects that both the City Planning Department hearing examiner who considered the Santa Monica Boulevard zone change and the City Planning Commission cited preservation of the land for future transportation uses as one reason for the downzoning, although the City Council did not include this in its final list of findings. There is little evidence in the record that these same transportation concerns ever applied to the Sepulveda properties.
Since the time of the rezoning, appellants have filed no applications with the City to propose development of the properties. One of their lessees did file an application for a minor variance, seeking permission to operate a surface parking lot on the property enclosed only by a fence, rather than the concrete block wall required by the zoning code. This request was denied by a zoning administrator in the City Department of Building and Safety. The record does not indicate that this denial was appealed.
The record contains no evidence that appellants had ever sought compensation for the alleged taking through other channels before filing this federal complaint.
Appellants filed this action in the district court on January 29, 1986. The complaint contained three counts: Count One alleged violation of appellants' federal constitutional rights to just compensation, due process, and equal protection under the fifth and fourteenth amendments and 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Count Two was a pendent state claim under the California Constitution, and Count Three alleged violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). In addition to the City of Los Angeles, the complaint named the County of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission (LACTC), and Caltrans as defendants. Although the rezoning, over which the City of Los Angeles had sole authority, was the act which appellants claimed had caused them direct injury, the other agencies were alleged to have conspired with the City in preparation for this action.
The district court granted an early motion by Caltrans to dismiss without leave to amend on eleventh amendment grounds. This appeal includes an appeal of Caltrans' dismissal. The district court also dismissed the CEQA claim as to all defendants and this has not been appealed.
On May 20, 1988, the district court granted summary adjudication of a single issue in favor of plaintiffs, ruling that their "facial" On December 14, 1988, the district court entered an order granting a motion for reconsideration of its May 20 order and subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of appellees on all claims. 2 Specifically the court found that all just compensation claims were unripe because even the facial claims required plaintiffs to seek compensation before filing suit. The court also found that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the due process and equal protection claims.
constitutional claims were ripe for federal adjudication. The same order granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all "as-applied" constitutional claims, ruling that the claims were unripe because plaintiffs had never filed a meaningful development application.
The notice of appeal was timely filed on January 10, 1989. 3
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo to determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there existed any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. Tzung v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 873 F.2d 1338, 1339-40 (9th Cir.1989).
Ripeness for federal adjudication is a question of law reviewed de novo. Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir.1989).
Constitutional challenges to local land use regulations are not considered by federal courts until the posture of the challenges makes them "ripe" for federal adjudication. Ripeness is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed. Shelter Creek Dev. Corp. v. City of Oxnard, 838 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 134, 102 L.Ed.2d 106 (1988). This deficiency may be raised sua sponte if not raised by the parties. Id.
Ripeness of an as-applied challenge (i.e., a claim that as applied to a particular property a statute effects an uncompensated taking) involves two independent prerequisistes. First, since a court cannot determine whether a taking has...
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