Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Redden

• Decision Date: 15 September 1978
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 75-1009.
• Citation: 458 F. Supp. 593
• Parties: SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Burlington Northern, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah Corporation, and Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, a Wisconsin Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. James A. REDDEN, Attorney General of the State of Oregon, Defendant, United Transportation Union, Intervening Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

458 F. Supp. 593

SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Burlington Northern, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Union Pacific Railroad Company, a Utah Corporation, and Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, a Wisconsin Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. James A. REDDEN, Attorney General of the State of Oregon, Defendant United Transportation Union, Intervening Defendant.

Civ. No. 75-1009.

United States District Court, D. Oregon.

September 15, 1978.

Michael J. Lilly, Portland, Or., for plaintiff Southern Pacific Transportation Co.

Randall B. Kester, Portland, Or., for plaintiff Union Pacific Railroad Co.

Roger J. Crosby, Portland, Or., for plaintiff Burlington Northern, Inc.

James E. Nelson, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co.

Rhidian M. M. Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, Or., for defendant.

Ann Morgenstern, Portland, Or., for intervening defendant.

OPINION and ORDER

BURNS, District Judge:

Several railroad companies bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief. They contend that a 1975 Oregon statute is unconstitutional or preempted by the federal law governing railroads.¹ The action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it doe not present a justiciable "case or controversy."²

Plaintiffs are railroad companies (Railroads) engaged in the business of operating railroads in interstate and intrastate commerce. Each is qualified to do business in Oregon. Defendant Redden (Attorney General) is the Attorney General of the State of Oregon. The intervening defendant United Transportation Union (Union) represents many of the plaintiffs' employees pursuant to the National Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970) (NRLA).

The Railroads challenge Chapter 512, Oregon Laws 1975,³ which is codified as ORS 17.075, 17.085, 17.990 (1978). This statute reads as follows:

"17.075 When settlement prohibited between employer and employe. (1) An employer whose interest is or may become adverse to that of an injured employe shall not, within 15 days from the date of the occurrence causing the employe's injury:

"(a) Negotiate or attempt to negotiate a settlement or compromise with the injured employe; or

"(b) Obtain or attempt to obtain a general release of liability from the injured employe; or

"(c) Obtain or attempt to obtain any statement, either written or oral from the injured employe.

"(2) Paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the extent that compliance with statutes or rules of federal or state agencies requiring reports of accidents and injuries necessitates obtaining an employe statement within the 15-day period following the date of the injury.

"(3) Any settlement or compromise agreement entered into, any general release of liability or any written or oral statement made by any employe after he incurs a personal injury, which is not obtained in accordance with ORS 17.085, requiring notice, may be disavowed by the injured employe within 12 months following the date of the injury and such statement, release, compromise or settlement shall not be admissible evidence in any court action or administrative proceeding relating to the injury.

"17.085 When settlement allowed. ORS 17.075 relating to settlements, compromises, releases and statements obtained by an employer whose interest is or may become adverse to an injured employe shall not apply, if at least five days prior to obtaining the settlement, compromise, release or statement, the injured employe has signified his willingness that a settlement, compromise, release or statement be given.

"17.990 Penalties. A person wilfully violating subsection (1) of ORS 17.075 shall upon conviction be fined not more than $1,000."

The Railroads employ workers who are engaged in interstate commerce. These employees can and do file claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970) (FELA) against the Railroads relating to injuries sustained in the course of their duties. Many such actions are filed against the Railroads each year.⁴

Various groups of the Railroads' employees are represented by labor unions. Pursuant to the NRLA, the Railroads have entered into collective bargaining agreements with these unions. The collective bargaining agreements typically provide for hearings when employees are disciplined or charged with violating company rules. The provisions governing the time within which the hearing must be held vary greatly.

Both federal and state law⁵ require the Railroads to make prompt investigations of all accidents involving injuries to employees and to file accident reports on those investigations. In turn, the Railroads require injured employees to file injury reports.

Before the Pretrial Order was lodged, the Railroads had interviewed and taken statements and releases from some injured employees within 15 days of the occurrence that caused the injury. They have stated that they would continue to do so if they were not restricted by law.

Defendant Attorney General has agreed in the Pretrial Order that "Unless they are restrained by this Court the district attorneys and courts of the State of Oregon will enforce the statute according to its terms and apply it to the plaintiffs." The Pretrial Order also states that there are no pending prosecutions for violation of the challenged statutes.

The threshold question in any lawsuit brought in a federal court is, of course, whether it is the sort of matter the court is authorized to hear under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. See, e. g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Specifically, the issue is whether or not the suit presents a justiciable "case" or "controversy."

"As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those two words have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). This case involves the "oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability . . . that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions." Id. at 96, 88 S.Ct. at 1950, quoting C. Wright, Federal Courts 34 (1963).

In determining whether an action presents a justiciable "controversy" or just a request for an advisory opinion, the basic inquiry is whether or not the suit presents "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment." Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941), quoted in e. g. Steffel, supra, 415 U.S. at 460, 94 S.Ct. 1209; Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 506, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972); Adams v. Morton, 581 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1978); Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 495 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1974).

Chapter 512 contains two different enforcement provisions. The penalty provision, ORS 17.990, provides that any person convicted of willfully violating ORS 17.075(1) shall be fined not more than $1,000. The civil enforcement provision, ORS 17.075(3), provides that any settlement obtained in violation of the other provisions may be disavowed by the injured employee within 12 months of the injury and "shall not be admissible evidence in any court action or administrative proceeding relating to the injury."

Thus, the challenged statute presents both a civil and a quasi-criminal⁶ aspect. The two aspects require slightly different analyses.

I. The Quasi-Criminal Aspect

"Because the decision to instigate a criminal prosecution is usually discretionary with the prosecuting authorities, even a person with a settled intention to disobey the law can never be sure that the sanctions of the law will be invoked against him. Further, whether or not the injury will occur is to some extent within the control of the complaining party himself, since he can decide to abandon his intention to disobey the law. For these reasons, the maturity of such disputes for resolution before a prosecution begins is decided on a case-by-case basis, by considering the likelihood that the complainant will disobey the law, the certainty that such disobedience will take a particular form, any present injury occasioned by the threat of prosecution, and the likelihood that a prosecution will actually ensue."

Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 n. 29, 95 S.Ct. 335, 358, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974) (dictum).

The first two factors mentioned are clearly met in this case. The parties agree in the Pretrial Order that the Railroads "have previously interviewed and taken statements and releases from some injured employees within 15 days from the date of the occurrence causing the employee's injury, and would continue to do so if not restricted by law." Indeed, the affidavit filed by the Railroads reveals that on at least one occasion since the filing of the Pretrial Order one of the Railroads has obtained a statement from an injured employee over his objection and within 15 days of his injury.

Thus, the existence of a justiciable controversy in this case revolves around the threat of prosecution. In order to present a justiciable controversy, the threat of prosecution must be both "real and immediate," not "imaginary or speculative." Steffel, supra, 415 U.S. at 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108-110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969); see Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n. 3, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977). I am satisfied that the threat of prosecution in this case is neither sufficiently real nor immediate so as to present a justiciable...