Southern Photo & Blue Print Co. v. Gore

• Decision Date: 02 April 1938
• Citation: 114 S.W.2d 796,173 Tenn. 69
• Parties: SOUTHERN PHOTO & BLUE PRINT CO. et al. v. GORE, Commissioner, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

114 S.W.2d 796

173 Tenn. 69

SOUTHERN PHOTO & BLUE PRINT CO. et al. v. GORE, Commissioner, et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April 2, 1938

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; James B. Newman Chancellor.

Suit by the Southern Photo & Blue Print Company and another against Albert Gore, Commissioner, etc., and others to recover unemployment compensation assessments which were paid by the complainants under protest. Decree dismissing the bill, and complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

Fred M Williams, of Chattanooga, for appellants.

Roy H Beeler, Atty. Gen., Harry Phillips and Edwin F. Hunt, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Alex H. Gray, of Nashville, for appellees.

DeHAVEN Justice.

Complainants seek by their bill herein to recover certain contributions assessed against them by defendants under the Unemployment Compensation Law of Tennessee, chapter 1, Public Acts, First Extraordinary Session 1936, as amended by chapter 128, Public Acts 1937, and paid by them under protest. It is charged that the act is unconstitutional for reasons hereinafter appearing.

The assessments in question are those for the first six months of 1937.

Complainants are two limited partnerships doing business in the city of Chattanooga. The Southern Photo & Blue Print Company was organized on December 31, 1936, and on the same day acquired all the assets and good will of a corporation of the same name. Taywal, Limited, was organized on June 30, 1937, and on the same day acquired all the assets and good will of the Taywal Corporation. Both of the predecessor corporations employed eight or more individuals. The two successor partnerships did not employ as many as eight individuals for any portion of the year 1937 up to August 13, 1937, when the bill was filed.

It is further charged, in effect, that even if the act is constitutional, complainants are not liable for contributions under a correct interpretation of its provisions and that the contributions in question were wrongfully and illegally exacted; and that the commissioner has abused his authority in promulgating unreasonable rules and regulations requiring contributions to be paid quarterly and monthly instead of annually.

The defendants, not raising any question as to the misjoinder of parties complainant, filed a general demurrer upon two grounds: That the bill shows on its face (1) that the contributions in question were legally and properly collected, and (2) that the Unemployment Compensation Law does not violate any provision of the Constitution of Tennessee nor the Constitution of the United States.

The chancellor sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill, holding the act to be constitutional and valid legislation, and ruled that the regulations "are not set out in the bill nor made an exhibit thereto so that any issue is or can be made thereon as to whether illegal and void."

Complainants have appealed to this court and assigned errors.

The first assignment is, in substance, that the chancellor erred in holding the act in question constitutional, because it violates section 17, article 2, of the Constitution of the state of Tennessee, in that the act is broader than its caption, contains more than one subject, and fails to recite in its title or otherwise the substance of former laws amended. The provision of the Constitution referred to is as follows:

"No bill shall become a law, which embraces more than one subject; that subject to be expressed in the title. All acts which repeal, revive or amend former laws, shall recite in their caption or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revived or amended."

The title of the act in question is as follows:

"An Act to provide a system of unemployment compensation benefits, to provide funds therefor, and to provide for the administration thereof."

The generality of the title is no objection to it. So long as the subject matter of the body of the act is germane to that expressed in the title, it is free from the objection that the body of the act is broader than its caption. Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. 504, 8 Heisk. 504; Palmer v. Southern Express Co., 129 Tenn. 116, 165 S.W. 236; Armstrong v. City of South Fulton, 169 Tenn. 54, 82 S.W.2d 862; Lamb et al. v. Whitaker, 171 Tenn. 485, 105 S.W.2d 105. In Couch v. State, 140 Tenn. 156, 203 S.W. 831, it was held that a general subject expressed in the title of the statute justifies provisions in the body of the act as to the manner, means, and instrumentalities whereby the statute may be enforced, or administered, or its purposes accomplished.

Complainants contend that the following subjects are not covered by the title to the act here in question: Benefit payments; eligibility for benefits; disqualification for benefits; claims for benefits; period, election, and termination of employer's coverage; employment service; collection of contributions; protection of rights and benefits; establishment of a special fund and designation of the United States Treasury as depository thereof; and requiring contributions through a tax upon employers of eight or more individuals. All of these provisions are germane to the title and constitute, in part, the method, manner, and means by which the purposes of the statute may be accomplished.

It is insisted that the title of the act deals with the general subject of unemployment while the body of the act deals with the general subject of employment and unemployment. The purpose of the act, as shown by its title, is "to provide a system of unemployment compensation benefits, to provide funds therefor, and to provide for the administration thereof." The exaction of contributions from the employer of eight or more individuals is an essential part of the "system of unemployment compensation benefits" and the method adopted "to provide funds therefor." We are unable to see any merit whatever in this contention of complainants.

It is next contended that a Board of Review is created in the body of the act of which no mention is made in its title. The board is part of the administrative organization created by the act. It cannot be doubted that the creation of the Board of Review is germane to the purpose expressed in the title of the act "to provide for the administration thereof." Without the administrative agencies set up in the act, the whole purpose of the legislation would inevitably be frustrated. Complainants rely on the case of Mengel Box Co. v. Fowlkes, 135 Tenn. 202, 186 S.W. 91. In that case the court had before it an act creating a levee and drainage district. Priv.Acts 1915, c. 186. In the body of the act a new court was created to hear and determine "all matters concerning the district and involved in dispute." No mention whatever of the creation of this court was made in the title of the act, nor was there any general expression of purpose contained in the title to which the creation of the court could be reasonably related.

Another contention made is that section 10(a) of the act, Pub.Acts 1936, 1st Ex.Sess., c. 1, creates in the Department of Labor a division to be known as the Unemployment Compensation Division, to be administered by a full-time salaried director, who shall be subject to the supervision of the commissioner of labor, which is an entirely different subject from that set forth in the title of the act. Obviously, we think, the creation of the new instrumentality for the administration of the act had direct relation to the purpose expressed in the title of the act.

It is insisted that with respect to the creation of the Department of Unemployment Compensation Division the act adds to the Department of Labor a new division, and thereby amends Code §§ 255 and 335, without recitation in its title, or otherwise, the title or substance of the law amended, in violation of the last...